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ON
THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND.

A Military Sketch.

BY
COLONEL SYNGE, ROYAL ENGINEERS,
F.R.G.S., F.R.C.I.

"THIS FORTRESS, BUILT BY NATURE FOR HERSELF,
AGAINST INFECTION AND THE HAND OF WAR."

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.....
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.....

TO
HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF RICHMOND,
LENNOX AND D'AUBIGNY, K.G.,

This Sketch

IS
BY PERMISSION,
VERY RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.



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S85

E R R A T A .

- *Page 14, line 2, 'hindrances to,' *dele* to.
- * ,, 30, foot note, last line,—for 'declaimers, who favour of dereliction,' read declaimers who favour dereliction.
- ,, 57, ,, 13, 'Acts of aggression has,' read have.
- ,, 58, ,, 4, for 'Tu dieses,' read In dieses.
- ,, 64, ,, 14, for 'To put,' read To pit.
- ,, 127, last line, for 'decide,' read decided.
- * ,, 128, line 6, for 'stepped and marred,' read stepped in and marred.
- ,, 137, ,, 6, for 'resent,' read present.
- * ,, 141, ,, 2 from the bottom, for 'done in the Name; in,' read done, on the Name in.
- * ,, 143, ,, 6 from the bottom, read 'may be galvanized into returning life and stimulated to attempt a latin headship.'
- ,, 172, line 10 from the bottom, for 'of it defence,' read for its defence.
- * ,, 191, ,, 18, for 'power of emergency,' read hour of emergency.
- * ,, 221, ,, 10, from bottom, for 'St. Edmunds, which,' read St. Edmunds. It
- ,, 225, ,, 7, for 'Kimboltom,' read Kimbolton.
- ,, 228, ,, 5, for 'their,' read this.
- * ,, 237, ,, 4, for 'not in having,' read not in not having.
- * ,, 244, ,, 2 from bottom, for 'when,' read where.
- * ,, 252, ,, 20, for 'deliberate,' read deliberative.
- * ,, 258, ,, 4, for "his instruments,' read the instruments.
- * ,, 265, ,, 4 from the bottom, for 'positions,' read portions.
- * ,, 272, ,, 10 from the bottom, for 'preparation, if,' read preparation of
- * ,, 278, ,, 6, for 'machinery be voted,' read the machinery he voted.
- * ,, 279, ,, 7, for 'three,' read four, and for 'four,' three.
- * ,, 290, line 9 from bottom, for 'made on to,' read made to.
- * ,, 294, ,, 11, from bottom, before 'without,' insert power.
- * ,, 309, ,, 2 from top, before 'precluded' insert selves.
- * ,, 313, ,, 2, from bottom after 'at all,' add events.
- ,, 321, for 'provisions' read provision.
- ,, 335, after "England," insert ,

The reader is requested to correct the errata marked* as they affect the meaning of the text.

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TO
HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF RICHMOND, K.G.

MY LORD DUKE,

The following pages, which your Grace has been good enough to honour me with permission to inscribe with your Grace's name, attempt to deal with the defence of England.

I have endeavoured to convey and illustrate my apprehension of the term defence; to suggest, rather than to detail, the more prominent reasons that render it imperative, alike from internal as from external causes, on England, to see that her defence is securely re-established and scrupulously guarded.

I trust, I may assume, the following points will be conceded. The regular army cannot be held in too perfect a state of preparation for active and immediate service. The principle applicable to Great Britain is defence by locality and by local means, not by a standing army in the number indispensable to enable it to compete with the standing armies of continental nations. The strength and defence of the kingdom depend on the general discharge of individual duty. The defence of the capital establishes that of the kingdom. It would be effected by the means I have suggested. These are not disproportionate to the supreme importance of the object.

It is of less moment whether I may be right or not in the remarks I have ventured on tendencies of European and American ambition

and on the evidences of universal disquiet, provided it is admitted that the aspect of affairs is so unsettled that the adequate protection of England is of pressing, and may at any moment become of vital importance.

The very excellence and solidity of the German character place the power that can wield the hosts of Germany with the genius and determination of which Prussia has given proof, in a position to become, at any moment, a far more formidable foe to the independence of other countries than France has ever been or can become until all her characteristics are changed.

It is unwise to build on the assumption that any power which makes the pursuit of arms the primary business of an entire nation will remain permanently unaggressive. History refutes the theory.

On the other hand, however warlike may be its temperament, a nation incapable of acquiescing in any form of internal government cannot prove a formidable foe to one in which continuity of rule is cherished, and the duties of defence not too lightly regarded. The attacks of warlike revolutionary violence are marked and bloody; but they are certain of defeat if confronted by an united nation discharging the ordinary and permanent duties of armed defence.

The lesson I draw is that security is derived from union and the adequate discharge of certain duties. It is imperilled by whatever tends to division and antagonisms. It has ceased to be when the preservation of peace, and possibly the permanence of national existence, depend in any measure on the acts or disposition of foreign powers.

The extract, translated from a work on the North Sea may not be of immediate consequence. It shows, however, that a spirit, with which the French have been exclusively credited, exists beyond the borders of France. It is there, and ready when it may suit political purposes to call it into action.

"*La politique n'a pas d'entrailles*," is a truth it is better to receive on testimony than to experience in person.

The school of so-called alarmists has Wellington and Burgoyne for teachers: I am not ashamed to own that I prefer their fears to the temerity of other men.

Yet the words of the *iron* Duke sound like a wail over the doomed.

"I am bordering," he wrote to the hero not long since laid to rest in the Tower, "on seventy-seven years of age, passed in honour. "I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being witness of the "tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert."

"There was not a cloud on the political horizon of Europe;" so ran what proved to be the un-wisdom of modern opinion as expressed by modern statesmen, an hour before the tempest broke over France. If the experience and sufferings of others can serve as warning against delusions,—against the intrusion of partizanship into questions of national defence,—against want of preparation of every kind, surely the warning presented by the piteous fall and miserable condition of France is the most impressive that imagination could picture, or the inexorable tragedy of real life present.

Defensive preparation is not a matter of idle speculation: least of all when the events of ages seem to crowd into a day. Yet if it were not often treated as a vision, nations would not be overthrown.

The pages which follow have been written during eventful days. Continental nations have been giving concentrated attention to warfare: England has been occupied in striking at her oldest and most cherished institutions.

In common, I fear, with every land or sea soldier who has given attention to the subject, I have become convinced that the perpetual conflict of parties is prejudicial to effectual military preparation. In other words, it endangers the independence of England.

In attempting to deal with this, the very basis of all national security, and therefore the foundation of all defence, I feel the extreme difficulty of the task.

Even in time of peace, Ireland is a country held by England.

A country held by military occupation, is at the opposite end of the scale from one providing its defence.

Kings are the rightful supreme commanders of armed forces. It follows that supremacy transferred to the political nominee of a particular section of the population is at variance with that right. I need scarcely point out this principle is wholly independent of accidental personal qualification.

The capital is unprotected; works for defence are mutilated on the plea of costliness, yet money is freely poured forth to change a mode of nominating to commissions. Plainly, the elements of defensive preparation are not estimated according to their value.

At the same time seditious meetings have been held in various parts of the Kingdom.

The Crown attacked, the Lords menaced, the Church assailed, the country ill-prepared, war hovering about, and possibly involving the country in Asia, Europe, and America at once, form a position in which the call to duty becomes of consequence superior to the power or intonation of any particular voice.

A re-action seems, however, to have taken place which is, in some respects, decided.

The marvellous recovery of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has changed a threatening calamity of the darkest hue into a signal mercy.

The worst symptoms of internal disorder have passed away. It is beyond human power to say they may not gather again. The storms that were threatening the horizon of nations appear to have lightened. No one will venture to affirm they have dispersed.

The principle and duty of defence are above time and circumstance; but the momentary calm renders the task, to which I have endeavoured to contribute, more difficult of execution. Errors in execution, which in the stress of urgency, might have been gladly over-looked, may mar effect when the urgency is less immediate.

I believe these difficulties to be overborne by the permanent and unalterable importance of the subject.

I hope the pages of which your Grace has with much kindness accepted the dedication, will be found free from the inculcation of either foolish panic or idle security. My endeavour has been to indicate how the reward of national security is built up of the aggregate performance of individual duty. So long as that is adhered to, fear and foolishness will be alike avoided. It is of happy augury that England's noblest heroes and defenders, both by land and sea, are identified, in minds that cherish their memories, with the discharge of duty.

I beg to remain,

MY LORD DUKE,

With great respect,

Your Grace's

obliged and faithful Servant,

MILLINGTON SYNGE.

1st June, 1872.

Alvercliff, Alverstoke, Hants.

“IF we are masters of the Channel for two hours,
“ England has lived its time . . . if masters of the
“ straits . . . we are masters of the world. What
“ battle ever promised such results as the invasion and
“ conquest of England.”

NAPOLEON I.

“ I know no mode of resistance, much less of pro-
“ tection, excepting by an army in the field, aided by
“ all the means of fortification which experience in war
“ and science can suggest.”

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

P R E F A C E .

THE question of defence necessarily includes dealing with armed forces. A work on defence written by a soldier will be expected to take before all things a soldier's view. It does not follow, however, that a soldier's view of defence, to which dealing with armed force is but an incident, though an important incident, will, or ought to be, the same as if he had to do with armed force exclusively or even primarily. The soldier is subordinate to the subject and citizen in one case ; in the other, the efficiency and expansion of an instrument for violence is the sole consideration.

A standing army and that standing army as nearly as possible co-extensive with the manhood of the realm will be the aim of the soldier dealing with armed forces. The trained capacity of the manhood of the nation to bear arms will be the object of the statesman who takes the wider view. That capacity must be acquired and maintained, yet neither acquired nor maintained by the sacrifice of industry to the pursuit of arms, but with as little disturbance as may be to the civil life of the nation. Nevertheless it must be a capacity that shall render invasion unthought of by a foe.

These opposite views respecting means to a common end do not meet on common ground till it becomes a question of dealing with that part of the nation which is devoted to arms as a profession.

It is probably in part because this distinction has been too little considered that effective protection of the United Kingdom is not in a more assured condition.

Naturally and rightly, the soldier when he sees men under arms, notes all their deficiencies, compares what he may have before him with the highest ideal, which he well knows is the only safe standard in such matters. He is—if acquainted with his business, he must be,—keenly alive to the tremendous risk that such bodies present of being taken, both by themselves and others, for a real power, no matter what may be their quality so they are numerous. He sees before him at once in mental vision all the disastrous consequences that must ensue from blind confidence resting on ignorance and inexperience. He cannot possibly form any other judgment. He will be so deeply impressed with it, that he cannot but shrink from the extreme responsibility, not to say guilt, of helping to build up a false, however favourite reliance.

Speaking merely of manœuvres, an experienced and distinguished soldier, His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, asks of bodies such as the militia exhibited last autumn,—“Could it be expected that battalions “thus brought together should shew to advantage next “to well drilled and highly efficient troops.” They

must be still less fit to contend with them in deadly strife.

Strength, in the soldier's vocabulary, means number ; but it is number of men perfectly disciplined and drilled. With him disciplined number is the meaning of the term strength.

Accordingly an officer of distinction,* who takes a deep interest in the organization of armed forces, advocates the extension of reserves of men who have been in the ranks of the regular army. He calls the existing militia "a mere body of enrolled recruits;" he points out how the system on which the militia is managed causes it to clash with the interests of the regular forces, and says,—“So long as the Government bids “with one hand against the other, offering different “terms, one service or the other must suffer.” In dealing with bad, because immature material enlisting in the regular army, he points out that one-fourth of the number enlisted are reported dead, deserted, or unfit after seven to ten months' service. He shews that when short service shall have come into operation only 80,000 effective men can be reckoned upon for every 120,000 voted and paid for. Of the intention of amalgamating the militia and regulars, he writes,—“The endeavour to combine into one harmonious “whole, bodies of such dissimilar character as the “militia and the regular forces is about as impossible as “to weld iron and copper.”

*Major-General Sir Lintorn A. Simmonds, K.C.B., Royal Engineers, Governor of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.

I have not taken a standing army as the primary base from which to establish defence. I have, on the contrary, sought to ensure it step by step by adequate protection of locality after locality. I have dealt, however cursorily, with all that is comprehended in the term defence; but with war only as an incident of broken defence. Moreover, though it may be indisputable that the militia does consist of a mere body of enrolled recruits, there is no valid reason why it should; none for its being brought together for a short time only; none for the system of officering it being mixed up with that for the line; none for its recruiting being placed in conflict and competition with recruiting for the line.

Classing armed forces according to the qualities required of them, I have treated the present standing or regular army as a force to be rendered wholly and constantly available for active operations. I have supplied garrison service by permanently embodied militia. I have proposed enlistment for successive service in the several forces. First,—as recruit in the garrison army; next, for a term of years during the prime of life and efficiency, in the army for operations; again, in the garrison army for another term; next in the first, and then in the second reserve, with a pension for life.

I have not endeavoured to devise a system, but to follow that indicated by the presence at once of requirements that are constant and unvarying, and of a means—the life of man—that varies at different epochs; but that varies under laws that are constant.

I have suggested localization ; but it is the localization of defensive provision, of garrison forces and reserves, not of the army for exercise or active operations. An attempt at any time to fetter its movements or destination will be necessarily attended by more or less of failure and may lead to expectations that never can be fully realized without detriment to such a force.

The localization of defensive provisions attains the end in view with certainty, and concentrates upon it general and local interest. This, as it appears to me, is too much overlooked in estimating the true value of the volunteer spirit, and of the body even as it exists, with all its defects and imperfections. The evils and dangers of any kind of military reliance on an undisciplined and untrained body, itself not only unconscious of its weakness, but probably fancying itself strong, cannot be overstated. Yet the national power to appreciate the value and necessity of true defence, as well as the right means for attaining it, may be better furthered by even this irregular—and in some aspects, dangerous—expression of interest in national defence than they would be by its repression, even though that repression should lead to a numerical increase of the standing army. The one makes defence popular, and so reacts on the feeling of the whole country, and renders possible the perfecting of the regular army. The other might again make all military preparation odious to the great bulk of the nation.

But there is no reason why volunteers should remain undisciplined, and, in consequence, untrustworthy.

The way to bring them on is to give them capitation grants up to any standards that may be specified. By requiring every locality to furnish, by means left to itself, certain standards of efficiency, and to supplement the garrisons army beyond the outcome from the active army yielded in the manner already referred to, a very near approach to the power of an armed nation would be attained without any of the drawbacks to that detestable expedient.

An accurate judgment may be formed of the value of the general plan of any works by careful attention to the first principles of all military science, without further professional skill. These are, placing the assailant under fire. Support between the several works and their parts. Perfect communication within them and between the parts of any portion forming a whole. To attain these objects in perfection requires the perfection of skill. Where they have been cared for, essentials have been provided: where they have been neglected, the bases of the art of fortification have been disregarded.

I have not found an increase on the amount of expenditure habitually incurred by authority of parliament necessary to the full defence of the country. By the scheme I have drawn up, the cause which has governed the abolition of purchase,—an idea of line and militia amalgam in officers,—would not come into operation. Consequently, the extensive works I have proposed for the metropolitan position and the mobility of the active army, would both have been provided at

a less cost than has been incurred without the attainment of these more important objects. The proper performance of military duty, not the method of obtaining a commission, determine efficiency. Discipline, not money, whether of the individual or the state is the means by which efficiency is enforced. I am at a loss to apprehend the difficulty of removing an incompetent officer because he paid towards his commission any more than if he had been crammed or recommended for it; nor do I appreciate the discipline that would leave in the capacity of second-in-command, an officer of whom it could be justly said by anticipation that he was unfit to command. Neither can I perceive any reason why recommendation should not have been made indispensable in addition to purchase. Abolition of purchase, whatever it merits in other respects, does not ensure the primary object for which its cost has been incurred. Allowing for a lapse of time equal to that during which purchase had existed, even greater evils may be found to attend selection. Under a parliamentary system of administration it opens the door to dangers that may prove fatal. In the hands of an absolute and warlike monarch, it is the perfection of ideal; but there is no analogy between the cases. A system requires to be judged, not by the mode in which it may be worked in the hands that devised it, but by its liability or otherwise to deterioration and abuse.

I have sketched a system of administration without reference to expenditure; but inasmuch as every

particle of superfluous administration is unmixed evil, the result of a system which includes only what has direct bearing on the sole object for which armies exist, namely, fighting power, is a considerable saving.

Arrangements that are simple, not only promote efficiency, but if they happen to supersede such as are complex, they necessarily effect a saving by ending an expenditure that if unnecessary cannot fail to be mischievous.

To make the commanding officer of each combatant branch, officer on the staff, bringing him in immediate relation with the general officer commanding, appears to me the right principle on which to form the staff, for the reason which I hold to be supreme in military, if not in all matters, its simplicity. It has virtually, though not in name, been put in practice for the duties that have been devolved upon the control branch.

I have placed the custody and distribution of supplies *within the army*, under the several combatant commanding officers, giving them the means for complete efficiency and an undivided responsibility. The minister for defence and his department retain a responsibility as undivided for providing supplies, or the means of obtaining supplies, to the several armies or commands.

I have repudiated hypothetical bases as to numbers, whether of invading or resisting hosts. The only healthful condition of a country, I hold to be that in which the duties devolving upon individuals are, as a rule, discharged. I do not see how it can be disputed,

that a measure of personal and pecuniary contribution towards defence, is among those duties.

The population of a country, rendered capable of service in the field to the extent of ensuring the redemption of all its obligations, is the measure of its strength and consequently of its responsibility.

I have taken for my fundamental basis this principle, that a nation is by the law of its being, furnished with the means of maintaining its security, and of living in the consciousness of safety. From this it follows, that a nation is bound to apply the means necessary to its security, and that failure in defence is not only the misfortune, but the crime and folly of nations.

England, garrisoned by a standing army and prepared to take the field, on the scale indispensable to enable her to cope with even a single one of her gigantic possible enemies, means stupendous outlay and the transformation of her people into a horde organized for violence. It means her sinking to the level of nations, on the watch to turn such a condition to account.

The armed forces of a nation, administered by party rule, means extravagance at the outset, and may mean anarchy at the end.

A nation devoid of the spirit of aggression is apt to neglect military matters to the extent of becoming careless of defence. One which deposes the care of defence to a standing army, but maintains the efficiency of that instrument, is all but certain to become aggressive.

On the other hand, defence is necessary to the existence of all nations alike. A rich and powerful nation, not animated by one particle of desire to do injury to any other nation, cannot therefore, in the very nature of things, be compelled to alternatives of evil, nor to spasmodic remedies by error, which with bombast, not accuracy, have been called heroic.

The armed might of Prussia is about to be raised to 1,700,000 men. The continental nations of Europe are making what effort and haste they can to keep pace with this appalling preparation.

The army of England amounts, *on paper*, to 133,649 regulars ; 189,473 militia, yeomanry, and reserve ; and 142,600 volunteers, making a nominal total of 465,722.

The preparations England has made, or is about to make are :—

First—Abolishing the system by which commissions have been held on payment rather than on receipt of money.

Secondly—Changing to some extent the system of supplies.

Thirdly—Exercising a portion of her forces in some degree in imitation of service in the field.

Fourthly—Intending to build some barracks.

Whatever be the merits or demerits of these alterations, they yield no increase to a strength assumed to have existed before their initiation. They challenge,—certainly the language in which the justification of these changes has been pleaded challenges,—the antecedent existence of that strength ; but the changes themselves

do not pretend to, indeed they cannot add an iota to strength, which antecedent estimates claimed to have already furnished, and which, furnished or not was not the question, was felt to be inadequate. They purpose to make that efficient which before was not so: they do not go further. They add nothing to what ought to have been before, if it was not. Such as they are, however, they are costly. They may be material; they may affect the character of the service; but whatever be their future issue, they are undoubtedly expensive: neither can there be a question as to the gravity of the reasons assigned for their introduction.

"You have been practiced upon," said the prime minister,* "by writers who seemed to find a kind of "luxury in panic and alarm . . . I regard them . . . "with little less goodwill than I should the propagation "of the small-pox or the cattle plague." Yet the minister, who sets himself thus strongly against vain alarmists, has felt constrained to add, "*instead of trusting simply to the native and sterling qualities of the country, we MUST now endeavour to ADD to those qualities every advantage that can be imparted by the most SKILFUL AND EFFICIENT TRAINING.*"

"Money," he had said on another occasion,† "is a "subject upon which the people of England cannot be "too sensitive." Yet he said also in the same connection, "with the day of the abolition of purchase would

*The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., Blackheath, 29th October, 1871.

†Whitby, 2nd September, 1871.

“begin the day of merit;” and, “in attacking purchase
“in the army, we were assailing class interest in its
“favourite and most formidable stronghold;” and
again, “the country . . . has witnessed with satisfac-
“tion the downfall of a great monopoly.”

“Fourteen years ago,” said Mr. Cardwell,* “a royal
“commission pointed out that . . . there was one
“place so conspicuous in importance, the filling up,
“of which by an incompetent officer might be so fatal
“to the army and the empire, that it was absolutely
“necessary as regards that, that purchase should be
“removed. That was the command of a battalion . .
“no attempt has been made to remedy the evil . .
“Why? Because the purchase system rendered it im-
“possible.”

Probably the case could not be more forcibly and
strongly put. Moreover the substance of the language
referred to is, in one instance at least, that of a royal
commission, not of an individual. Yet these arguments
to be of force, involve the existence of tenacity of
selfishness, in determined opposition to the general
welfare of the country, in the class to which from time
immemorial officers have belonged. They impute to
the officers themselves unwillingness or incompetency
to attain a standard that could be reached only by skill
and diligence. They evidence in the governors of the
country, at the least fourteen years of helpless acqui-
escence in an evil that endangered the very preservation

*11th March, 1872.

of the realm. They prove in the country itself deadness to a danger that might have imperilled its existence. *They express that almost hopeless condition in which the duties of defence are necessarily confided to mercenaries as the only available means by which to procure protection.*

No wonder the prime minister placed his conviction on record that it was "only our pride . . . passion . . . our follies that ever constituted a real danger to " us."

And so it ever has been. Nations fall only by their fault. A nation alive to the danger of insecurity is already half defended.

From such reflections, be they well or ill-grounded it is satisfactory to turn to a more assuring statement. It rests upon the same authority, on such a matter, perhaps the highest. It is this, "The power of this country is not decaying; it is increasing in "itself and increasing as compared with the power of "other nations in Europe."

In the face of recent history, this assertion is difficult to follow; but, if it be correct, as probably it is in the modified sense, that *the elements* of power have not only not decayed, but have increased relatively to similar elements of power in other countries, then is England's responsibility the greater; her negligence of defence the more unpardonable; her policy of recent years the more inexplicable; and, above all, her need the more indispensable without delay, to fuse the elements into the reality of power. She will then have no occasion

to live by theories and on sufferance, to entertain Black Sea conferences or *Alabama* claims; to submit to Fenian raids or piratical descents on her dominions; to listen to dictation, whether on the sin or sanctity of treaty obligations. Informal declarations have been held as fetters* if they could be strained to affect the influence of England's maritime power; but solemn covenants have been scouted as folly if it suited Russia or Prussia to trample them under foot.

Complete efficiency of the standing army, and a defensive force able to cope within the dominions of Great Britain with any force that may assail the security of these dominions are the objects that must be attained. Command is but an ingredient in the formation of armies and is scarcely wisely treated as a distinct and separate question. Not the most despotic monarch ever known, took on himself the sole control and entire appointment of every grade of command in his armed forces. It has been reserved for parliamentary ambition to make an attempt which seems to contain within itself the certain germs of the worst results. Nothing can surpass the evil of an armed force in which rewards may become the prizes of partizans. The more powerful and efficient the instrument for violence, the greater the danger.

Feudal ties were the result of an appreciation of defence learned in the hard school of necessity. Abuse and the growth of commerce combined to

*Abandonment of the right of search and Immunity of private property at sea. The declaration of Paris.

overthrow these ties; but the secret of unconquerable strength lies in the right adaptation of the principle on which they were originally based. That was defence achieved step by step by local association and means. The principle was carried to perfection. Defence, real or pretended, constantly assumed the active form of attack or counter attack. The structure put together for defence was mobilised. The armed force, knit together with all the ties of social life and locality, became an army in the field.

Gradual change in the conditions of society necessitated new adaptation of the form and application of the principle. They did not require its overthrow. Principles do not admit of alteration. They can only be neglected or abandoned. In all the arrangements of feudalism, influence was directly co-extensive with the share of duty discharged and of burden borne. The feudal age was an age of violence; but that is so far from invalidating, that it confirms the probability of the value of the principle on which it organized its forces. Restoration of its fundamental principle, under however different forms, would certainly secure defence and that in the best and surest manner. This plain and honest principle, of power and influence in proportion to burden borne and duty discharged, still governs every relation of domestic and commercial life. *It has been discarded ONLY from the conduct of NATIONAL AFFAIRS.* On its restoration, defence would result from union and harmony springing from the practice of justice in a manner plain and patent to all. A country

intelligently attached to its institutions, with the political incentives to class rivalries removed, would infallibly secure both its internal tranquility and its security against external attack. Intense devotion, mutual attachment, even familiarity in its proper sense, and not class hatreds between the various grades of society, were the characteristics of feudal times. Rival chieftains were the heads of whole conflicting bodies. Sections of society cut through from top to bottom came into mutual collision. Obviously the best model on which to form national strength is to be found in an age of conflict, in which necessity and experience discovered and applied a principle that bound all grades together in a common purpose on a common understanding. Chieftainships were so many mimic nationalities inspired by mutual rivalries, sometimes by undying animosities, always by unbounded internal devotion. The modern age has not laid aside the rivalries and animosities; but it has lost devotion and attachment. The stratification of social life is peeling into hard and separated layers, if I may use the expression. Now, the antagonism is between the strata, and threatens to be as much more destructive than the former as the increased density of population and the enlarged power of appliances can make it. The conflicts of nations that have lost internal concord, can end only in horrors it is impossible to contemplate unmoved.

Defence provided by localities, facilitates the re-introduction of the principle of proportionate influence in the arrangements for providing that defence. The

grades of command can also be made dependent on qualities exercised in levying, equipping and qualifying armed forces. Their constitution would tend to re-awaken ties of common action, and consequently of harmony, between differing grades of society, a characteristic that forms no inconsiderable feature in the existing volunteer movement.

An army ill supplied is rendered useless and exposed to danger to the extent that it is ill supplied. The system of supply is of the same importance as the existence of the army. But when an army has been perfectly supplied, nothing has been attained, beyond the power of applying the efficiency of the numerical strength of which the army consists.

To be perfectly equipped an army must contain provision for all its wants within its own constituent elements. This is equally the case with its several parts. The more completely the supply of every unit in an army is identified with that unit, the better the system of supply.

It is an old and trite saying that army and exercise are interchangeable terms. This exhausts the value and necessity of manœuvres, a word which expresses a portion of the same truth. An army to be efficient must be an army exercised. Manœuvres are a representation of the exercise, which, according to Roman ideas of itself constituted an army; or, as it would be in our equivalent—a force, drilled, disciplined, and trained to arms,—versed in its work.

Fully granting the value of all steps taken so far

as they tend to establish defence, it is clear the goal is not yet reached.

An imperfect force of 133,649 men on paper; incomplete fortifications; a defenceless capital; a militia not trained to the standard of efficiency; and an irregular amount of undisciplined good feeling; parliamentary interference and administration by accountants; do not constitute a strength that, if the evil day should come, can meet the hostile array of continental powers that have subordinated all the resources, wisdom, and energies of rule to the purpose of aggression.

To revert to the expression used before, till the elements of power are fused into its reality, the existence of England, so far as it depends on man, is by the goodwill, forbearance, or want of agreement, of powers more alive than she has shewn herself to the duties of defence.

Part 1.

ON THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE TERM DEFENCE.

WHAT IS DEFENCE?

Does this seem at first sight an odd and needless question?

Perhaps so, and yet to arrive at sound conclusions it is very necessary to be sure of the premises. Clearness and plainness, as well as agreement in the matter of terms, are the ground-work of useful discussion.

The question,—What is Defence? I must acknowledge, is one more easily asked than answered.

We are all familiar with the motto of the gallant auxiliary force that *arose*, (rather than was raised,) out of the indignation of the land, at language that assumed to threaten.

Then the words “Defence, not Defiance” became household words in England.

We are to treat of arms of precision; let us therefore begin with precision in words. Defence *is* defiance. Defence implies attack, and expresses

determination to resist it. Defence, in its full meaning is defiance—utter and complete. It laughs to scorn the threat—it meets the power of the attack with effectual resistance—it shatters, scatters and destroys the power of the enemy.

Such is my reading of the term. That which falls short of this, is resistance, not defence. Indeed, in the spirit of its intention, the motto speaks the highest truth. It means defiance, defiance to aggression: no wanton challenge, no heedless boast, no unprovoked injury to others; but its expression, (the pledge of the organisation which adopts it) is resistance that shall prove effectual and overcome aggression. It is the concentrated iteration of defence under a new form; it is the volunteer's old word and motto. "No surrender," transposed to notes of triumph.

Common as are the expressions, "making a gallant but ineffectual defence," "after a brave but useless defence," they are inaccurate and self-contradictory.

I point this out at starting, not as a matter of pedantry in words, but as a matter of vital consequence to the question. It may seem harmless to be inaccurate in expression, but it is not so, for such want of exactness springs from inaccuracy of thought, and leads to fault in action.

In this matter before us, it makes all the difference between wisdom and folly, peace and war, victory and defeat, life and death, to bear in mind this great distinction in every treatment of each one of the many elements that enter into the means of resistance, but of

which only the aggregate rightly employed, builds up the true power of defence. It is the difference between the single faggot, and the bundle that cannot be broken.

The fall of a fortress, for instance, would be correctly described in such terms as these:—"The resistance hitherto offered by Strasbourg has been overcome ; the capitulation took place this day." On the other hand, defence, if the term were applicable, would embrace as much as this—"Belfort has been defended. There is no enemy that can threaten, in sight or within reach."

The accuracy unconsciously inspired by intense earnestness is singularly apparent in the title "Government for the National Defence," adopted by persons who possessed themselves of supreme power in France, and who at once and concisely, defined and limited all they understood by each term. "Every inch of territory," and "every post within it," was the limit imposed on the term 'National,' whilst to be saved from menace by "all the resources of the nation," justified the term 'Defence.'

What then are we to think of such common headings to articles on the subject as,—“On our National Defences”? Only this, I fear, aid that is embarrassing, and advice that may be ruinous, springing, as it would seem to do, out of thought and opinion, evidencing hopeless confusion and want of apprehension, even as to the nature of defence, and the object of the organisation of means of resistance.

We start then upon common ground, and use the same term with a common agreed meaning; and when we treat of elements that enter into defence, we treat of means that must be so employed as to render resistance supreme, effectual, and triumphant; and this, and this only, is treating of defence. In treating of defence, we treat of that in which the result is not doubtful, and cannot be doubtful. We deal with that in which we cannot fail, and be without fault.

Doubtless innumerable instances at once crowd upon the mind, in all of which aggression and attack have been successful; and yet if these cases are analyzed, countless as they may seem, they vanish before investigation. In all, the elements of resistance have been imperfectly combined or misapplied: in all, there has been resistance, but defence in none.

The difference between these, the value of the one and the folly of the other, appear very forcibly in two passages familiar to the ear, though we may never have thought of them in this connection.

“When a strong man armed *keepeth* his palace [or position] his goods are in PEACE.” This is defence. If *resistance* only is possible, and the strong man is either bound and spoiled by a stronger,—if he cannot with superior strength meet him that comes against him, his wisdom is—

“While the other is yet a great way off
* * * he desireth *conditions of peace*.”

Ineffectual defence is nonsense and a contradiction in terms; ineffectual resistance is folly.

Defence never should be so much as thought of, apart from the holy attribute of triumph with which it has been mercifully clothed.

You may think this a lofty and poetic view of defence. I will not deny that it is so; but it is the only view that is practical and true, and even this is not exhaustive of its character and power.

We shall complete the meaning of defence by applying it to practice, when three questions necessarily arise, viz. :—

WHAT IS TO BE DEFENDED?

AGAINST WHAT IS IT TO BE DEFENDED?

HOW IS IT TO BE DEFENDED?

The fulfilment of obligation, which of old time has in soldiers language been called—honour—is the first thing to be defended and the last. Happily all history teaches that a nation which is known to guard its honour, that is to say, which is known to be ready, both in will and deed, to fulfil its obligations, is not so much as threatened; and this, as I understand it, completes the meaning of the word defence. It is protection against danger, fear and threat.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE WORK OF WAR.

TRUE defence then implies immunity from threat. There is no risk of threat where there is no internal fault. The threat is notice to put the house in order, and warning that it is not in order.

There have been criticisms without number, ascribing only to childish vanity and to national conceit, (incapable of acknowledging the possibility of fair defeat), the startled exclamations of the French that they had been deceived and betrayed, and that treason had been rife amongst them. It is an instinct, true and correct, though it may be unreasonably expressed, and may be directed wrongly, but it is a true and perfect instinct that prompts a nation meeting with insult, much more with unwonted calamity, to feel that it has been betrayed. The nation which is left defenceless in the presence of an enemy has been betrayed, and a nation without defence, if left in ignorance of the fact, has been deceived. The breach of defence, in the word's full meaning, is folly and treason of the very worst degree.

The soldier, and more especially the leader, who is called upon to fight for his country in that terrible

hour, when defence has ceased and the country is subjected to insult and exposed to threat, will not have gauged correctly the difficulties he has to confront, he will in fact have left unreckoned the greatest of them all, if he does not base all his measures and form all his calculations on the fact of which he may rest most assured, that feebleness and incapacity, disunion, and often something worse, have all combined to form the situation that has dissolved defence into the elements of which it is made up, and which he is called upon to weld again into the unity that has been broken. This is the real work of war: the why and when that justify it. This is the work its fire and its thunder have to do.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE ART OF WAR.

So far we have been considering the definition of a word; all that follows would be useless unless grounded on the laws and principles which govern the whole question of defence, and clearly understood to be so. It is a question, the laws and principles of which determine the nation's life or death.

Though theories are often very wild, principles never vary. To take an old and familiar illustration, "the law that bids the apple fall, is concerned in the adjustment of every single atom in the universe." It is the same throughout the art and science of a soldier's duty. The principles, which in their observance, provide for the security of the nation, govern the sentinel's duty.

The art of war has indeed undergone important changes since the days (if ever such there were) when fisticuffs constituted the whole of "the noble art of self-defence,"—when its science was literally held in the clenched fist: and yet the first principles then taught remain unaltered.

Hitting out and hitting strong, guarding your position, and being up to time, are rules as necessary

now as they have ever been, only they have to be more intricately applied. A paradox, or seeming contradiction is often the epigram of truth. Attack still remains the first element of defence, whilst the converse is quite as true, and the primary considerations in successful attack, are questions of defence. So that when we are dealing with defence, our thoughts are almost necessarily directed to weapons of offence; with attack, to questions of security.

Again, the combination and concentration of elements which transform resistance into defence, assert their importance as fully in operations of attack. In these they appear in the form, familiar to all successful campaigners, and to all students of military history, of the rapid movement of overpowering forces in quick succession on all necessary points.

Arms form the basis on which all other considerations rest.

You must know the power, range, and I will even go so far as to say, the habits of your arm. The former cannot be dispensed with, and you cannot obtain perfection without the last. It is a point, too, that wakens up the interest of the man personally in the work he has to do.

The delivery and distribution of fire claim the first attention.

Musketry instruction, while showing the value of what is called a low trajectory, will easily enable us to apprehend that as fire must not only be directed neither to the right nor to the left of the object,

so also it must be neither too high nor too low. Now following up this idea, when we come to work the combination which this element of resistance affords, it is easy to perceive that to obtain the greatest possible effect, it must fully cover the three directions that define all limits of space, viz.: direct, flanking and vertical, or distance, direction and height.

A plentiful cross fire, beginning with artillery, before it can be seen, continued by breech loaders in trusty hands, and pouring out of a position, strengthened by secondary means of resistance, which may be called passive impediments to an enemy, is a very fair beginning. Where you can select your position, you can always add to this delivery of simultaneous, crossing, lasting fire, by forming different heights for parts of the delivery, so as to multiply the numbers standing on space horizontally, and consequently, also, the fire which can be delivered, by placing it in heights one above another.

The next consideration is to keep your enemy under this fire. Communication outside a position must therefore be rendered impassable: your own within the position, must, on the contrary, be as free and direct as possible.

CHAPTER IV.

ON SUPPLIES.

COMMUNICATION inside a position must be clear, free, simple, and direct, because it subserves a necessity indispensable to success, namely, the custody and distribution of every kind of necessary supply. This must be forthcoming unless defence is to fail, both in time and quantity as required, and this without approach to confusion. Every unavoidable difficulty in this respect, (and there are many,) is so much unavoidable evil, so much wear, tear, and loss, necessarily sustained by the defenders; but every particle of difficulty caused by complication of arrangement, by mismanagement or by neglect, is so much wilful, sinful damage inflicted on the defenders; so much unjust and wasteful drain upon their temper, their spirit and their strength. Where this occurs, it is a giant evil, more fatal than the enemy in front. At times, as we have seen, it has been so prominent as to lead to a nation's anguished cry of treason and of treachery; but to some extent, it is a difficulty that confronts every warlike operation, and takes a foremost rank among the things to be considered. If it has at times received

the attention it deserves, it has nevertheless, very often fallen into hands that have elaborated the hindrances to which it can be made to evolve, till they have reached the sublimity of a Chinese puzzle. For what it can do, and how, if it arises, it must be met and strangled I would refer to the despatches of the soldier of whom we are most proud,—England's great duke, the prince of the allied armies, that restored peace to Europe, and who framed rules for this supply and distribution which have, however, been swept away.

It is probably also not too much to say that the difference of system and management, as respectively adopted in this respect by France and Prussia, would of itself have decisively determined with which would be the victorious issue from the struggle.

CHAPTER V.

ON POSITIONS.

HAVING the fire and the force so established and supplied that it can keep up that fire as long and deliver it as often as it may be required, the next consideration is to keep the assailant under it until he tires — or, if able, goes away. Should he retire, you must follow him till he can come back no more. This last consideration qualifies to some extent the rendering of communication outside a position impassable by passive impediments. These should be as formidable as possible, but must leave some margin for purposes of pursuit. Quickness is essential to pursuit, and the means for ensuring it from the boots of the soldier to the shoeing of the horse require careful consideration and constant attention.

When we begin to deal with positions and passive impediments, earth and water become the auxiliaries of fire. These should be dealt with, always with reference to it, and so disposed as to give to the smallest portion of fire the greatest possible effect. The soldier who throws away his fire fails in his duty ; so does the general in his, if he does not dispose the

fire under his command so as to have the utmost attainable effect.

The disposition should be such as to compel the assailant to advance in line, and take him in flank; it should bring artillery to bear upon his columns, and converging fire upon all his parts.

Positions cannot always be chosen that give full scope in this respect, but such is the aim to be kept in view throughout. The conformation of earth and water, determine how far it can be practiced.

In the term, *earth*, in this sense, are included sand, rock, iron, and portions of the vegetable world; in that of *water*, mud is also included.

Sand I look upon as one of the most valuable forms in which earth can appear for our purposes, and mud not less so as to water. They are still more valuable where combined. In what situation, for instance, could we more heartily wish an enemy's fleet that had approached our shores to be than on the Goodwin sands? or an army that had disembarked, than on the mud of the Thames or the Medway?

From the sand bag to the sand hill or the bank of sand, and from the marsh to the moving bog—these are in the abstract, the most useful forms of auxiliary passive means of resistance: rock and deep water require peculiar conditions; the former only require to be at hand, and in abundance.

Where you can bury your enemy's missiles in wet sand, or keep him in good soft oozy mud, the end is gained.

It may be answered that he will not come there. This is exactly what we want to prevent his doing anywhere.

Where such elements of passive resistance sufficiently abound, that part of the position is defended by them.

CHAPTER VI.

ON IRON.

IRON, the opposite extreme in the scale of earthy helps, requires, more than any other material, preparation and peculiar conditions. Its use applies only to chief positions of vital consequence such as arsenals, dock-yards, the capital, the seat of government, great centres of wealth or population, and perhaps to great commercial harbours, and that under conditions.

I refer to it, partly because it is an element peculiar and too important to be wholly omitted, but specially to throw out a suggestion for the study of others.

In old time improvement in weapons gradually led to the necessity of increasing the weight of personal defensive armour, until horse and rider were so loaded, that once overthrown they had not power to rise.

The invention of gunpowder and the introduction of fire-arms, rendered personal defensive armour more than ever desirable in itself, but human ingenuity failed to devise any, within the possible limits of man or horse power.

When it would have become more than ever advantageous, it was necessarily abandoned altogether.

The same difficulty does not of course apply in the case of fixed positions. Evidently a fort can be constructed to bear any weight of armour. For that matter it may be all of iron. But there is a branch of warfare to which it does apply: a branch often called our line of first defence, though it would be much much more true, to say an outer line of our insular defence.

Neither ships nor floating batteries can carry an unlimited weight of armour and float*; and, whilst carefully guarding myself against being misunderstood, as suggesting the elimination of iron from means of passive resistance, I cannot but think that effectual protection against the ponderous and far reaching weights that can now be thrown by artillery is to be sought rather in other directions than solely in heavier and more cumbersome clothing. I believe there is much force in the analogy I have pointed out, though in some respects it may be imperfect; and, I think the importance and interest of the subject would

* These remarks were written before the melancholy catastrophe of the *Captain*, or the utterance of the forebodings of Mr. Reed as to other iron ships, or the comments on the counteracting of top-heaviness by ballast below, in the letters and lectures of Admiral Fishbourne and others.

Without entering into any opinion as to the particular and exceptional causes that may, or may not, have been correctly traced in each particular case, the tenor of all that has appeared on either side upon the question, seems to me to point still more and more in the direction I have ventured to indicate, and to warn us more and more that iron, however admirable a casing it may be made to yield, is a material inapt of buoyancy to so great an extent that no amount of counterpoising quantities of it, anywhere distributed, will confer buoyancy on the vessel by which it is encumbered.

amply reward those who may pursue the thought, and study how best to perpetuate the naval supremacy of their country, by aid from such analogy as there is between the present conditions and the results that followed the first introduction of fire-arms, when swiftness and number and new tactics, superseded, although they did not end, hand-to-hand encounters.

CHAPTER VII.

ON PREPARATION.

THE circulation of the blood conveys life to the extremities, but depends on the beating of the heart.

So must all positions have, so to speak, their centres of life, and their extremities, their outposts and their citadels.

A nation is a body with parts, one more vital than another, one more indispensable to its existence than another.

Our island limit has this great advantage as a position to be protected, that it has a visible circumference. It only requires a central heart, with proper beat, to convey healthful life to the furthest national extremities : in other words, it must have a keep or citadel on which all may safely rely.

This will ensure that the heart, on which the nation's very life depends, shall perform its functions, and the insular limit will be protected. In these days of insatiable and unscrupulous ambition, of terrific preparation, of keen and brooding subtlety, of hosts that may be figured, but in numbers which the mind fails to grasp, nothing, short of full preparation, can be deemed sufficient. The heart must be so shielded that it shall beat in the assured sense of that perfect security which constitutes true defence. How shall

this be done? How shall the island home be kept free from invasion and secure from threat?

There is one way only. It is to be prepared to meet the enemy everywhere with the two things he does not want in our country, nor at our hand. These are death and a grave.—That is the work.

Be ready and he will not come: fail, and we fall. We have great advantages; we know what he wants; we know what to have ready. We know he must begin with landing; we know within limits where he must land.

He wants the triumph and booty of a conqueror; he must meet with the overthrow of all his hopes. He and they must lie down together. He means to seize the dockyards and to destroy the arsenal; he must be seized and destroyed himself.

Wherever passive impediments are not enough to stop his landing, he must be met by fire. Wherever he might be tempted to seize a position and establish a foothold, he must be encountered by such force as utterly to baffle his attempt.

The *power* of doing this effectually round the seaboard of an island, affords so strong an element of resistance, that it has only too often been mistaken as in itself constituting defence.

But if the imaginary protection of the 'silver streak' or 'little ditch' be put in the stead of the duty to be done by brave hearts and by sturdy men, the days of England's prosperity, independence, and honour will have gone down together.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON PREPARATION—*continued.*

It is very usual to put the supposition of a calamity or of some paralysis to the fleet, in the foreground of any attempt to deal with the defence of the shores of England. Suppositions, however, are a preliminary injurious to the value of the suggestions they are intended to support. They are dangerous, if not fatal, to the hope of proper preparation for the military defence of an island, that, however often conquered, has now rested long in undisturbed reliance on her insular form and her floating moveable bulwarks. They are, moreover, beside the point and merits of the case.

Without venturing upon any forecast affecting that which we are pleased still to call the civilized world, it will be enough to suggest to all who are conversant with the condition of that world, that when assault on this country takes place, it will have been prepared for on as gigantic a maritime scale, and as stealthily, as have been any of the territorial invasions which have, in quick succession, followed the morn of a would-be era of universal peace, that was proclaimed with inflated boastings, which have exposed its trumpeters to ridicule and shame.

Whatever our naval strength, it will be attempted to be matched; nor would it be the wisest course to run a race in this respect against a coalition of powers. That would be engaging in a contest by one means only. We should be drawn into the competition of armaments in one form, whilst rejecting it under another. Whereas, by having regard to the analogy and proportion of defence, if the expression may be allowed, we may remove the incentive to the end. That end is a blow at the heart with a view to the extinction of life, and, if that may not be, for as much mutilation of the body as is possible. Naval preparation only, is fighting all round the circle and having no defence for the heart. It is a war of outposts only, without supports and without citadel.

The tables are in a measure turned, and land defence has become the basis on which naval supremacy must rest.

The heart and island must be perfectly secured by other means, in order that the fleet may be free to render naval coalitions hopeless, and to act as arteries by which the life of the insular citadel shall course to the furthest possessions.

Art and science have to be applied, and full and proper use made of every element to contribute its due proportion towards defence. Ships of observation,—forts and floating batteries to bar the channels and approaches to ports and arsenals—living lines of observation all around the coast, supported by works suited to each respective locality,—a population, supplied with

and trained to arms—these, with thorough communication between post and post ever converging to a final centre, would cover the land with a network of protection. Even in the presence of a hurricane of continental wars, it would leave England, happy England, for it would be England provided with defence and calm in the consciousness of well assured security.

CHAPTER IX.

AN ILLUSTRATION.

FOR some illustration of the defence of one of the principal positions on the coast, I will select Portsmouth. Let us picture that important station as it was some years ago in respect to modern implements of war: virtually unprotected. Instead of being a standing menace against invasion, it would be a standing solicitation to an aggressive enemy. The fleet engaged by an enemy has its maritime battle, necessarily within the limits in which alone such an engagement could take place; the transports disembark their hordes as near as they can to the limited sphere of operations, and the landed forces proceed to occupy or to destroy the chief dockyard of the kingdom, and to secure a base for further operations,

But how if Portsmouth be defended?

First of all, the fleet, no longer hampered by having to bear the burden of a protection which no fleet can more than indirectly accomplish, would rest on a citadel as on a support, and be free to search out and to pursue the enemy and all his transports without the fear of leaving a main post to surprise and hostile occupation.

The forts commanding the channels of approach are so many fixed supports from which fire of every kind can be poured with accuracy upon every inch of sea that any hostile ship may venture on. From within these, the handling of a little wire sets in motion a new element of danger hidden in the waters; nay, the very passage of the ship may with every forward movement be the last revolution of its engine before it strikes the dread torpedo. Whatever be their dash, rapidity and skill, the enemy's ships can but hasten from one peril to another, from destruction in one place to destruction in another, so long as they are within a defended position.

Or let the hostile fleet engage our own, while the transports try to land their forces beyond the invulnerable limits of a main position, and let the forces as they are disembarked, seek to turn the harbour, and to take it in reverse.

They will first encounter that belt of observation, and that local line of fire that, if the country is to be defended, must be formed everywhere, and that will necessarily be in greater strength the nearer it is to so important a position. This alone must materially hamper disembarkation in force and with artillery, yet it is only the beginning of sore trouble to the assailant. The several positions, we must assume, are selected on the principle of mutual support. Each position is complete according to its importance. Each is so determined that it shall have command or height, that is, it shall overlook, but shall not itself be

overlooked, by any unoccupied ground within range of arms: it shall be so formed that it shall look into, and fire with its triple line of fire, into every inch of its approaches.

Where is the enemy to begin?

If he land far enough from one position to begin his operations against it in comparative safety, and advance by rule and line, he only lays himself open to being taken in reverse from the next. If he seek to advance by dash, and risk cutting himself off from his own base, it is only to hurl himself to his destruction against an inner line, and so on, with ever increasing danger. The rule of supports outward from a main citadel or centre not only provides for the safety of the capital, it completes the mesh which entangles the invader, whose violent dealing comes back on his own pate.

Whilst resistance, uncertain of result, is the most miserable game of death that can be played, it is unnecessary and wanton to incur it. Next to the act of unprovoked aggression, the most criminal and the most provocative of war which a nation can commit, is to substitute resistance for defence.

CHAPTER X.

ON SUPPORTS.

IF a single position like that of Portsmouth be defended in the full sense of the word, but only as relates to the ground on which it stands; if that be treated as an integer, which, however great, is only a post in a larger position of which the whole ought to be held; in other words, if the defence of posts, one by one, be substituted for a chain of protection by mutual support derived from the common centre of a unity; if we trace the consequences that follow on such an act, we not only learn one of the most valuable lessons in the art of war but of our lives.

Nothing falsely isolated can endure, however strong it may be in itself. If we carry the idea of our insular position into isolation, whether it be within the kingdom in seeking class instead of general interests, or beyond it in adopting a 'policy' of cold neutrality in questions of right and wrong, we must inevitably suffer. The neuter* is man's invention, not God's ordinance.

* Neuter—"an animal without distinction"—*vide* dictionary.

The estimate in which Germans hold neutrality was given by one of their poets years ago.

An isolated post will sadly prove the paradox, that it must fall although it be *defended*.

The enemy, landing beyond the limits of the defended position, meets in this case with no check from any supporting post. He advances to the nearest safe and suitable ground, and sets to work to establish for himself a quasi defended position. It becomes a contest of position against position, of defence against defence, of attack against attack. But the enemy maintains his communications; he works in harmony with the principle of supports. He has not isolated either himself or his position. It becomes thus a question of time, endurance and determination. He succeeds at length in silencing, say, an important work. Its guns are dismounted, its stores and ammunition are become useless; but defender's ground is really defended. That ground has its inner supports; one of these is fallen back upon. To it the stores and ammunition are removed; to it the garrison retires. Nothing is abandoned but the ground; nothing is left behind.

Immer strebe zum Ganzen, und kannst du selber kein Ganzes sein,
Als dienendes Glied slies an ein Ganzes dich an.

Which may be rendered paraphrastically—

Strive to be always entire, and if thou canst not be entire thyself,
Poor pitiful thing, as slave, to something than can
Hasten to join thy incapable self.

The original, however, expresses counsel and encouragement rather than scorn; but the feeling is there, ready to explode, if the thing addressed, instead of lamenting its condition, should glory in its un-manliness. The essence of the lines is deprecation of the neuter.

In Schillers day no one dreamed of the abominations that are now addressed to us in its behalf, both socially and nationally; nor that a free people would elevate wordy declaimers, who favour of dereliction of duty to high position.

No. The preparations are very different. The work that has ceased to be useful is left, but it is not surrendered; within proper distance is the connected support on which to retire. The emboldened enemy advances towards a post that no longer opposes his fire. Let him, in any way he will. By dash, by assault, by reconnaissance, or by yet more cautious regular approaches: it is immaterial. He ventures on ground which though relinquished, is defended still.

Defended? How?


There points not a gun; there lives not a man; there remains no material. All there is silent; all there is secret; all there is still as death and the grave.

In a little room in that far off supporting post stand two men, of whom one puts his ear to a tube in a wall, or looks at a dial in front. In an upper space above them stands a third, who carefully scans by means of a tube beginning and ending with glass, what numbers have settled upon the lately abandoned hive.

"It is full," is whispered or signalled down.

The time has come. Two little wires they touch,—and—all is over. Of that work and the hive there stays neither stone nor man. The victory of the assailant turns to his destruction. Defeat, in its catastrophe, sets the everlasting seal on true defence; but the place falls too: the UNITY was broken.

Part 2.



* * *

"BROKEN LIES CREATION,
"SHAKEN EARTH'S FOUNDATION,
"ANCHORLESS EACH NATION.

Ερχου, Κύριε Ἰησοῦ.

* * *

"MIGHT THE RIGHT IS WRONGING,
"SWORDED MILLIONS THRONGING,
"EARTH'S MISRULE PROLONGING,

Ερχου, Κύριε Ἰησοῦ.

* * *

"LOYAL SOULS ARE CLINGING
"TO THEE, LIGHT UPSPRINGING,
"LONELY HEARTS ARE SINGING,

Ναὶ, ἔρχου, Κύριε Ἰησοῦ. Ἀμήν.

CHAPTER I.

ON FRANCE.

FRANCE has been credited with being the most warlike and aggressive of European nations. Her songs lend no support to this assumption. If the assertion be well founded that the temper of a nation may be most accurately traced in its songs, France is neither aggressive nor warlike. Her language teems with revolutionary songs; she has scarcely a war song. The most brilliant of her songs, the most inspiring and beautiful of her hymnal melodies, furnishes the most striking evidence in proof that can be given of this fact. 'The Marseillaise,' a war song in origin, spirit, music and words, written and composed in one night in order to stimulate the heroic energies of the citizens of Strasbourg against a coalition of enemies, became at once in use, influence and application, the rallying cry, not of war but of revolution.

Independently of the special circumstances of its origin, and of the solemnity, magnificence and splendour of its cadence, its words emphatically stamp it a war song. It appeals with grandeur of spirit akin to the power of its melody, to citizen defence

against attack by mercenaries; it appeals to almost every noble emotion compatible with war: it recognises and sets in motion that first duty of *all* to rise as *one* against that external aggression which internal fault alone had rendered possible; but it is entirely free from inspiration of that sort which is the essential characteristic of what is meant when a nation is branded (as the French have been), an aggressive and warlike nation. It breathes of compassion and kindness, it speaks of discrimination in foes; but it has not one tone for aggression, no word for injury to others beyond the conflict involved in establishing the nation's own defence. Yet it has never been the song of war. Probably because of this lack, for aggression is, in fact, the essence of that disposition which constitutes a nation warlike. A warlike nation is one that learns war as an art, looks forward to it as an habitual condition and pursues it for gain and aggrandisement. But, the 'Marseillaise' is emphatically the song of France as well as the song of revolution. History, dispassionately read, corroborates, in this instance at least, the language of song, and teaches us that France is a country revolutionary rather than warlike. The reference in the war song to INTERNAL FAULT, *by which alone the dangers that surrounded France had been made possible*, at once overpowered, and has outlasted all other emotions. The effect was not to excite first a common union against all foreign foes, to be followed in due time by investigation, punishment, and remedy of the fault: it was discord, civil war and revolution from the first,

though the outburst was with a power and force that overcame foreign attack as well as overwhelmed every institution of the country.

Revolution and continuity cannot exist together ; but continuity in will, purpose and action, is perhaps the most indispensable of all the characteristics that combine to render a nation really warlike, dangerous and aggressive. The revolutionary violence of France did indeed for the time preserve the integrity of her soil and of her boundaries, and the marvellous manipulation of her power by the Corsican soldier, made her the temporary scourge of Europe ; but, this meteor fury is not the same as that spirit in a people which stamps it as under the abiding power of the lust of war, conquest and aggrandisement: with such, these are a business to be pursued in cold blood and with much circumspection, to be planned with malice aforethought in the hard avaricious spirit of dishonest and violent appropriation, to be carried out at the appointed time remorselessly enough, cruelly if needs be, yet as quietly and even as plausibly as possible. The wars of France, on the contrary, have been the saturnalia of revolution, the outbursts of uncontrollable fury, in madness and rage, and with fearful noises, destroying, pillaging and shedding blood. Her challenges to Europe went forth in the name and with incentives to revolution everywhere.

In her more technical military songs, those of the barrack room and camp, there is the same absence of warlike spirit. They usually treat with careless, good

humoured but rather childish ridicule of the discomforts of a soldier's life; they shew a lively sense of those of the conscription; they evidence a good deal of gentle, even of soft feeling, and almost a tenderness and love for rural life and peace. They betray much liking for self-ease, self-love and self-indulgence; but there is an all but entire absence of the spirit of extermination and aggression, as well as a dearth of the hardier qualities of personal self-respect, of lofty feeling and high sense of individual duty.

Such is the temper of France as it may be inferred from both her story and her songs. The inference is sadly against the early resuscitation of her power and glory. The fight against the Prussian pales before the frenzy of her civic war.

Incapacity before, weakness and indecision during a struggle for existence, give no evidence of aptitude for war. The upsetting of all governments without the glimmering of light as to the substitution of any, bears ample testimony to the severity of the revolutionary paroxysm: the symptoms of recovery are faint as yet, and afar off. Our sympathies have been irresistibly drawn out by the misfortunes that have overwhelmed the country and the nation; but it cannot be denied that in not comprehending the responsibilities of the position she had assumed and the duty of being prepared to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations she had contracted,—above all, in failing in her own defence,—France has failed in the first duty of a nation. She has, to use her own expression, 'betrayed,'—that is,

proved false to, the liberties of Europe and has not only lost herself, but has inevitably involved other nations in her loss.

Her late government had given her twenty years of magnificence and much prosperity. Under every trial and temptation, and alone of all the governments of France, it had laboured with unwearied labour to build up and to strengthen, rather than to merely formally maintain, the perfect understanding of a thoroughly friendly spirit with England. That rule had emerged by the will of France out of another fit of revolution, and, if imperial and absolute, it governed in accordance with the caprices of the nation—nay, unfortunately, even in accordance with its follies; certainly not against its will. Nor did France shew herself averse to the absolutism of a prosperous and powerful rule. To form a just opinion on this subject, we must contrast her repeated acclamations of the emperor Napoleon III, not with the ideal of a tranquil and contented people, but with her turbulence before and since his reign. Not, till seeking to perpetuate what was only his own personal work, the fruit of his own energy and skill, the emperor consented to, or possibly set in motion, a pressure that hurried on parliamentary government for which France was utterly unfitted,—not till then did her calamities break forth.

Whatever share in this work, if any, may be attributed to the incessant revilings, carplings, and intermeddlings against the form of government France had chosen, that flooded a portion of the English press, with its

ceaseless obtrusion and advocacy of another form, of which no country that has tried it has yet had reason to be proud, that share we have had in the downfall of France, in the destruction of her government and the rupture of the cordial understanding that had been formed and maintained by the imperial rule. Characterised by the consistency of all impertinence, this was the diligent work, whether attended by result or not, of those who at the same time that they deem themselves free to nag without intermission—it is the only word that will express it—against the rulers and the rule of other nations—and to set provocations without end before a people prone to revolution, proclaim the high necessity of standing aloof from all part in the right or wrong of Europe, except in exasperating words which they scatter in profusion.

So long as the alliance between France and England was maintained in good faith, it secured the independence of Turkey, and set at rest the disquietudes caused by that desire on the part of Russia for encroachment on Turkey and for aggrandizement in the East, to which the colourable name of the Eastern question is applied, but which is a question only of honesty and good faith. It guaranteed the peace and tranquility of Europe. The good faith and firmness of the Emperor of the French, and the honesty of the English people were fast converting this happy alliance into a reality with a reasonable hope of permanence.

It may have been originally framed with very different objects, and possibly have been intended to

act its part in bringing about the final catastrophe of Turkish history. The contrary result was nevertheless the actual evolution, as it seemed likely to remain. So the alliance was broken by the fall of France.

These opposite tendencies, views and acts have been fully presented to the English people. Under differing complications the same aim may be traced, steadily and earnestly pursued on the one part, and as earnestly opposed upon the other. At one time a French alliance may be treated as the instrument of its accomplishment; at another, the power of France may be seen as an obstacle that must be broken: it is in either case in pursuit of the same aim.

"That they [the administration] may have been "deceived by the word of an Emperor [of Russia]", were words of Mr. Disraeli, so far back as 1854,* "may be a mournful fact. . . .

"Russia may be forced at the end of this struggle "[the Crimean War] to a position which may secure "the independence of Europe, and the safety of civilisation. You may have a war which may restore "Bessarabia to the Porte—may convert the Crimea "into an independent country, destined to flourish under "the guarantee of the great powers,—a war that may "make the Danube a free river, and the Euxine a free "sea; but all this is dependent on the somewhat humiliating, but comparatively pardonable circumstance—"that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government has

* Hansard, February 20, 1854.

“been the consequence of credulity. But let us, for a moment, contemplate the results of the alternative.

“If their conduct has been suggested by connivance, you may have a war; but it will be a war carried on by connivance,—a timid war—a vacillating war,—a war . . . with the exact results which were originally intended. If from the first there was a foregone conclusion . . . that the independence and integrity of Turkey was a farce, and that by connivance the affair might be settled. &c.”

The same English statesman said in March [17], 1862:—

“I would suggest . . . the consideration of the means, . . . how the Declaration of the Treaty of Paris may be altered.”

“Who,” cries Count Bismarck, “cares for England since the declaration of Paris?”

“If,” Mr. Disraeli deemed it right on a later occasion to say, “if, when her Majesty’s government communicated with Count Bismarck respecting the repudiation of the treaty of 1856, they were ignorant of an arrangement between Russia and Prussia, they were extremely ill informed; but if they were aware of the existence of this secret treaty, and yet made that appeal to Count Bismarck which led to the conference,—then I say, that the conduct of Her Majesty’s ministers is of a very grave character. The censure of the house would be called for by such conduct. I beg the house will recollect the few observations I make on this subject.”

“I should be very sorry,” are, on the contrary, words of Mr. Gladstone, “if in reference to Turkey, we should “not preserve as much as possible, a desire to treat it “with the respect due to a power which is responsible “for the government of an extended territory. Not- “withstanding, . we are authorized and . obliged “to occupy ourselves with questions . it would be “impertinent of us to occupy ourselves in, in respect “of other foreign countries. . I hope, that in all the “European Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the “same principle may be adopted, as ‘in the case of the “Danubian Principalities.’”

“The words ‘integrity’ and ‘independence’ as “applied to Turkey,” said the Duke of Argyll, “have “not the same meaning as the words would have if “applied to any other country. . For myself, I “will say I did not then believe, and I do not now “believe in the regeneration of Turkey. If the signs “of decay and death were ever . perceptible in any “political society, their mark is now to be found upon “the face of the Turkish Empire. But what had that “to do with the Crimean War? Our object was not to “preserve Turkey, except as a means to other things “ . The result of that war . has driven Russia from “the protectorate of the Christian people in the East, “to which . she was naturally entitled.”

The wheel of revolution, but the noiseless wheel of a revolution without marked violence, had displaced the

* Hansard, 8th March, 1867.

former for the latter politicians. The upholders of obligation had been made to give way to ministers between whose utterances and the aspirations of Russia, there is, slight, if any, difference. Coincident with this change has been the complete disruption of the western alliance by the annihilation of France.

The destruction of France was indispensable before England could be invaded, or even humiliated by the powers of the north. Till that destruction was accomplished, danger to England could arise only from France; but, under the imperial rule, France had become less and less inclined for acts of wanton aggression on an ally between whom and herself ancient prejudices and animosities were alike becoming extinct. The very circumstance, however, of England's security against every other quarter, the remnants of traditional jealousies and animosities, and that vague unreason that is content with superficial appearances and careless of probing consequences, all rendered it easy to work on the common impression in England that France was a dangerous country, prone to aggression, and Prussia, on the contrary, a power far off, comparatively weak, animated only by sentiments of peace, and a country sore hindered in the accomplishment of German unity, under which sounding name the purposes of Prussian supremacy and conquest were masked. English sympathy was perplexed and England's power for action paralyzed. The first step to her ultimate humiliation was made possible. She looked on in puzzled bewilderment at the candidature

for the throne of Spain of a Prussian Prince,—apparently blind to the obvious intention of repeating a device that had served its purpose in Roumania,—a candidature that in the interests of Europe, but of France especially, might righteously be held to require a complete and not a mock withdrawal. The long planned war broke forth, and changed as rapidly as success rendered it possible for it to change, from war waged against one man's authority, to war against a dynasty, then against armies, till it was quickly waged to extremity, and closed at last, with extortion that awoke a cry through Europe, amidst cruel taunts, addressed to the petulancy of despair, the outbreaks of which were threatened with further vengeance.

Scarcely was the power of France eclipsed than the first manifestation of the ulterior purposes with which this had been done was boldly ventured. After the announcement, coupled with every accompaniment of insolent dictation, that Russia would no longer observe treaty stipulations, England was made to record her acceptance of the reversal of the conditions which the Crimean war was nominally waged to impose. They had served their purpose. Circassia had ceased to exist. France had fallen. England had no ally to stay the encroachments of Russia in the East.

There is no continental bulwark left to interpose between the powers of the North and the desolation of her shores.

A FABLE.—By LA FONTAINE.

En ce monde if se faut l'un,	In this world one must another help;
L'autre secourir.	If thy neighbour chance to die
Si ton vëisin vient à mourir	'Tis on thee the burden's put.
C'est sur toi que le fardeau tombe.	
Un âne accompagnait un cheval peu	An ass travelled beside a horse of scant
courtois,	civility;
Celui ci ne portant que son simple harnois.	The horse, bearing his simple saddlery;
Et le pauvre baudet si chargé qu'il	The donkey laden till he sank.
succombe.	
Il pria le cheval de l'aider quelque	Who prays the horse some trifling aid
peu	to give him,
Autrement il mourrait devant qu'être à la	Or he must die before they reach the
ville	town?
La prière, dit-il, n'en est pas incivile	"My prayer," he cried, "is not
	excessive;
Moitié de ce fardeau ne vous serra que jeu.	Half of my load to you would be no
	load at all."
Le cheval refusa, fit une petarade	The horse refused, turned with con-
	tempt upon the suppliant;
Tant, qu'il en vit sous le faix mourir son	So much so, he looked on and saw his
camarade	comrade die under his task.
Et reconnût qu'il avait tât.	Then learned he had been wrong,
Du baudet en cette aventure	Of the ass that's told of in this story.
On lui fit porter la voiture	All the load is put on him,
Et la peau pardessus encore.	But the beast's carcass into the
	bargain.

LA FONTAINE'S FABLE.—(*Freely imitated.*)

Bear ye one another's burden,	The Pharisee answers, with scorn,
And so fulfil the law of the Anointed King.	And a homily.
By the side of a Pharisee	Looks complacently on
Travelled a sinner.	At the death of the sinner,—
The burden of one, his phylacteries;	Crushed by the weight of his woe,—
The sinner, so laden,—he fell.	And awakens, too late,
In anguish, he asks for the Pharisee's help;	To a sense of his deed.
"The enemy," he cries, "will press me	In the law of his book it was written,
to death."	"Members, the one for the other,
"Despise not, I pray, my appeal,	should have the same care—
So great are thy wealth and thy power;	"Consider thyself—lest thou also be
Without hurt—my distress to relieve—	tried."
Thou art able."	

CHAPTER II.

ON PRUSSIA.

PRUSSIA, protestant by profession, assumed to be kindred to England in race and creed, and to be German in sympathy and truth, although it may be difficult to substantiate by proof any one of the three claims, has been hailed as the gentle pioneer of a higher civilization. If her songs do not belie her, she is, on the contrary, unscrupulous in ambition and fierce to cruelty. Her songs are war songs,—vindictive, aggressive, and of well-nigh devilish ferocity. The contrast between her songs and those of France can scarcely be made more apparent than by placing side by side words from the ‘Marseillaise,’ and from one entitled ‘*War Song against the French.*’ The song of France is a song of defence, vibrating in unison with the key note of that holy principle. Even in its strongest antagonism, it generalises its enemies and limits its hostility to those who have stimulated attack by a league of foes. It carefully discriminates between the instigators of invasion and their instruments, and, in the very midst of the struggle, calls for this distinction, for forbearance, and

for mercy. After the magnificent words, as addressed to the leagued invading hosts—

Tout est soldat pour vous combattre !	Age and sex are armed against you,
S'ils tombent, nos jeunes hères,	When our youthful heroes fall,
La terre en produit de nouveaux,	Earth herself gives life to others,
Contre vous tout prêts à se battre.	Against you—to fight prepared.

It goes on—

Français en guerriers magnanimes,	Frenchmen fight like warriors noble,
Portez ou retenez vos coups,	Know how to strike, how to refrain ;
Epargnez ces tristes victimes,	And spare the victims of oppression,
'A regret s'armant contre vous,	Grieved in arms to be against you.

The totally different feeling of the Germans finds its appropriate expression in such words as these—

So sammle, mein Deutschland, dich	Assemble, my Germany, meet to a man,
stark wie ein Mann,	Bring with you the offerings of blood,
Und bringe die blutige Gaben,	Bring terror, bring horror and fear ;
Und bringe das Schrecken and trage	From all of thy mountains, from all of
das Grauen,	thy vales,
Von all deinen Bergen, aus all deinen	Burst forth with the watchword—The
Gauen,	Rhine ! over the Rhine!
Und Klinge die Lösung : znm Rhein	All Germany on into France.
übern Rhein !	
All Deutschland in Frankreich hinein !	

As to ambition, it would be little better than waste of time to endeavour to prove what has been made self-evident. The question—*“Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland ?” has become the by-word for greed, pre-

*The following are extracts from two of the many parodies on the poem to which this insatiable craving has given rise ;—

Was ist des Breitman's Vaterland ?	Where lies the German fatherland ?
Py Sharmans sdream or Yankee sdrand ?	The country wrenched from Denmark's
Ist wo Mosel tovärd's de Rhein,	hand ?
Pours bright pure vafe and thin poor	Is't there? or in the grumbling south,
wein ?	Whose heart still curses, through her
Ist wo, py Erie's voondrous fount,	mouth?

tension and absurdity that have covered the patriotism and passion of its origin with ridicule not wholly undeserved.

What then is the nature of the contradiction, if contradiction there be, between these songs and the reality; and what are the portents of the harmony or divergence between them? Is the impression well founded, or rather on what is founded such a general impression as to be all but universal, that had the scale of victory inclined as decisively for the French as it has against them, the world would have witnessed scenes of cruelty it has been spared: and also, that weighing all the circumstances as they ought justly to be weighed, the Prussian occupation of the conquered territory has been singularly free from the worst vices

De treaming Dutch de bubbles count
Oh! no, no, no! Oh! no, no, no!
You von't content Hans Breitmans so.

Was ist des Breitman's Vaterland?
Oh! name dat blaze so pig and grand,
Where Gheist is sdill so vonderful;
Where cities all are ploonderful;
Which iron und blut to glory pring,
Where robbers ne'er on gallows schwing.
Dere let me go! dere let me go!
Und wie der Breitman leben so.

Was ist des Breitman's Vaterland?
Verefer roves de Bummerband.
Where var lets lust und murder loose,
And theft in glory finds excuse;
Where tyrant mob or robber king
Triumphant hymns to Himmel sing:
Das soll es sein! das sol es sein!
Ja Breitman, ja! dat land ist dein.

Be shut by force? No, German, no—
Your fatherland's not bounded so.

Where is the German Fatherland?
Wherever greed can close her hand—
Wherever power can crush the weak,
Or war can sheath her bloody beak
In freedom's heart; there take your
stand;
There, German, is your Fatherland.

Where is the German Fatherland?
Where men throw insult in the face,
Yet speak of peace with unctuous
grace,
Where canting rapine's wolfish game
Is played in the Almighty's name;
There, German is your Fatherland.

that so habitually stain and debase armed forces as to oppress the very profession of a soldier with an infamy of its own.

Before an examination, not satisfied with being superficial, the contradiction disappears, or rather resolves itself into that harmony between the song and character of a people that everywhere exists.

The song of France, though it sprang from the duty of defence, was instantly debased into the cry for vengeance. The very force and fervour of its poetry caused its original purpose to be swallowed up and lost before its high attribute of a perpetual song, always true and always applicable, but hitherto, unfortunately, always misapplied. It breathes so fierce a spirit of defiance against the invocation of a foreign alliance to redress internal disorder, and that indignation is so just and holy, that it cannot burn too fiercely so long as it acts as an incentive to duty,—it has mingled so much of truth of purpose with misdirection so fearful,—that it has probably for ever associated in minds more passionate than reflective, the pusillanimity and vice of such alliance with the very existence of kings as well as the virtues of patriotism with the turbulence, rebellion, and disorder of mobs. When man suffers the determination of justice to be overpowered by a thirst for vengeance, he has already passed into the capacity for murder, and, what appears to be very little remembered, he is acting without, or rather against God, the exercise of whose prerogative he has invaded. The annals of the Old Testament are frequently named as evincing an

inferior morality to that of our age ; but the assurance of Joseph's forbearance towards his brethren, who feared he might take vengeance on them after Jacob's death, is conveyed in language that is evidently conclusive to their minds when he rebukes the imputation and allays their fears with the words—" Am I in the place of God."

Amour sacré de la patrie

Conduis, soutiens nos bras vengeurs.

Consecrated love of country

Lead and sustain the arm of vengeance.

have been the passwords both to the fame and to the infamy of the noble song of Rouget de l'Isle. The last line sprang from, expressed and has nourished that life without God which is the very essence of atheism ; and from atheism have sprung the fury of the French when they have tasted blood, their weakness in the face of disaster, and their turbulence in time of trial.

The same national and individual forgetfulness of God, which is threatened with the extinction of the nation that falls into it, prevented their looking to other than second causes throughout the long course of their defeats and disasters, so that they did not remember God, either to humble themselves before Him, or to look to Him and to call upon Him for deliverance.

It is owing to the same cause that in all their more familiar and household songs there is so remarkable a want of appeal and reference to the higher and hardier qualities of manhood.

This is exactly reversed in the great bulk of the songs of Germany.

The fierce and aggressive war songs are corporate, not individual, in their character and object. They bear evidence more or less of a purpose, and shew dictation and instigation as much as individual enthusiasm. It is not difficult to think of them as sung with something of the precision and under somewhat of the circumstances under which martial music may be massed. Fine, too, as they are, they fall short altogether of the more homely songs of camp, barrack, and personal life. They are careful, moreover, to lead up to the deeds of blood and of conquest, which they invoke by the presumption that these are absolutely necessary for attaining the fixed ideal of a monster Germany under a monster government. An ideal to which the world generally, but France with especial malignity, is said to be inevitably and determinately hostile.

The cradle of this modern German national song was rocked in adversity. Every outward circumstance combined to unite individual excellence with the best aspirations of lofty patriotism. The oneness for purposes of national defence that had been provided by an imperial supremacy over a federation of sovereignties had practically passed away; but the superior domestic and social happiness to be found in smaller independent and home governed communities flourished as nowhere else. When the whirlwind of the Napoleonic career passed over the land and it was found to be defenceless, the longings of the people took the form of an intense desire to become one powerful state, till

this craving became a passion to be satisfied at any sacrifice of principle and cost,—one to which they have given their civil liberties in offering, and which they have gratified at the expense of right dealing with kindred states as well as with foreign nations; and so it came to pass that individual excellence threw itself into the hands of enthusiasm and ambition.

If the earlier songs of German defence be put in contrast with that of France the same striking difference becomes apparent that is evident in the more popular poems of the respective countries. The ‘Marseillaise’ contains not a single trace of dependence on a higher power far less on the God of Revelation as the only, the true and the known God.

How different is the case with Arndt’s,

AUFRUF.

Frish auf, ihr deutschen Shaaren !
 Frisch auf, zum Heil’gen Krieg !
 Gott will sich offenbaren
 Im Tode und im Sieg :
 Mitt Gott, dem Frommen, Starken,
 Seid fröhlich and geschwind
 Kämpft für des Landes Marken,
 Für Eltern, Weib und Kind.
 Frisch auf ! Ihr trägt das Zeichen
 Des Heils an eurem Hut ;
 Dem must die Hölle weichen,
 Und Satan’s Frevelmuth,
 Wenn ihr mit treuem Herzen,
 Und rechtem Glauben denkt,
 Für wie viel bitt’re Schmerzen,
 Sich Gottes Sohn geschenkt.

GATHERING.

Rise up, ye hosts of Germany—
 Rise to the holy war ;
 God will Himself reveal
 In victory and in death ;
 With God, the Holy and the Strong,
 Be joyous and be swift ;
 Fight for the borders of the land,
 For elders, wife, and child.
 Rise up ! Ye bear the token
 Of salvation on the helm ;
 Hell must before that yield,
 And Satan’s impious mood ;
 Whilst ye, with faithful hearts
 And true belief, remember
 To pangs how far more bitter,
 God’s Son did give Himself.

Who that can read in German, but knows some at least of Kœrner’s poems; who that has read, has read

his songs unmoved. It may, however, appear scarcely fair to trace in the songs of Germany, writhing under oppression and panting for deliverance, the spirit that has carried Prussia through her successive works of unscrupulous conquest, and yet, has at the same time, imposed on her hosts that abstinence from the worst forms of military license, for which they have been conspicuous. And yet it is so. It gave unlimited power to those among the rulers of Germany, who might see it to be so, to wield the most excellent material at will, so it were really or ostensibly directed to satisfying their one passionate desire. Scarcely a home song but shows the excellence of the material; not a war song but breathes the most immoveable determination to die, or to obtain the end. The lurking cruelty and the expressed fierceness, are palpably the offspring of doubt as to the end, a question of the possibility of success. Humiliation and disaster, the presence of the French on German soil, might have been a harder test, at least a harder test at first, than the attainment of the object. Nothing can put this in plainer evidence than the contrast between the individual personal good behaviour of the conquering troops and the atrocious cruelties perpetrated by command, as at Bazeilles and elsewhere, and the remorseless terms imposed on France with every accompaniment of cynicism from which a generous foe would have carefully abstained.

The prospect in the future is less bright. Not Prussia only, but Germany, has been brought to stain herself with crime, with the perpetration of the wrong done

to Denmark, with pitiless extortion from France, and with the forcible severance of two counties against the earnest wish of their inhabitants. The power that has become dominant in Germany, is especially laden with the guilt of treachery and violence. After receiving a decision against itself, it challenged the authority to which it had appealed. Then followed the long planned spring on Austria, carried out with marvellous success, the obliteration of North Germany, the absorption of Hanover, and the reduction of South Germany to the condition of vassalage. Utter disregard of treaties is wantonly paraded and uncrupulously practiced. Acts of aggression has not only been accompanied by diplomatic deceit, but with unexampled recklessness of accusation against the victims that had been selected, and by pretences of fear of their aggressiveness, without precedent out of the fable of the wolf and the lamb.

Ambition is an opposite school to that of desire for liberation, as opposite as aggression and falsehood are to truth and defence. The happier influences of the past are at an end,—the internal liberties are gone. Dreams of empire, cravings of pride, and words of falsehood, supersede trust in God, in hearts where ambition holds its sway. Under this possession, they cannot sing the songs of faith.

A soldier no longer fighting in defence of his country, but smarting under the consciousness of the injustice of the war in which he is engaged, cannot sing—

Du reicher Gott in Gnaden,
 Schau her vom Himmelszelt,
 Du selbst hast uns geladen,
 In dieses Waffenfeld.
 Lass uns vor Dir bestehen,
 Und geb uns heute Sieg!
 Die Christenbanner wehen,
 Dein ist, o Herr, der Krieg.

Oh, God of plenteous grace,
 Look down from Heaven's belt!
 Thyself hast led us on
 Into this battle-field;
 Let us before Thee stand,
 This day give us the victory:
 The banners are Thine own, O, Lord!
 Oh, Lord! the battle Thine.

No: Arndt, Kœrner and the singers of the liberation period will pass more and more away, and a coarser sort will take their place.

Ich denke der Champagner Wein
 Wird, wo er wächst, am besten sein.

The wine of Champagne, I opine,
 To taste best on the ground where it
 grows.

is more near the modern standard.

Kœrner's scorn for idle knaves will yield to poems of enticement to pillage and licentiousness. The sure accompaniment of these is cruelty.

Such songs as have been quoted or referred to, and others, of which *Der Gute Camerad* or 'The Chum,' as our men would say, and 'The Dawn' are examples, express the feelings of and have powerfully contributed to make the soldiers of to-day. But when this magnificent instrument is misapplied and turned to the disturbance of Europe, it must lose its tone under the impious hand that does this. The song will lose its melody, the poem its inspiration. The military organisation, by which the coveted goal has been reached, may easily be continued; the mighty power that has wielded it may be prolonged; but the material must prove of other quality. That trust in God which boldly enters the battle as ready to die as to remain

unscathed, to face death as readily as victory, the trust which before the battle has faced and overcome the fear of death in the fear of God, will have gone, and gone for ever. The aggressor that turns aside this instrument sweeps the fear of God out of the land he rules. It must have received a rude shock in the wars against Denmark and Austria: but the delusion dazzled before it, was the utterance of its one aspiration. It must inevitably have been broken in the aggression on France, but that it was made to believe France perversely warlike and incurably hostile to itself.

When reliance on God is intruded into designs of ambition, it becomes a mere profession of the lip. If the invocation of God be made with purposes of fraud and violence, so making use of the name of the Diety as the accomplice in and the patron of wrong, the heights of impiety and profaneness are well-nigh attained. The demoralisation of the* nation that does, or that permits this, must follow. The offence of degrading the noblest sentiment of a nation, and the misery to mankind which it must involve, it is impossible to estimate.

Whatever may be the disposition of Germany, and however it may, in the future—when they may be pushed

* The downward course of Prussian sentiment has since these pages have been written, shown itself, and probably received a fresh impulse in the forced resignation of office by Herr von Mühler, a step which has been commented on by the press of this country as the result of a policy not likely to maintain that religious feeling, to which the French themselves ascribed so much of the success of their conquerors.

to undisguised purposes of aggrandizement,—resist impulses which it has hitherto welcomed with the utmost enthusiasm, a strange and calamitous partiality has hitherto, seemingly, blinded other European nations to the teaching palpably set before them at every stage of the increase of Prussia.

Not a page in her history is free from the stain of unscrupulous ambition. Not an incident in her career justifies the hope of her supremacy being freed from a repetition of the crimes which this involves. From generation to generation, her pervading thought has been the perfecting of armed force and its prudential application. Violence has been to her a commercial study, and though now her apprenticeship might well be considered over, she shews so little symptom of laying aside her armed pursuits, that, on the contrary, larger rehearsals of her power than ever, are said to be going on as though the work had only to begin. Her eager and anxious preparation for a fleet that shall as much surpass the fleets of Europe, as have done her armies those against which she has contrived to pit them at advantage, betokens little intention of entering on a new and peaceful life. When the remorseless appropriation of other people's lands and the pitiless extortion of the uttermost farthing have become an historic habit and have been pursued with signal success, it is an expectation rather sanguine than warranted, especially in the face of still further plans and further preparations, that it is suddenly to cease. That vulgar insolence of manner, distinctive of

Prussian officialism, and which for years has been said to have been especially experienced by English subjects is not conciliatory in its effects. In a country under so strict and universal a discipline it is as little indicative of peaceableness as of courtesy or high civilization. That haughtiness of demeanour, to which a far harsher term might not unjustly be applied, which has been peculiarly the mark of persons of the highest influence in the affairs of Prussia, is happily known to be so sure a precursor of a fall as to go before it; but it has never been held to be the expression of gentleness of disposition. The little episode of the English flag and merchant ships and the treatment of her accredited officers were not pacific in their tendencies. The boast of the effacement of England as a power entitled to influence in Europe, and the description of her as impotent to dictate moderation, may or may not be, for the moment, true; but they have an irritating tendency. The revelations of the Berlin pigeon-hole may be the mere record of a clever exercise of theoretic military study; but it is scarcely calculated to tighten the bands of an alleged brotherhood, to be told that the desolation of England is cherished practising ground of Prussian "Geist."

The Map of Germany, with its recent additions, and the topographical study of the land of France, preceded her spoliation.

Prussia may be innocent of all aggressive design in the future; but this cannot be accepted on her own statement. Spectres more ghastly and more numerous

than those which haunted the thane of Cawdor, would rise to reproduce her past asservations, and to prove that her word acquires value only by inverted reading. The preparations she continues, her non-fulfilment of the obligations she has contracted, her overbearing, and her scoff at any other right than that of might, or of redress except by iron steeped in blood, all testify in one direction. It is that of ambition and of unbelief, except in force.

But there is, besides, an influence stronger than that of ambition, and a motive more powerful even than the completion of a plan : necessity, it has well been said, knows of no law.

The songs of France and Germany are not wider asunder, than are the sentiments and aspirations of their respective peoples. France may above all things be first passionately free, but her incapacity to agree as to what freedom, or as she calls it—liberty, consists in, has so torn her with the dissensions of individual license, that of her own free will, she found refuge in absolute rule ; and whatever be its faults of theory in the opinion of its adversaries, she has never so flourished as she has done under that rule. Germany, panting to be one, and looking to war as the only means of attaining the object of her fond idolatry, has become warlike before all things ; but she has surrendered her liberties unwillingly to the passion that has consumed them. The Germans are not favourable to absolute rule for its own sake ; and would infinitely prefer interminable constitutional disquisitions. They have not voted the priority of Prussia, unless the scene in

the Great Hall at Versailles, be deemed a popular election. Not one component of Prussian might has come willingly under its stern and arbitrary sway. Whatever may have been its necessity for German unity, Prussian supremacy is beyond doubt, the work of blood and of iron.

Unjust war waged with success,—in other words, gilded aggression, condones much crime. Germany was found ready to greet the victor with acclamations even in the streets of Hanover, Darmstadt, and Bavaria. The shameful memories of the house of Brandenburg have been obliterated by its warlike aggressiveness. Its unflinching military determination has given to it the stronger impress of unvarying success in its ultimate objects, however rough the path by which they have been reached. But war becomes in its turn the tyrant, and aggression the absolute necessity, of those who have deprived their subjects of internal freedom, and have intoxicated them with triumphs and with spoil. These must continue occupied, dazzled and bewildered ; or they may rise, in the might that has been organised, for quite another purpose, in their own behalf. The victors who have conquered Germany and stifled her liberties more utterly than they have ravaged France must needs pursue not right, but the extension as much as the consolidation of their conquests.

Maritime ascendancy and the abasement of England may be the new ambition dangled before bewildered Germany.

CHAPTER III.

ON RUSSIA.

HOLY Russia has one creed and one document, which is to her in the place of poetry and song. Her creed is the Czar; her document is the testament of a Czar. To her, her Czar is the vice-gerent of the Diety; the land under his sway is to her, holy, and that beyond, profane. The document reveals to her people the will of the Most High and of the Czar, for redemption of the profane by the extension of the holy land of Russia: to her statesmen it represents one supreme, permanent and unalterable object, and embodies the means by which its attainment is to be achieved. The means are different to those which distinguish Prussia. Armed force holds but the second place in her estimation, and subtlety the first. To put the various powers of Europe in succession one against another, till each becomes in its turn an easy prey, or an instrument that she can influence and control, is the traditional policy she has adopted, and which, with or without reason, she enshrines as the dying injunctions of the Czar to whom she owes the foundations of her greatness.

She teaches her subjects that in obeying the Czar's behest they obey the will of God, and so, by that

perversion of truth which a limitless extension of a fundamental but a bounded law admits, she welds her masses into an homogeneous, blind, and willing instrument, with all the high and noble qualities that obedience, untempered by light, can bestow. The virtues as well as the faults which thus ensue, characterise her soldiers and her peasantry alike. One mould shapes her internal life and her external policy. But the moment light dawns on blind obedience, the obedience which before had all the excellence and was capable of all the heroism compatible with ignorance, must become qualified in exact proportion to the light received; for that which was as right before becomes deliberate wrong, if the direction imposed on that obedience be itself a wrong. The choice must then be made between light and obedience, and hence the weakness as well as the strength of the policy of Peter the Great, which is but the expansion of the rule and motto of Catherine of Medicis—'Divide et impera.' The functionaries of Russia, schooled and trained to give the direction of wrong to these habits of obedience, cannot do so without the all-imperilling guilt of misdirecting human minds and engulfing the ignorant in crime. They are agents deliberately giving to the whole life of a nation the direction of wrong. Uncorrupt men cannot do this, and the corruptness of Russian officials of all ranks and classes is the scandal of the land, and has often caused the arm of the Czar to fall powerless. It admits of no remedy except by renouncing the object of universal supremacy and empire; but

the Russian has been brought to look upon this as the very renunciation of Holy Russia herself.

Filled with these pretensions, and ever pursuing this aim, her primary immediate object must always be the fall of the Turkish empire and the possession of Constantinople and the Straits of the Dardanelles. The rival pretensions of the Sultan fill Czar and people with immeasurable indignation. The Czar is the rightful inheritor in her eyes of the emperors of the East, and Constantinople, under those emperors, the rightful representative of the universal monarchy from which Rome had fallen. The Mussulman is to her an infidel intruder whose possession no time can ratify, and no treaty countenance beyond the moment necessity may impose; whilst in her eyes it is her sacred office to bring all her power, energies, and subtlety to bear, in order to hasten the end of that necessity. The Mussulman's sin in the utter rejection of the Saviour of the world, and her own profession of his adoration each lend their powerful aid to the attainment of her object. It is a fact which can be brought home to the understanding of the most ignorant. It can be applied to paralyse the hostility of Europe to her unscrupulous acts; it admits of the devotion of her peasantry, and the self-sacrifice of her soldiery being made the instruments of her ambition. She has so blended this sentiment with the whole being of the nation that it is to her the inspiration of song and the enthusiasm of poetry in action.

Her rule, where not opposed, is not without benefi-

cence, though the cruelty of her vengeance is proverbial. She is training herself carefully for the role she aspires to fill. The pschyconomist tells us of her people—‘It is the hand that is destined to be master of the world,’ and her ambition believes it. One of the most patriotic schools of English thought has long studied to lay bare convincing evidence of the steadfastness and progress of her purpose, and especially of the subtlety which peculiarly distinguishes her every act. The student of Divine prophecy finds reason to see in her the great power of the North, that will finally place its standard in “the Holy Mountain,” and of which it is written, “He shall come to his end there, and none shall help him.”

The struggles for possession of particular places in the Holy Land and for certain priorities of rights and privileges between the Eastern and Western Churches ; in other words, between the would-be representatives of the Eastern and Western empire are familiar matters of contemporary history,—as are also the ceaseless attempts of the Czar to place himself in the position of protector of those subjects of the Sultan that are Christian by profession.

It is quite evident that these facts taken singly—namely, the ambition of Russia,—the policy by which she pursues it,—and the events which have within a few years crowded the history of Europe,—are as plainly consistent with the law of cause and effect as it is possible to be ; but the consequences which necessarily attend their combination are such that we shrinkingly

put them aside instead of contemplating the result and meeting it like men.

The prominent characteristic of the final form of universal dominion, as foretold in Holy Writ, is the extermination of every creature that offers it so much as passive resistance, and we are face to face already with a gigantic power that is straining every nerve to attain to universal supremacy.

The present and future position of Russia touches England more closely than any other strictly European people.

The professed goal—that is the goal made necessary by the passionate impulse of the ambition of universal power,—is the Holy Land. Constantinople is the stepping-stone, and once won, the rest is easy. We may, therefore, treat it as the primary aim, whatever may be the pretence put forward as the means for wielding at will and as a unity the people and forces of “all the Russias” that make up the one “Holy Russia.”

The Turk must be dislodged. But there were powers in Europe that did not adopt the Russian view of “Holiness,” and that would not join in schemes for Turkish spoliation devised to make Russia reign supreme.

Who and what were these ?

Austria, papal and terrified at the thought of a formidable neighbour instead of one tempered down into gentle placidity : Austria, empress of Germany in law, heiress of Rome by right or pretension ; Austria, holder of Italy ; Austria, herself the titular and real

representative of Roman, or in other words of universal empire; Austria, herself holy, Roman and imperial by style, title, and pretension.

The seat of the hereditary dominions of the princes who had become hereditary heads of an empire that had become elective, had superseded the true seat of the nominal empire. Vienna, not Rome, was the capital of the holy Roman empire, under the princes of the House of Austria. Rome, however, boasts herself eternal and clings to the tradition of her power. The greater drew and still is drawing the less. The remnant of empire passed more and more away from that which held the shadow and the name, and tended more or less to revert to a new emanation from the centre that had been the source and inspiration of the power of that empire. The perpetual separation of the princes of the empire from that centre, and the difference of language between Vienna and Rome favoured the representation that Italy had passed under a foreign yoke

Rome herself was ruled in nominal independence; but was bitterly angry at her political lot and insignificance. Instead of being empress of the world, she was the spoil and sport of priests. But the arch-priest, the Pope of Rome, was a third rival pretender, claiming a more impious vice-gerency even than the Czar. He affected to sway all nations, kindreds, and tongues, and Austria and the empire were the child and parent of the Pope, both the blessed and the protector.

Moreover, the geographical position of Austria

tempted her half to violence against the Sultan, half to his protection ; but, as against Russia, to protection certainly.

The excitation of the cry of nationalities would hasten the effect of the tendencies at work and end the sway of Austria, imperil if not destroy the Pope, and knock half the peoples of Europe one against another, to the inevitable destruction of some.

Accordingly, the machinery was set in motion, and proved of even unexpected efficacy.

There was seated on the throne of France an enthusiast,—one of whose earliest dreams had been the deliverance of Italy from the thralldom of that ecclesiastical rule which was upheld by Austria. It was a masterpiece of Russian diplomacy, to bring the autocratic Czar of all the Russias to approach the elected Sovereign of turbulent France, in order to bring about a democratic revolutionary dream of the youth of the man who had been in arms against him.

Italy and Austria were separated. The necessities, moderation or discernment of Napoleon ended the alliance; but another instrument was ready. After the episode that left Denmark defenceless and prepared a way for Russia into the North Sea, Prussia was only too ready to turn her arms against her legitimate Sovereign, and completed the humiliation of Austria by depriving her of her imperial supremacy over the confederation of Germany.

These, however, were but preparatory measures (as indeed all must be,) until that power is degraded, self-

degraded or deposed by violence, which had most power, if it have it not, and had, and has, most interest and most responsibility, in the maintenance of true right against ambitious pretensions and dissemblings.

What Sir Hamilton Seymour rejected for England, must now be done in her despite. It has never been impossible to the representatives of astute states, to influence the domestic arrangement of the nations. to which they are accredited.

Especially in democratic countries, cursed with party spirit, is this foreign interference easy of concealment. The constant ebb and flow in revolutionary countries, that is, in all countries, whatever be their form of government that have no fixed principles and in which power and privilege are not exercised in proportion to obligation discharged, made it easy to create or to take advantage of a favourable conjuncture, and to supersede statesmen of England by partizans of Russia; or at all events, by the personal opponents of those who had penetrated and opposed her ambition. England was made to pride herself on her insular position, and on her moderation. She was taught to repudiate more and more all interference with the affairs of foreign nations, and partly from generosity, partly from fault, exactly from that combination of falsehood and truth, of right and of error, from which the most valuable advantages of subtlety are won, becomes less and less able and willing to discern where lies that line of demarkation between the internal rights of nations and the responsibilities which attach to the whole Euro-

pean commonwealth of which she is a member. At all events, the probability, if not the possibility, of her interference in this next act of the drama, was effectually prevented.

The collision of Prussia with France was precipitated; the western alliance was broken. Its re-construction was to be rendered impossible. A long cherished and carefully planned design was put in execution. By a skilful manipulation of the arts of diplomacy, France was seemingly placed in the wrong. It was alleged, as has been done before with like success in the case of Austria, that she was the scheming treacherous aggressor. She was driven into the declaration of war. She lost the sympathy of England, which was carried over to the side of the real aggressor. The action or inaction of the government of England was secured. By a coincidence more singular than explicable, the army of England was reduced and her naval stores were distributed by auction; so that neither army nor navy was available, exactly at this conjuncture. Russia must have failed signally in her usual skill if she were not perfectly cognizant of the intention as well as of the act; but Russia was the scarcely concealed ally of Prussia, if not her instigator throughout. Whilst it was only through the attitude of England that the aggression had been rendered possible, she received the congratulations of Europe and claimed the recognition of France for her judgment in limiting the spread of war out of deference to the expressed determination of Russia. France was to be over-

whelmed by a superior power strong enough to crush her, and none should dare stay the fray. This crowning injury and provocation was claimed as justification of an alleged impartiality, which they proved to be false or foolish,—most probably both. This deference to the stronger and isolation from the weaker, are, however, only the consistent and indeed inevitable superstructure of a policy built up on the theory, that European powers have no international responsibility for the maintenance of right. If the theory be true, the conclusion is wise. If it be false, it is a formal acceptance of the supremacy of brute force.

Frankenstein's monster may frequently become too powerful for his master, and it has been said, not without some show of reason, that the relations between Prussia and Russia contain the germs of disagreement; but no one can give the slightest thought to the dominant passion of Russia, and fail to perceive that it is not her purpose to evoke a quarrel with Prussia, until that power has subserved her purpose, and gratified her own desire in the attempt to wrest from England that dominion of the sea, which is the only human safeguard of an insular power face to face with aggressive communities.

CHAPTER IV.

ON ENGLAND.

“REVOLUTION,” according to dictionaries, is defined to be “a returning motion.” Explained by its derivation, it is a motion which turns and turns, again and again. Dictionaries continue the definition thus—“a change of government in a state or country.” Further are found “revolutionize,” “to change the government in any state or country;” and “revolutionist,” “a favourer of revolutions;” or, completing the explanation by the aid of the previous definitions, revolutionists are “the favourers of changes of government in any state or country.”

We have accustomed ourselves to associate violence with the idea of revolution, and because violence is the chronic accompaniment of changes of government in France, we have written down France as the home of revolution and the country of revolutionists. We have fallen into the errors and evils that spring from the lax and careless abuse of language and speech, and so have unconsciously glided into a self-complacent condemnation of our neighbours and a reprehension of “revolution” and of “revolutionists,” as we have under-

stood the terms which the thing and its abettors may full well deserve, but which we might not have been ready to bestow so lustily and glibly had we been aware that we were condemning ourselves out of our own mouths.

That which requires force to accomplish in one place, but which in another finds a condition prepared for its unrestrained action, is not at home under the condition of violence, but under that of ease. The violence accompanying revolutions is the measure of the difficulty which the abettors of change experience in attempting to carry out their designs.

A country perpetually harassed by revolutions accompanied with violence, is one in which revolution may be struggling for a home, but in which the abettors of change are nearly balanced in strength by the opponents of revolution in general, or of the particular direction it is desired to give the contemplated change in each successive case.

A country, however, which has so arranged its rule that not only change of government, but *change in every law on which government is founded*, has become its fundamental idea of freedom and privilege, is undeniably a country of revolutionists and the home of revolution. The country answering this description is not France, but England.

If revolution can be justified as the primary characteristic of rule, it must be by the abstract excellence of change; otherwise, any principle once admitted to be true and practical, stability would be

sought for that principle at least, by those who had received it. Inasmuch, therefore, as principle is invariably true and always applicable, a country adapting the machinery of its government to constant change, cannot rightly be said to have adopted any principle whatever.

A revolutionary nation may have habits of rule ; it may have many things not as yet plunged into the revolutionary vortex, but it cannot be truly said to have any institutions. It may have many things that have stood a long time ; many that were put together before the dominance of revolution ; many that were never intended to be touched by revolution ; many that once have been established, that once were, and were intended always to be institutions ; but in the presence of revolution their stability is necessarily gone.

The establishment of any tribunal, permanently endowed with the power of dealing unreservedly, not only with the outward forms of government, but with determining what are and what are not to be the very bases of national and social life, is nothing short of revolution made permanent, let the tribunal be constituted as it may. Such a tribunal consists in England (where it is said the system had its birth, and is to be seen in the highest perfection,) of the Sovereign and the Lords and Commons, assembled in a Council which by a monstrous fiction, reflects the whole nation in its corporate capacity, embracing its varied ranks, its wealth, its intelligence and its numbers. It commits and binds the nation to the laws it passed. Its work is incessant

change of legislation. The more nearly, therefore, the august assembly approaches to its high ideal in reflecting the nation, the more completely it exhibits the industry and interest of the country in its national character, as absorbed in the work of revolution. This is so true in fact as well as word that the neglect of the most grave details in the administration of known laws and duties, and of such daily necessities as concern only life and health and honesty, is held to be not only free from blame, but to be commendable. The irresistible pressure of a higher necessity is accepted as a sufficient plea for putting such matters aside. After six thousand years of the world's history, and eight hundred of that of the kingdom, it is still deemed more imperative to devise fresh theories about national existence and well being.

This is precisely the language of avowed and recognized revolutionists, that is, according to the received meaning of the word, of men who accompany their love of change with acts of violence. To both alike, the past offers no guidance; it is full only of precepts and examples to be shunned. In their greed for change,—incongruity, inaptitude and incapacity,—are to them no offence. On the contrary—to them, a tailor sitting in the place of a throne, a merchant ruling the sea, a lawyer dictating in the field, a boor in the gallery of arts, the goddess of reason in the temple of God,—are proofs of progress. A man's acquaintance with his own business, with his calling, in the holy meaning of that full and beautiful word of our olden speech, which

tells in one sound of Divine Providence,—and that specially and personally exercised,—and of obedience to it—and that yielded for conscience sake—that teaches of capacity, given and applied in an appointed way:—all this, to the revolutionist, is less than nothing. It is one form of resistance to revolution, and so the instrument for the abolition of everything that is and the substitution of all that is not, receives a more than commonly strong application, that change may go on the faster.

There is an especial distinction in England which stamps it as peculiarly the home of revolution. The element of friction, that is of resistance, has been well nigh eliminated altogether. All the authority in the land is compromised in its changes, and the variable-ness of authority is made to spring from, and to depend upon, that of the mass. In man, fallen and debased, the only constant is his variableness.

So the machine seems to work smoothly. Its use is universally obtruded as the one specific for all the ills that national flesh is heir to; and truly, for perfect adaptation to its purpose, that of facilitating true revolution, or change without resistance, it is not easy to see that it can be surpassed. But it has this inherent and fatal fault: if the direction of change be evil, there is nothing to resist it, and no remedy other than the disruption of a system, identified with the whole nation in its corporate aspect. This is the case in England, where there is no power whatever to resist the revolution ceaselessly at work: but revolution,

stealthy and unsuspected because unceasing and ever present, may finally engulf a people in irreparable consequences, infinitely more disastrous than even many outbreaks of violent revolutionary disturbance.

The theory of this organic system of perpetual change is, that the high conjoint assembly reflects, if it does not actually comprise, the whole nation, and that therefore, no law can be imposed upon the nation, but at the pleasure of the assembly, and none which that same assembly cannot at will, modify, alter or repeal.

This theory is specious as all theories must be in order to gain general acceptance, and it is true so far as it extends ; but it bears upon its front the fallacy by which it is fatally condemned. That the bent of a whole nation cannot be resisted by any instrumentality within it, does not admit of question, any more than that a full and fair reflection of its convictions, and its will is the most effectual means for preserving its internal peaceableness. It is the permanent establishment in constant action of such a tribunal that is necessarily at variance with stability, and therefore wrong. It is the fit accompaniment of every condition of change, but it is compatible only with change. Its functions cease with the establishment of the change to effect which it would be rightfully assembled. It is the rightful instrument of change or revolution under its high and useful aspect ; but translated into permanency, it is inconsistent with all other permanency, and becomes the means for the propagation of revolu-

tion in its destructive and pernicious form. The tribunal which can make, shape and repeal law, is not the proper administrator of law, nor the rightful custodian of its sanctity, and has itself no lawful existence in the presence of established law.

If there were no light for the guidance of man in the organisation of his social existence, the hope or even the possibility of finding some light or guidance by dint of ceaseless experiments would be the hope, and would stimulate every effort of wisdom. To be everything by turns, and nothing long, would be the wise man's part. Yet, even on this assumption, the justification of change would cease with the discovery of light. A nation which confesses the reception of One Light, and calls that light 'The Light' and 'Eternal Truth,' cannot at the same time, justify an organisation legally empowered to call in question the existence, and the acceptance or rejection of that light.

Choice must be made between the two, between revealed religion, and a tribunal empowered to overthrow it; but the tribunal in permanent action in England, neither is nor can be, fettered by any restriction. It is the highest tribunal which the aggregate of the nation can form, and its range of object for determination can be controlled only by its moderation. That moderation has already ceased, when the principle of the dependence of the organisation of human society on a higher, a known and a supreme law, is liable to be called in question. To

have no fixed principles after a history of eight hundred years, is either to deny the light, or to say that it has not been followed hitherto. This is precisely the difference between the days of the Tudors and those that now are. When men meant the words they spoke, they formed again the organizations of society in harmony with the light. Convinced that the light had been obscured, they went back to seek its guidance with diligence and care. They did not strike out for new. They set themselves to the task of forming and building up again; to reformation and restoration. That revolution was towards the light.

In the days that are, the reception of the light, and submission to its guidance have been formally made to be dependent on the momentary inclination of man. The authority of revelation and the principles of duty and obedience, have been displaced from being paramount over man. They have been degraded to accidents, which according to their teaching, it rests with the national tribunal to accept, reject or modify at will. This revolution is from the light. It is infidelity in practice.

From godlessness in active exercise to atheism in national profession, the step is shorter than may seem. The presumptuous instrument that makes the determination of truth to depend on the caprice of man, subverts the relations between the Maker and the creature, and must perish in its vain and foolish work.

In England, that instrument is, in theory, the whole nation in deliberate and constant action.

CHAPTER V.

ON ENGLAND.—*continued.*

LOGICAL as these deductions and true as these statements are, they seem to lead to monstrous consequences at variance with evidence and fact. It will be said that the form of government in these islands, and the constitution and perpetual action of the supreme tribunal, have been time out of mind the same, and that they have proved the instruments of prosperity and of historical grandeur. It will be added, that it is only now that they have been brought, and still are being brought to finer and finer adjustment, and receiving the highest finish of elaboration.

Unfortunately, this is admitting much. Change has reached the instrument itself. In other words, revolution is devouring itself. Moreover, the contrariety between deductions from principle and facts as they appear, vanishes on investigation. There is, to begin with, the all important distinction between revolving towards, or away from light:—the difference both in the principles and in the forms of government, as they approximate to or recede from light. But there is, also, the historic fact, which is not in accordance

with, but contrary to the statement, that the supreme tribunal, or even the forms of government, have been, time out of mind, the same. In every essential they have been different until recent, indeed until very recent days. This appears, most plainly, by considering what they are now.

First—there is the Sovereign, or the power of the Crown. It may be better, or it may be worse to have the Sovereign constrained and powerless, not sovereign over advisers whom the Crown can neither select, control nor punish; but few will be found to pretend that this is the historical position of the Crown of England.

Next—there are the Lords spiritual. The power and influence of ecclesiastics may have been too great at times. It may, or it may not, be better than this, that all the bishops of one of the three kingdoms, should have been suddenly degraded from their rank, and expelled from their offices, even in their own persons; but he reads history strangely who can see in this condition, identity with the condition of the past.

It would be as difficult to identify the barons of England, who withstood kings in their day of might, and won the liberties of England, in the peers who are now desired to set their house in order by noisy lecturers in borough towns.

And surely no course of more unceasing encroachment and turbulent usurpation, has, in the history of any people, marked any depository of power than has attended the progress of that “high life below stairs,”—the house of the knights of the shires and burgesses,

which pretends to bestow all the power of the crown and to wield it by its nominees, yet evades the responsibilities that attend its exercise and the penalties that attach to its abuse ; which brow-beats and insults the higher House, but passes its own time in reckless party strife.

The olden administration of the country by the Sovereign in Council has altogether disappeared as a reality, and with it has fallen all real responsibility. The mockery of a perpetual scramble for the spoils of office has taken the place of the power that sent traitors against the well-being of the state to the Tower and the block. All these things may be improvements, or they may not ; one thing only is too clear to be disputed—they are not the same. Each bears its own separate testimony to the whirl of revolution.

The country has retained its glossary ; but it has effaced its landmarks. It has been tempted to destroy realities, under the delusion that conservation of the name, preserved the substance. It has instead, lost the power of learning from its own history. Reading of things, of which it still retains the names, and which, to the ear, it has before it still, it fails to penetrate the spirit of the time when name and thing, word and substance were one, when words represented the realities and truths of life.

The composition of the Houses has changed, as much as have their offices and relative positions. They had their origin in the simplest, and, at the same time, the noblest principle on which human society

can be constituted, and it is the only one that is consistent with its stability and endurance. This, tersely stated, is the *extension of privilege to the measure of obligation*. Recognition, by the law of the land, that liability to duty, involves the exaction of its fulfilment, and that performance of duty carries with it proportionate privilege. In a monetary age, the expression of this principle, did it survive, or were it recovered, would be *influence in representation directly proportionate to the measure of taxation borne*. It is rendering to all their due.

Entire liability to the commonwealth, both in property and person, and the priority of the claims of the commonwealth, before all others, are principles that in olden time, were put in practice; they were not disputed nor debated.

The "Wittenagemot" of the Saxons, as well as the subsequent assembly of the knights of the shires and burgesses, was the practical acknowledgement of the privilege that accompanies the discharge of liability in the service of the commonwealth. They were organizations, it may be, that also enforced the discharge of the liability, and maintained the security of the privilege, but they certainly did not call in question the truth of the one, or frustrate the performance of the other, by debates on the nature or existence of duty, far less by the modern insane assertion of an universality of right and privilege, regardless of proportion, and independent of, and superior to, the discharge of duty to the state.

The duty of the king to the commonwealth, and

of the barons to the king, consisted in the ordinary administration of known laws, and the observance of known, recognized, and binding, although unwritten principles. The high assembly of the realm was convoked in solemn consultation only for special purposes, formally announced. On the determination of the decision, the kingdom reverted to its normal condition of subjection to the law, under the government of the Sovereign in Council.

The vital difference between this condition, and that which now is, deprives of all force and consolation, the assertion so often hazarded, that the days that were, and the men that have been, were as bad or worse than those that are. The law may have been transgressed, and the transgressions may have been heavy, frequent, and terrible; but it was as crime acknowledged, and felt to be crime. Now offence is committed purposely, and not the offender, but the law is arraigned as in fault. The purpose of modern legislation is the subversion of all law; the obliteration of human subjection to eternal and unalterable laws. Man gives it in evidence of progress, that he calls all law in question, and obeys none, till he is satisfied with its conditions. The postponement of obedience to what is termed philosophy, determines the character of the age.

Just as it would be a waste of words to point out at greater length, that this condition is vitally different from that which has been, so it would be scarcely possible to enumerate the differences; but they may be briefly summed up in this, that whilst past revolu-

tion has frequently been a violent endeavour to turn towards the light, that is to say, has been a struggle for the recovery of principle, and the better observance of duty—for recovery from their neglect and disuse—the revolution that now is, is revolution without a struggle,—revolution that obliterates all permanence, except that of change, and that tends to the dissolution of society.

The Wittenagemot was the assembly of ‘the wise and aged met in Council.’

It was not an augury of better things when the assembly was called “*parlement*,” yet it was not a term unfitting an assembly called to consider, as well as to decree, the execution of certain specified matters. “Talkdom” would be the more intelligible rendering, now that our language has lost so much of the significance of its Norman elements. M. T., member of talkdom, would not only be the truer designation, it might even now save the country from the ruin which must attach to its revolutionary course by making evident, by its mere utterance, the folly of living under the reality. That reality we groan under; but we disguise it from ourselves by using a term we have ceased to understand. The vulgar epithet applied to ceaseless talk is ‘chatter,’ or ‘jabber’ when it is at all malevolent. These terms are taken from the noise and way of apes. We live under the rule and sway of Jabberdom; so much so, that the Darwinian theory might be supposed to be in error, chiefly in having inverted the order in the origin of species. Power in

the countries that have most prominently followed this delusion has naturally fallen into the hands of the men of the most words; the most notorious talkers; the chatterers and jabberers. Many centuries ago, the word given by Divine inspiration to a man, who was emphatically wise, was this: 'In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin;' and again to another: 'A man full of words shall not prosper in the earth.'

Party worship, and party strife have extinguished devotion to the welfare of the Commonwealth. Sectional divisions, class interests and party victories, are the highest impulses invoked. Neutralizing their antagonisms is the nearest approach to even the theoretic idea of a common well-being. The inevitable consequence is the proscription and sacrifice of principle.

CHAPTER VI.

ON ENGLAND—*continued.*

PRIVILEGE springs from fulfilled obligation. It is its fruit and reward. By every law of reason, right and sense, it should be proportionate to the measure of obligation fulfilled. There can be no right of privilege without adequate discharge of obligation. On the other hand there can be no right to limit privilege, and at the same time to extend obligation.

Degrees of obligation discharged rightfully, carry with them proportionate privilege. Of this right, voting power in proportion to taxation borne, is obviously one form. Disregard of this connection in the fulness and harmony of due proportion is so grave a fault, as to endanger national continuance. It is, in fact, the disfranchisement of excellence and the strength of revolution. It constitutes in itself the tyranny of the worse over the better portion of the nation, and is contrary alike to sense and justice. It sets at naught the strongest incentives to patriotism and limits the energies of man to individual self-seeking. He must forego his proper share of influence, or take altogether

to public life, which it is absurd to suppose can be pursued by more than a few; but every man is entitled to influence in proportion to the burden he discharges, and if entitled, then morally answerable for its exercise. The sense of personal responsibility must therefore always be at war with an unjust, unreasonable, and injurious restraint. Exertion, moreover, is the road to national as much as to individual prosperity, and a system which allows no difference of influence between a man who contributes largely towards the discharge of national obligations and another whose share in the common burden is scarcely to be perceived, deprives the state, by arbitrary folly and injustice, of the due influence of the men who make instead of mar its well-being.

The capacity which has made them what they are is lost to the counsels of the nation. The position they hold is evidence of that capacity, and must be adequately reflected in any representation that could rightly claim to express the true aspect of the nation. The wrong and bad faith of a system which denies this right are evident from the single circumstance, that men are not so infatuated as to adopt a similar rule in any other transaction of life. They do not so conduct the business of any other interests as those of the nation. They do not dream of exposing their commercial or private affairs to the mischances that would be the inevitable consequence of the attempt. The affairs of the nation, although immeasurably the larger, do not require different principles to those which govern all other transactions. On the contrary, the

more careful adherence to the same principles is indispensable in proportion to the largeness of the stake at issue.

Acquisitiveness in some form, is the strongest stimulant to individual exertion, and among the higher aspirations of men who have acquired property, influence, intelligence, or skill, is the desire to place in the most favourable position that they can, those that they care for and that come after them. This desire is strongest in such as are not only endowed with such gifts, but have received, or acquired them, by means of principles they value, understand, cherish, and desire to see perpetuated. The same things by which a man achieves individual prosperity build up the welfare of the nation. These self-evident and simple facts were once understood and acted on: the revolution has turned principles over. Were the ordinary practice of the country a picture drawn from imagination rather than a reality, it would scarcely be believed that absurdity so wild could be found out of the regions of lunacy.

The country acknowledges the instincts which prompt exertion, appears to value and reward their action. It watches with delight all that is most esteemed amongst its ranks, climbing by various paths of common excellence to the highest distinction that it can bestow. It forms this culled and choice selection into a grand tribunal, which it invests with the highest honour and dignity. It then suddenly turns round, deprives these very men individually of their personal influence, though on the plea of that formally bestowed

on their especial office. Next it goes on to cover this tribunal, so laboriously constituted for purposes of honour, with common abuse. It threatens with intimidation and extinction, the assembly into which only the highest excellence, real or supposed, can gain admittance, but which is, and always has been, open to excellence and desirous of its acquisition. Finally, it bids it stoop to dictation at the hand of quite another gathering.

A gathering notoriously inattentive to imperial interests, reckless in its disregard both of the law and the lawfulness of its legislation, unscrupulous in its requirements, careless both in its parsimony and its lavishness, but possessed of a fierce activity in the attainment of its personal and party objects, and irrepressible in meddling with every function, provided only it be beyond the province of its proper duties.

With but a seven years lease of life for its individual members, it is unfortunately regularly renewed in its corporate capacity, and so is extinct only to revive, and is never in abeyance. From cradle to grave it has no characteristic of honour. It is brought into being amidst corruption, drunkenness, and mob-violence. It is hurrying on to add secrecy and concealment to cover vices it acknowledges and does not control. It expresses itself so incompetent as to be incapable of any other remedy for the orgies of the periodical parturition that brings it into being: but it is so encroaching as to have seized for the nominee of its choice the exercise of the power of the Crown.

It hurls its invectives against and strives to impose its will upon that great high council which is composed from all of every kind that has been held in the highest individual esteem. Itself individually collected for objects of self, pelf, and party, it represents every kind of interest except that of the common weal, which, in the blind worship of party, it has rendered impossible so long as it continues. It numbers many a score of excellent exceptions, but they are an overwhelmed minority. They are powerless protesters against evils they are powerless to stay.

A country which is a prey to never ceasing change falls into slavery under manipulation arranged by its smallest minds. It becomes weighed down with pettiness, small questions and little issues. Expediency usurps the place of honour, and pretence is seldom wanting to expediency. The maintenance of right is named intervention, armed defence, extravagant expenditure. Intermeddling and revolutionary agitation profess, on the contrary, to be support and protection to the weak and wronged. The negation of revelation assumes to be respect for human independence. Meanness of demeanour calls itself conciliation; the surrender of strength at the shrines of luxury and avarice, heralds itself as the incoming of a new age into the world.

There is a coalition struggling hard for mastery, both in the House of Commons and the nation, that holds no other aim so dear as casting aside all national means for preserving the knowledge of the Deity, and shutting out from the realm the only source of that knowledge—the Bible.

If the temper of a nation may be judged by its songs, the National Anthem of the past, read in contrast with its modern parody, furnishes a warning that cannot fail to be laid to heart by any people not given over to judicial infatuation.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

God save the King,
Send him victorious,
Happy and glorious,
Long to reign over us,
God save the King.

Thy choicest gifts in store
On him be pleased to pour,
Long may he reign.
May he defend our laws,
And ever give us cause,
To sing with heart and voice,
God save the King.

O Lord, our God, arise,
Scatter his enemies,
And make them fall.
Confound their politics,
Frustrate their knavish tricks,
On him our hopes we fix,
God save the King.

SAVE YOURSELVES.

People throughout the land
Join in one social band,
And save yourselves.
If you would happy be,
Free from all slavery,
Banish all knavery,
And save yourselves.

Why will you always toil
While others share the spoil?
Work for yourselves.
Let them who live so high
Work for themselves, or try
To keep themselves.

Parsons and peers may preach,
And endless falsehoods teach,
Think for yourselves.
Then let your watchword be
Justice and liberty;
And toil unweariedly
To save yourselves.

There is no hesitancy to be found in the compilers, authors and circulators of these modern songs of a new England. They are not simply content with flinging the aspersion of wholesale and deliberate lying for the sake of gain, upon the peerage and the Church of England, they state, that "the theological teachings of "the world are most powerfully obstructive of human "improvement and happiness . . . it is the duty

"of every individual . . . to actively attack the
 "barriers, . . . to give equal freedom of thought
 "and utterance upon theological subjects.

*"The passive list [of members] consists of those
 "whose position does not permit the publication of
 "their names.*

"The objects are to obtain the repeal of the laws
 "against blasphemy as a special matter affecting the
 "members.

"The disestablishment and disendowment of the
 "State Church . . . the destruction of the present
 "hereditary chamber of peers."

The collection, as may be supposed, contains allusions painful to refer to and difficult to quote; but such specimens as follow are enough to strip the pretence of accidental error from the act of joining in the efforts of this conspiracy which are set forth without disguise.

We want no Bibles in the school,
 No creeds or doctrines there.

What's been a fruitful cause of cant,
 Hypocrisy, deception, rant,
 And madness oft when brains were scant?
 The Bible.

What eighteen centuries has stayed
 The progress science else had made,
 In rendering mankind her aid?
 The Bible.

Praise God for that, our worn-out creed,
By which we yet the people "bleed,"
And let us raise our voices higher—
Praise Him for brimstone and hell-fire!

Praise Him for queens and tyrant kings!
May we all value such dear things!
And teach the people 'tis God's will—
Their toil should Royal coffers fill.

Praise God for dukes, and lords, and earls,
All better flesh than common-churls;
Praise him for bishops strong in might,
To bless the wrong and curse the right.

Blasphemy and scurrility are not new. It is new and evil to find parliamentary work in the House of Commons in unison with revolting folly and wickedness.

Fortunately it is written—"Them that honour Me I will honour, and those that despise Me shall be lightly esteemed."

CHAPTER VII.

ON IRELAND.

NEVER before had the revolution achieved so great a triumph. It had fought the fight of the standing or falling ground of nations, and it had won the day with every accessory that could give lustre to the triumph and victory. The name of the 'dis-establishment and dis-endowment of the Church of Ireland' had been given to the battle-field; the rejection of national recognition of the Almighty by one part of the United Kingdom, had been achieved. The fool had said in his heart, "there is no God." The revolution had affirmed the same by the mouth of the British House of Commons.

The higher tribunal of the realm had opposed that House in the matter of a tax, and it had then gained the day. Now it had fought for its honour, its principles, and its convictions, and had been made false to its creed and to God,—true only to treason. It had spoken the word "content" to that which it loathed. It had, for very fear confessed, decreed that to be law which it declared impiety. The arch druid in very olden time, had voted for the introduction of Christianity: the chief official representative of its teaching had now set

forth the unholy evil of its abolition, but had given no vote for its retention. Influential lay peers exposed the monstrous injustice and impiety of the bill, but pleaded for the utterance of "content:" so strong did they deem the wilfulness of England on this decisive question.

It was a moment to be marked in her history. The nation had, as was said, expressed its will. A union formidable for strength, number and determination, had carried a party to power, for the purpose of this bill. The country had not been surprised in an unhappy and unguarded moment. It had been expressly appealed to: the vital change, though not the vital character of that change, had been set before it. The assembly had been summoned to adopt or to reject it, and it had resolved to bring about this consummation. The nation, so far as the mass which had the power of deciding, but was constituted without reference to the discharge of obligation, can be called the nation,—the mass of number with equality of voting power,—had answered the appeal with even passionate earnestness. The new watch-word passed from faction to faction, and what had been likened to a scattered rabble, stood like ranked warriors ranged for the fray.

The triumph of the revolution was complete. For the first time in Gentile Christendom,—for the first time, it is likely, in the history of any nation—was achieved, not in the frenzy of a violent outbreak, not by the lowest of the people, but by a Monarchy with all the peaceful accompaniments of a legal condition, the

solemn renunciation of the Most High by a nation claiming the true knowledge of God.

On poor Ireland, always a prey to internal dissensions, from which she has never been suffered to recover, and now doctored by strangers, this vile experiment was to be practised. Religious, if superstitious Ireland was the victim on which the effects of dogmatic dispute were to be exhibited. The disputes themselves were to be hushed by common consent in the obliteration of God as recognised ruler over the nation. "Victoria, Queen of the Britains, by the grace of God, defender of the faith," was to be made first for Ireland less than an empty sound,—a lie. As the clock struck between the years 1870 and 1871, the recognition of God and of His Anointed King on the part of Ireland as a nation was to cease. Henceforth, Ireland as a kingdom was to know Him no more by whom kings reign and princes decree justice.

The people of the olden faith might still singly practice, if they could, the old familiar way. They might do so in a corporate body on conditions. They should even be given a portion of that which was their own. Ungodliness, it was said, is not intolerance—it remains to be seen what it will prove to be—but the nation should no longer have "this man" to reign over them. Another way of rule had been learned in the schools of sedition and murder.

When did revolution ever triumph so before?

Once there came a message, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill to man." The

new message of the revolution proclaimed man's peace and goodwill by setting aside the worship and knowledge of God. This, indeed, was change or revolution perfected.

Yet, as has been remarked by a writer of the triumphant faction, the heavens have pursued the even tenour of their way, the sun has shone as brightly, the earth has brought forth as kindly, the world has revolved as safely—as what? Is it as though the rejection of the Deity by a dominant revolutionary faction had been of absolutely no effect upon the God-head? To a mind that had brought itself to believe that this was a matter for man to determine, it must have appeared strange indeed that the God-head should remain unmoved by the decrees of a House of Commons!

But is the writer right? Have things on this portion of the earth gone their accustomed way? Have they continued as they were in the land that did this deed?

It is not in Ireland that the answer must be sought. It was not Ireland that rebelled against the Most High. She acted by no volition of her own. She fell through divisions and strife; but she did not rebel against the sovereign authority of the Supreme. We need not look for the consequences there, at least not chiefly there.

But is the Crown of England exactly in the position in which it stood before? Or is it a new thing for private individuals to have to defend the personal honour of the

Sovereign against imputations of fraud and falsehood? Did anyone hear ought before except of universal love for the Queen by all her subjects and of honour yielded to the Sovereign as the ordinance of God who has been disowned? Does the minister whose work this has been stand where he did? Was it always the doctrine of the author of a work on the recognition of the Godhead in all the transactions of authority, that this is a matter for the people to decide with a liberty of rejection? Were manuals of blasphemy the literature he studied in days before he had likened Protestant ascendancy to the poisonous power of the upas tree?

Does the church in England stand as she did before she abandoned her helpless sister?

Does the profession of religion of any kind, so far as it is in accordance with any portion of the Truth of God, stand as it did before the clamour of faction and the spirit of dissension and of party chose to have no recognition of God, rather than that recognition with a discipline of worship not in accordance with particular practice?

Does the House of Lords stand where it did before it preferred its fears to its honour, and affirmed what its members loathed?

Are the rights of property as secure in the self-denial of the people as they were?

Is the sanctity of law as strongly established in the veneration and regard of the nation as it was before oath and treaty were made of no avail against a set purpose that dishonours the Judge of all the earth?

It will be time enough to burst into the jubilee of congratulation when these questions cause no misgivings of heart.

Since England first received the knowledge of the truth, that truth had been her shield, her glory, and defence. No crime could be more uncalled for, no tyranny more impious on her part than forcing this renunciation of all national recognition of the God-head on a helpless and dependent people.

Ireland has long been helpless. The internal and external defence of a country alike depend on unity and earnestness of will. Ireland has neither the unity nor the will. The cause lies on the surface. They have been destroyed by the absence of good faith. It has suited the political rivalries of party to make her history and passions its plaything and stepping stone to power. It has apparently been easy to allege successfully the existence of exceptional and peculiar difficulties, as though the inhabitants of Ireland differed from the remainder of mankind. Though so impudent an assertion refutes itself, it has, unfortunately, been proved that differences of creed, race and class, may be fostered till the degradation of a people is accomplished; but it never has been, and never can be proved, that where the common interests of a common land exist, differences cannot be reconciled and a nation be prosperous and contented in their despite, until the very differences yield and disappear. No nation labours, of necessity, under the hopeless condition of continually changing laws; but it is indispensable in every country that the law should be justly and honourably administered.

However true our convictions, we are forbidden to thrust them on our neighbour violently.

On the other hand, we are not to be participators in his error. Neither tolerance and connivance, nor intolerance and purity, are linked lawfully together. We are, on the contrary, bound to be both tolerant and pure. In the main, England, until recently, has recognized, and with exception has acted on this truth in her own kingdom. In Ireland she has not done so. First—she accepted that kingdom in gift, with the condition attached of subjugating it to a yoke she herself afterwards renounced. She next endeavoured to impose upon it a second change of creed, and failed. Now she overturns the recognition of her own belief in defiance of the most solemn and stringent obligations that nations can contract,—a treaty and a coronation oath.

She has pronounced the creed she renounced idolatrous and blasphemous, yet, by the hand of those loudest in its denunciation, she indirectly subsidized it and openly promoted its interests, carrying on a perpetual intrigue with its political power. The result was inevitable. The conviction became established throughout the length and breadth of the land,—that it had been the practice of the men of the revolution, to divorce obligations of religion and principles of truth, from duties of state, long before they gave to this theory the power of a law. The Irish are scarcely to be blamed for the conviction that in point of fact England has no religion and no conscience: none, at least, when it becomes a question of the administration of Ireland or

the treatment of the Irish. Now, the opposite to irreligion, is the prominent characteristic of the Irish nation. It has little agreement about forms. There is the antagonism between papal supremacy and the faith, which at times is fanned to fury for political purposes; but there are both religion and conscience. So the Irish believer in Roman supremacy takes as his due what the sycophancy of English statesmen offers, and is as thankful as becomes him for a boon wrung from fear or bestowed as a bribe; but that, either way, comes tainted with the dishonesty of being given in the conviction that it is applied in the cause of idolatry and blasphemy, and must strengthen the recipient in deadly error leading to perdition. "Thank your honour, kindly," is Pat's homely native way of putting it, "for helping me to hell; sure, it's the only place according to your honour, that they don't write on, 'No Irish need apply.'"

The Irish believer in the primitive creed, knows there is no sympathy for him across the water, or he would not have to waken on a new year's morning an atheist as to national confession through the connivance of revolutionists and the pleasure of the See of Rome. The descendant of the English 'colonies,' who has inherited traditions of political ascendancy, is maddened by the sense of betrayal and desertion, as he sees all real support and sympathy given to that which is ostensibly condemned. All have their own and their just provocations against a country that prostitutes religious profession, that learns from assassins, and

tramples only on its friends. Political dishonesty and empiricism entail and deserve contempt, but they carry with them the inevitable consequence of the dangerous insecurity of Ireland, and of its connection with England only by constraint.

Is there a God in the eyes of the nation and rulers of England, or is there not? Is there a word revealing Him to man, and is that Word the Truth, or is it not? Do they believe the religion they profess, or do they not? These are the questions really at issue, and Pat's conclusion is not far from right. Surely the grossest possible libel on all truth is to hold it an unfit ingredient in the rule of any people. To deny the recognition of God and the Word of Revelation, by which alone He can be recognized, to any portion of a people that demand it, to whom it has been covenanted, and who call for the fulfilment of that covenant, is the worst form of robbery and falsehood that breach of faith is capable of taking. To say that God must be ignored because a portion of the people holds as superstition, what another holds as truth, is to stultify the reception of Christianity by the rulers in every land. It would render much more impossible the sway of Christians over a heathen land; it would render the conversion of any nation to the Christian faith impossible; it would throw back into the darkness of heathenism such as have received it. To strike the recognition of God out of the duties of national life, is to strike out the rule of God from the highest form of social compact. This is to erase it from all others. If it does

not bind the ruler, how can it bind the ruled? Wherever it crosses human inclination it will be done away. Religion will be delegated to one sphere, social relations to another. This is simply returning to heathenism, to the grossest forms of superstition, and to the most rank hypocrisy. The whole purport of the Christian faith is the principle of revealed truth pervading a new life. To tamper with that principle is to destroy the faith. What is glibly called the 'separation of Church and State,' aptly hides, for the moment, the fell purpose of atheistic rebellion. It is the inevitable result of perpetual division and party strife, but it is transparent hypocrisy spoken only for political purposes. There is not an Irishman but knows and feels it. Not Ireland in her oppression, so much as England in her ungodly tyranny may be expected to suffer for this sin.

The object of society is mutual protection, and government exists in order to provide and administer protection. Its duty is to reconcile, not to stimulate animosities. The work of political partizanship is, on the contrary, to pit the classes and sections of a country one against another, but it is the infamy of those who pursue it. It is disorganising government and breaking up the foundations of society.

* "We have legalised confiscation ; we have consecrated sacrilege ; we have condoned high treason ; we have shaken property, and have emptied gaols

*The Right Hon. B. Disraeli.

“making Government ridiculous,” was the comment spoken in Parliament itself.

Is then the exercise of rule over a population, in large proportion, holding the theory of Roman subjection by an authority that does not hold it possible only by apostacy, or by denial of God?

“What doth the Lord require—but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.”

If professing Christians cannot agree, they may at least deal with one another as Christians should with heathen. Each is free to consider himself the Christian.

Let him that holds Roman supremacy be freed from having to contribute for the worship of him that does not hold it, and let him that holds it not, be freed from being concerned in furnishing what he abhors. There are cardinal truths which are held in common, and these happily comprise the acknowledgment of the same God, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. The same moral commandments are acknowledged; the observance of the second table it is still the admitted duty of the civil ruler to enforce.

Restore then to Erin the national recognition of her God: follow right and honest dealing; cease to make market of her divisions, and they will die out naturally. The protection of all, not the espousal of partizanship, is the proper function of the State. Let them that like denominational schools have them, and those that like mixed schools better have mixed schools

if they like; but let each provide for his own, the State restricting itself to the province of guardianship, seeing that each contributes according to the choice he makes, and also that all have perfect enjoyment of free liberty of choice. Beyond these the State has only to deal with that residue whom associated private effort does not reach. The system established in military schools affords proof that there is no inherent impediment to fair dealing with these. Honors and degrees flow naturally from the matters to be dealt with, whether law, physic, literature, or music. Those in theology can be given to the satisfaction of the recipient, only in the school to which he belongs. The holder of Roman supremacy acknowledges no other, and there is no need of any hindrance whatever to his taking the degree he likes. England does not hold Roman supremacy, and has no competency to grant or confer Roman degrees; but not till a creed interferes beyond the range of its adherents, or trespasses against the laws of the land, does it come within the domain of Government, except by the voluntary adhesion of conviction: that yielded, the protection of truth becomes a sacred duty. In spurning her Irish sister, England spurned—in all creeds alike—what truth those creeds confess. In disavowing God within the kingdom of Ireland, she gave in her adhesion *pro tante* to atheism.

If this injustice were redressed, these grounds of strife removed, and the supremacy of the estates of the Empire reserved by a statute barring all local law contrary to perfect freedom of commercial and social inter-

course or to Imperial laws, there can be no reason why contented Ireland should not possess her own administration, under a vice-royalty elevated above party. Not a parliament : the high assembly of an empire should be in the fullest sense imperial, and the permanent assembly of the highest tribunal that can be constituted is inconsistent with the welfare of any land.

Ireland must have reason to be contented before England can be really secure. Party must be hushed to lead to that contentment, which it can never be, so long as revolution is the theory of English administration in both realms alike. A return to honesty of representation would extinguish party power and its rancours. The strife that has made Ireland a land of wrath and sorrow is one laboriously sustained : neglected or discouraged, it would die. England would find her firmest succour and her warmest friends in the source of her present weakness and danger. Wealth and population would gradually replace existing desolation ; industry would spring up in the place of discontent. The English army of occupation would be numbered with the things that are passed. The defence of Ireland would be by her own people and her union with England be established by her own goodwill.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE ENGLANDS IN AMERICA.

HAPPY, it has been said, is the land that has no history. A country without history, is not likely, however, to be remarkable for songs or poetry. The feeling and sentiment which, moved by events, refined and exalted through trial and conflict, find their utterance in poetry and song, will, in their absence, force some other outlet for themselves; but for want of enabling influences, their expression will be of so coarse a sort as hardly to be recognised for kindred to the exquisite tones of genius which reflection and suffering have rendered sublime. The characteristics of the New World may be traced in the dearth of song and poem, in the dreary substitutes of 'tall talk,' 'buncombe,' and 'spread eagles,' as much as in the songs and poetry that exist.

The story of the Englands in that hemisphere, short as that story is, has four great episodes :—the first, of discovery and settlement ; the second, of rebellion and severance ; the third, of civil war ; the fourth, of the days that are. Their National poetry consists of negro melodies, plaintive utterances based upon uncultivated but touching expressions of affliction seeking refuge in

song, and—sighs of a deeper sorrow still—those of a country crushed under the heel and made desolate by internal strife.

The first epoch was marked by toil more stern than the cultivation of genius and refinement; but it contains the germs of the characteristics of the several epochs by which it has been followed. The life of a people that had gone forth to form a new community, to lay afresh foundations for a new condition of society, as well as to battle with the wilderness, was drama and poetry in daily action. It neither needed, nor had leisure for expression in words. Such were the early settlers' purpose and occupation. They were possessed of two firm resolves. These were to acquire exclusive possession of the soil on which they went to live, and to be free from all control by the rule and authority of the nation of which they were a part. They had gone forth under the influence of bitter alienation and estrangement, and they carried their narrowness of heart and judgment to its furthest conclusions. They were especially rigid and inflexible when they encountered the opposition of a tenacity equal to their own. This alienation and estrangement grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength. It has been handed down through every epoch; but notwithstanding all, room is still left for hope of better things. These feelings are, and always have been, entirely un-shared by the nation they have left. The homely saying, "that it takes two to make a quarrel," is happily, a saying that is true.

An Englishman who would fain be proud of his country, can scarcely fail to be angry and indignant at the sorry part that country has played in the story of the land and people it has lost. He must needs, if he feel that they of right are one, be vexed that their unity was absolutely hateful to those that have forsaken it. He cannot but blush for shame over many a page in the relations between the severed countries. Alike through periods of active hostility and transactions of diplomacy, abasement, apology and concessions, questionable from the circumstances under which they have been made, have often been the part of his own land; but when he remembers what he has never ceased to feel, that they of right are one, the concession and the humility lose all their pain, because the fault of all faults lies in their division—the virtue in all that tends to heal it.

The dominant feeling of severed England in America, has unfortunately been as opposite as possible to this. A bitterness, akin to rooted hatred, has distinguished it from all other, but the most extreme division. The alienated English in America, have always been found in closest alliance with the most conspicuous enemy, or rival for the time being of their brethren in England. During profound peace, piratical descents of “sympathisers,” on the inhabitants of British America, and of “Fenians” on Ireland, have received the shelter, countenance and protection of the severed country. To measure aright the unbounded hostility of feeling which such conduct evidences, we must, for

a moment reverse the position in imagination, and think of the universal reprobation that would greet any attempt to act from our midst towards any country as we have been dealt with by those of our race and kin. The indignation would be so vehement, the anger so universal,—in short, the attempt would be so impossible, that this view of the matter seems not to have occurred to English minds. The mere idea of similar attacks being planned, fostered and connived at from our midst, is so beyond the possibilities of reality that it has not been grasped, even as a means of measuring what has been done to us.

Building the *Alabama* has been alleged as more than a counterpart. The invention of an analogy is itself no unfit counterpart to figure beside the abetting of invasions of Canada, the murders of Canadians, and of English and Irish policemen. Yet the government in England seems to have more than accepted the imputed parallel! It waves the graver question, places itself wrong, if retrospective law can do it, and refers to foreign judgment the idle charge and not the grave. This is but proper punishment; a fit result of a condition that has no international principle of right; knows no accord or harmony for the prevention of wrong; recognizes no concern in a neighbour's preservation; and is without jurisdiction to strip aggression of pretence, and to lay bare the lies of violence shielding itself behind false accusation.

The circumstances attending the construction of the *Alabama* are one question, but in no case are they the

paramount question. Her prowess and success no doubt intensified the heart-burnings of those, who, though they deprecate her construction and her escape from an English port, nevertheless came victoriously out of the struggle only by means of an unhindered inpouring of European thew and sinew; but the real issue was, and is independent of, and far above that of the *Alabama* or her acts. That issue, which ought to have been raised in the hour of their conflict, was the right or wrong of the acts of the North and South. This rested, and still rests, on the terms of the several constitutions of the States and of the league in which they had banded themselves for an especial purpose. Like the question of the true merits of the issue raised between France and Prussia, this was exactly a case for the determination of a High Court of Appeal, supported by the common action of such nations as care for the honour, which is caring for the peace of the world.

The maxim and the motto of the States in America, however, seem to be, "All fair so it be foul to England;" "Any friend so he be England's foe."

To be able to concede to such a disposition, to conquer it by kindness, deserves the highest meed of praise, and may attain the noblest of rewards; but it must be clear that the concessions spring only from kindliness of heart. The growth of separated England in America has been gigantic; its power has become colossal: that growth and power are extending still, and if apology and concession wear at all the semblance of being extorted by fear, of being made for convenience,

or influenced by avarice counting the cost of war too high, of anything in short, but kindness of heart;—if the attitude of England on any question in Europe or America be lacking in dignity and power,—conciliation, instead of working good, will only add contempt to hate, and increase an ignorant ill-will that rejoices in any ill or injury to England.

“Of all mistakes,” wrote a departed English statesman,* “of all mistakes in public affairs as well as “in private, the greatest is to truckle to swagger and “bluster, or even to unjustifiable violence. . . .
 “Nothing is more unsound than the notion that any-
 “thing is to be gained by trying to conciliate those ^{to}
 “who are trying to intimidate. . . . The only ^{care of}
 “possible way of keeping such persons in check is to ^{prevent}
 “make them clearly understand that one is not going to
 “yield an inch, and that one is quite strong enough to .
 “repel force by force.”

The sense of personal obligation to the commonwealth, of privilege in proportion to obligation discharged, and of the primary duty of government to protect all its subjects in the possession and enjoyment of defined and lawful rights, must have been obliterated before the English settlements in America could have been made, under the circumstances and with the feelings towards the mother country, that have been described.

And so it was. The era of the Tudors had passed away.

*Lord Palmerston.

Although Virginia never lost the noble impress of the Elizabethian age, the enterprises of the reigns of Henry VII., Henry VIII., and of the "empress of the West" had failed to produce their due effects through the feebleness of the succeeding Scottish dynasty.

The spirit of the founders of the Northern States in America was very different from the spirit of Raleigh. The sense of obligation they acknowledged was the fulfilment of their will and the gratification of their malice. They undertook other obligations, but they contracted them with the deliberate intention of disregarding their fulfilment. They professed allegiance to the king; but it was only to obtain a charter. They punished the exercise of the right of petition to the king by fine, imprisonment, and whipping. They declared themselves members of the Church and sought the benediction of bishops; but it was falsely to attain their private ends. They transported beyond the settlements they made the men that were such in truth. They undertook obligations of trade and commerce; but they robbed the proprietors at home of their money.

To believe that the tea-tax laid the foundation of the alienation from England and English law, that made the complete and final separation of the countries possible, is to disregard the entire history of the early settlement of the colonies and to take no account of the able and consistent, albeit thoroughly unscrupulous conduct of the founders of the Northern States.

The Charter of the "Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay, in New England," dated 4th March, 1628, was intended by the king and his councillors, to be the means of founding a corporation similar to those of the East India, Hudson Bay, and other great companies, that had been given power to settle plantations within the limits of assigned territory. It enjoined the oaths of allegiance and supremacy. They were not administered. The King's arms were not set up; even the flag was altered.

The settlers left England, saying, they "esteemed "it their honour to call the Church their dear mother " . . . as members of the same body . . . "while we have breath, we sincerely desire and endeavour the continuance and abundance of her welfare." On landing, they suffered no professing member of the Church to live amongst them.

They entered into partnership with merchant traders; but carried on no trade on joint account. In seven years they closed the partnership without having declared any dividend whatever, and possessed themselves of the whole property.

Their next act was to get possession of the Charter, carry it out to the new country, and practically seal a virtual declaration of independence. Though, when convenient, they pleaded the possession and the terms of the Charter; they fulfilled none of its stipulations. They elected their own government, and formed a new communion in religion.

They then proceeded to what their panegyrist

and historian * calls a "glorious exploit." One of themselves, one of their ministers, calls it in language they much affected and in this instance, practically carried out, "making their enemies lick the dust." Bancroft's description bears repeating. "Every wigwam was burned, every settlement was broken up, every corn field laid waste; there remained not a sarrup, nor squaw, nor child, nor warrior of the Pequod name. A nation had disappeared from the family of man." They had commenced that career of extermination of the indigenous race that has disgraced American history.

Next, and without any reference whatever to England, they formed a "common *firm and perpetual league*," to which they gave the name of "the United Colonies of New England." This step was quickly followed by diplomatic action between themselves and French, Dutch, and Swedish representatives. They adopted finally an independent coinage that bore no reference to England, and no king's image or superscription.

A right understanding and appreciation of this solemn, persistent, and immovable pre-determination is of great present consequence. Hostile feeling to England does not take its origin from irritation aroused by passing events, nor did it spring from anger at armed controversy. Had it been so, these feelings would have passed away with the events that

* Bancroft.

gave them birth. The kindly forbearance and anxious conciliation that have replaced the passing predominance of similar feelings in England would be found also in the severed States. On the contrary, the foundations were laid in alienation, if not in hate.

It is impossible to trace aright the important movement that has made the older colonies of England republican and not monarchical, hostile instead of devotedly attached to and at one with England; this has robbed them of national confession in religion and of national connection with a primitive church, without a due appreciation of the fact that these divergencies were the express objects of the founders.

They carried out successfully a fixed determination. Without this understanding, that extreme and curious sympathy for the severed States which animates a certain party in England, so that it prefers everything American to anything English, is also quite incomprehensible.

The superstructure grew in strict conformity with the foundation of fixed hatred of all that once emphatically characterised the rule and law of England. Sympathy with this antipathy is the feeling that causes the strongly-marked, though happily exceptional, admiration lavished by particular partisans in England on a people, who being of her race, have prided themselves on their opposition to English obligation in religious, national and social duties. A partiality so perverse that it will acknowledge no fault in the fraudulent duplicity of the early settlers, that extenuates

their conduct as the result of persecution, yet has not a word of censure for their own far more rigorous practice of compulsion, sees only something to admire in unnatural opposition to a parent State, though it has degenerated into rabid hostility. Hate of the institutions of their country condones all other offences.

This conflict a loyal Christain subject of the Crown of England can desire to see ended only in one way. There are in this sense two Englands in America even yet, and now, alas, there are two also in England. One, England proper, the other, England disaffected. One England in America has made her severance and has been bid heartily, God speed,—farewell! Nothing of her power or greatness, of her wealth and growth, but has England's goodwill. There is no other wish in all who differ from her most as to the wisdom of her severance from the traditions of England, but that she may, if it be good for her, herself perceive the better excellence of much that she has cast away. We only ask her not to tamper with our foes, not to break all international law and duty in making her soil the sanctuary of banded marauders, not to return all evil for all good. We ask her to cease calumnious imputations on our good faith,—not to bring false charges against our good name and not to make extortionate demands on our property.

Would we win her to do this, it can only be by proving that the olden principles of England are not forsaken by her children now: that without a particle of the spirit of aggression, but full of that of peace,

her forbearance and conciliation spring not from weakness, not from parsimony nor from fear, but from full contentment with the ordinances she has preserved, and in which she has learned the lesson of a unity paramount even over political severance.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE ENGLANDS IN AMERICA.—*continued.*

The antagonism between Virginia and Massachusetts, destined in the future to attain lamentable dimensions, was manifest at a very early date. On the murder of King Charles I, and the accession to power of the Protector, the latter colony prohibited all intercourse with the former until it had acknowledged the supremacy of the commonwealth. Virginia, it needs hardly be told, remained true to its king, and was reduced only by the arms of admiral Ascue, whose instructions, even then, were to free such servants and slaves as would fight against their masters. The Virginians were the last to lay down their arms in the king's cause, and they were the first to take them up again in his behalf. As soon as they received tidings of the death of protector Cromwell, they re-called their former governor, and proclaimed the king.

The skill that succeeded in estranging this firm and true attachment, based on both principle and sentiment, must have been great and perseveringly applied, and so it was.

We have no occasion to follow the story of the

growth of England in America, or that of its intestine distractions, through the the second and third periods: but just as the asperity of Northern aversion to the England of Europe, is to be traced in the very cradle of the new State and its causes can be only rightly discerned by doing so, so there will be found operating with the same consistency throughout the same length of time, the cause of that common resentment against English supremacy, rule, or union, that has overcome as strong an original attachment to it in the South. A persistent course of action may be traced, that has finally succeeded in uniting in one feeling and under one political power, two countries and classes of inhabitants, that have no other sentiment in common than antipathy to the country from which they are estranged.

One of the earliest acts of King Charles II, was done contrary to the urgent advice of the council he himself established for the superintendence of the colonies. Warned by the evils which had arisen from vague, injudicious, or injurious grants, they urged him to avoid all future grants, and, by agreements with their possessors, to resume those that had been made. Instead of this advice being acted on, Rhode Island and Connecticut were given such absolute independence that the oath of allegiance was not required to be taken, nor was any power to negative laws reserved. Even the nominal stipulation, that these should be in conformity with the law of England, was made void, by the condition of consideration for "the constitution of the place and the nature of the people."

Whilst, in this manner, disloyalty was being encouraged by grants wholly improper, laws restricting commerce and navigation, which drew the line of distinction between England, *against* her possessions and foreign countries, and not between England *and* her possessions against foreign countries, fell with peculiar severity on Virginia. These laws were rigidly enforced.

Firmness had at length placed the royal authority and the connection with England, in temporary ascendancy. It was then so grievously abused, as to complete the work for which the founders of the Northern Colonies had care fully prepared. The last of the Stuarts, who sat as King upon a throne, though accustomed to habits of business and conversant with affairs, soon displayed his petulance and inconsistency.

He nominated Andross to the government, and the instructions issued to him completed what the selection sufficiently ensured. The faults and the merits of the governor, his arrogant and tyrannical conduct, his sarcastic and cutting references to precedents set by local tyranny, his folly, his talents and his activity, were all employed in perfecting the certainty of the revolt from England, of all the colonies in America.

He had previously been made prisoner in Massachusetts. In the spring of 1688, amidst exhortations to sedition, strife and violence, and a profane misapplication of texts, that has painfully marked the history of New England, he had been suddenly seized, the frigate in the harbour taken, and the fort surrendered by orders extorted from him in prison. The rebellion

spread from Boston to the Chesapeake, from the Atlantic to the frontiers of the French and the Indians.

“Shortly after Andross was released,” says a distinguished writer,* to whom this sketch is largely indebted, “he was appointed governor of Virginia, as “a reward for exasperating the people of Massachusetts “and exciting them by his illegal conduct and oppressive “measures to open rebellion, a precedent, the value of “which may be estimated, from the uniformity with “which it has been observed, from that early date to “the present time. Whatever changes may have taken “place in other colonial usages, this has been generally “adhered to ; and from Andross, who caused a revolution [rebellion] in 1688, the effects of which are still “felt, to him who recently assented to an act, “rewarding those who plunged their country into civil “war, imperial honours but too often await the man “who signally fails of success in his administration, “provided he obeys his orders ; while he who preserves “prosperity in the province committed to his charge, “is as frequently left to enjoy in obscurity the approbation of his conscience.”

Nearly a century after the event just recorded, a part of North America, adjacent to the territory of the several portion of the race, passed to the dominion of England from that of France. It possesses a history of more varied incident and feeling. Notwithstanding its foreign origin, it has become pre-eminent for a

* The late Mr. Justice Halburton.

strength of attachment to England that has not yet been overcome. English authority in America is not yet extinguished; English territory not yet all forfeited. On the contrary, the attachment which has preserved them has been handed down as an heir-loom and as the expression of an historic duty. To the up-holders of the connection, it represents the preservation of religious confession, and of national privilege. That attachment itself has been bequeathed as the symbol and sentiment of their security. It has been an attachment stronger, purer, and higher than much of that which has existed in England itself, to the principles that have made her what she was. It was received amidst experience more impressive than the happier lot of the mother-land afforded. It has survived rude shocks, and may surmount yet farther trials. It has stood firm against the threats and has resisted the blandishments of those who warred against their native land: it would none of their ordinances. It has remained faithful under the harder trial of systematic discouragement and vacillating rule. England forced on it, arbitrarily and determinately enough, a system of rule congenial to revolutionary power; that accomplished, she has done anything rather than favour imperial integration, or more intimate alliance. Continual insinuation of separation, and not the recognition of the ordinance of nature, a unity that exists in every other than the English race, has been the reward of a loyalty and attachment that have stood firm against the great rebellion of the severed colonies. Perpetual

iteration that the connection is insecure, that the perpetration of severance is a prize open to political adventure, are constant incentives to politicians whose ambition centres in self. Unfortunately, modern practices have made the pathway very broad and smooth for such. There is, however, in fact, no other course open to men, who themselves are leaders only by the force of revolution. The several parts of an extended empire can be integrated only by recognition and practice of the principle of influence proportionate to responsibility; of representation proportionate to taxation; of weight proportionate to contribution; in other words, of privilege in proportion to the amount of obligation discharged, whatever be the form that principle may assume. Revolutionists cannot adopt a principle which sounds the knell of partizanship, and is the overthrow and extinction of leaders, whose position and bread depend on wranglings, divisions, strifes, agitation and change; in short, on revolution. The policy of the severed States presents a striking contrast to this feeble and unprincipled uncertainty.

Picturing the wonderful success of the early settlements, Haliburton continues: "THEY HAD OBTAINED 'NO VICTORY AND WERE NOT FLUSHED WITH TRIUMPH. 'THEY HAD NO OPPOSITION AND WERE NOT OBSTINATE " . . . AUTHORITY WAS NOT DEMANDED, IT WAS "CONCEDED . . . EVERY MEASURE ADOPTED WAS "AN ACT OF THE WHOLE BODY AND NOT A PARTY. "IS IT THEN TO BE WONDERED AT THAT THEY REASONED WELL AND DECIDE WISELY?"

The unity and not the form of its expression; the unity among themselves, not the quarrel with the parent body; the unity and not the frauds they perpetrated, nor yet the hate that filled them; the unity, was the secret of their marvellous success. Alas! the other elements stepped and marred its lineaments, tarnished, though they could not efface its power. Were not the bloody cruelty and the untempered ferocity of the civil war, fruit gathered from early cultivation of hate? Is not repudiation, that has become a by-word and corruption, that makes administration stick in the nostrils of honest men, fruit of the fraud early and successfully perpetrated on the home proprietary? Is not the loss in the great bulk of the Northern people of faith in the Divine Redeemer fruit gathered from early persecuting schism?

Unexampled growth and power have sprung from the unity,—sorrow from special faults. Moral misery that does not overthrow material prosperity is lightly regarded; but it may lead, and that suddenly, to disruption more complete the more extraneous causes have tended to accumulate elements of prosperity. Meanwhile, the land is limitless and fertile, the population hardy, the country rich. The abettors of revolution, here as there, go on their way boastfully rejoicing as though all their prosperity arose from alienation from the law, the monarchy and church of England, many add—from the rule and recognition of God, the Redeemer.

They are right in one respect. There is one vital

difference between the national and administrative laws of England and those of the severed colonies in America, which is altogether in favour of the latter.

In the laws of the American States, there is a cause of prosperity altogether independent of natural advantages, and so much above them, that, without its operation, natural advantages would rather impede than favour the growth of a powerful national polity. It is moreover true, that this cause operates only in the severed colonies, and that the incohesion of what ought to be the English empire, is owing to its disregard by England. In the system by which they aggregated the many and complex communities of which they consisted into a unity, though not in the internal arrangements of those communities singly, the settlers carefully observed the connection between privilege and the discharge of functions of obligation. It is not difficult to perceive how this anomaly arose. They were men determined to exercise control, but to submit to none. They could present the aspect of republican equality as opposite to a rule they had left and abhorred. Their position itself tended at starting to individual equality. Its nominal and legal existence would only enable them more effectually to wield the several communities completely at their will. In the numerically small bodies, of which they separately consisted, in which each man knew all the others, influence inevitably, if insensibly, centred in the directing and most active minds, notwithstanding, or, rather in virtue of the laws of equality. Men so tenacious of

power, would have been speedily engulfed in mutual recriminations, only that they were drawn together by a common aim and a superior animosity. They solved the difficulty, and attained their aim by adopting a principle of perfect justice, in their scheme of aggregation,—a scheme, formed for purposes of opposition and soon turned to acts of enmity against England.

The duties and privileges of the union were carefully defined. In all the gradations that raise a new settlement to the rank of a territory and from a territory to a state identical with the oldest both in duties and privilege, the duties to be discharged and the privileges attending each discharge of duty are jealously marked and rigidly guarded. Discarding the name, they are the only people that have carried out in its full integrity the lofty ideal of colonization. It is the secret of their strength and present unity. On the other hand, they have within the communities themselves maintained a flat equality. Consequently, since the time when personal ascendancy came to an end through the growth of those communities, they have been steeped in corruption and overwhelmed by violence. Excellence in the land is in effect disfranchised. They have, in both cases, harvested according to their planting.

It is important for us to trace these effects to their causes. We see state after state,—each filled with disorder,—still clustering in devoted connection round a central system that has practised this wisdom in the aggregation of its parts and this folly within

those several parts. Otherwise, though we may not fall into a common error and ascribe prosperity in America to national irreligion and republicanism, nor become indifferent to the evils of a condition of violence and corruption, we may yet be without an answer to a seeming contradiction, or fall back upon the extent, fertility, and natural advantages of the country, which, great as they are, offer no solution of a unity that has resulted from the observance of an immutable law.

This is of the more consequence because it is essential to the preservation of England that she revert to the observance of the same law. It is necessary to save her from final destruction by revolution. It is necessary to enable her to reap the harvest of power and prosperity that only wait her willingness. If the power of that law is so great as to work as it has done in America with its lavish natural advantages, yet hindered by the violence and corruption incident to a condition of society that is impatient of the yoke of order and right, what limit can be assigned it under a happier condition ?

There seems little human likelihood that England will awaken to the true value of possessions in every habitable quarter of the globe until she has incurred their loss ; nor to the responsibilities of a race speaking one language, having one origin and one confession of hope till she can fulfil them no more ; but were she to do so, her vision of empire would be no dream of ambition, her wealth no spoil of fraud, her power no

result of war. She would merely have escaped from revolution by returning to the path of duty. In a colonial empire, aggregated round her centre on the principle of coincident privilege and obligation, she would build up a power, that, so long as she maintained her olden principles, would give the world security for peace.

A time must come when America will be full. Her perfect colonization must then necessarily be at an end. The internal confusion of her several communities will then have the fullest scope for its display. That confusion may have distracted her and caused her to be torn asunder long before; but she must then become the prey of unrelieved disorder unless the prevalence of individual excellence and of personal self-control give her a future very different from the past; but England has only to revert to the observance of the principle America observes in the aggregation of her states, to establish an empire in which the acknowledgement of the God she confesses shall be the seal of security. This is her responsibility. Surely her widely-scattered possessions have been given her for this purpose. To urge upon her to bind her empire into a unity is not to stimulate her ambition, nor even to lead her in the path of impregnable defence so much as to point out her plain and simple duty. She can scatter her empire only by abandoning alike her privileges and her duty.

CHAPTER X.

ON ROME.

THE LAMENT—

“Roma, Roma, Roma,

“Roma, non è più*
“Com’era prima.”

has been superseded by the happier cry “Roma rediviva.” The new word is, moreover, the key note of anticipation, not the tone of triumph or attainment. The expectations of the future are seen by the light they shed before them; the age to come is looked for in the radiancy of a hopefulness that discerns it by its brightness, not by the dim anticipatory lineaments of more ordinary events, which are known by the shadows they cast in their approach. The new birth of Rome, heralded by a star,* is to be the fulness of brightness and triumph.

* Crowds of people were gathered, all intently staring at the zenith, and there indeed was a bright, particular star, of the first magnitude, shining in the broad day-light. The Roman people have fully made up their minds on the subject, and certainly so remarkable an appearance, however easily accounted for, is a curious coincidence on this day, (Nov. 27, 1870,) when, at each side of the opening of the Corso, there have been placed two great shields, bearing the celebrated device of the House of Savoy, with its legend,—“I’attends mon astre.”—*From the Daily Papers.*

The positive change in the town and Campagna of Rome is little as yet in all that meets the visible eye; but enough of historic change has taken place in every respect, in the position of the city and rule of Rome, as it relates to the rest of the world to free an attempt to dwell for a moment on the political significance of the sound, that represents in one breath at once a city, a country, a creed and an empire—the past, the present and the future—from the charge of being irrelevant and visionary. Who, a few years ago, would have ventured to predict that a man would claim the attribute of Divinity, and proclaim himself infallible? Cloaked however it may be at its first assumption, veiled and limited as by virtue and exercise of office, as the vehicle only of an inspiration unlimited, it remains a claim to Divinity and to incarnation of the Spirit. Who might have ventured to foretell the simultaneous loss of territory, and extinction of dominion, to a power that carried with a high hand, pretensions to direct and unbounded intercourse, if not to Oneness, with the Highest in the heavens? Who could have anticipated in the coincident assumption of this spiritual omnipotence and the downfall of this temporal power, the germ of a revived grandeur that shall surpass all the former splendour of the city that boasts herself empress and mistress of the world, ever the same and unchange-

The darkness of that covered Rome during the proclamation of infallibility, was caused by an extraordinary thunder storm, and so easily to be accounted for; but the thunder storm did not break over the shield of the House of Savoy, and the star did not shine over the Pope's proclamation.

able? Who shall venture to describe her future, who calls herself the city that is eternal, and who is called in the words of truth and soberness, "that great city, which reigneth over the kings of the earth,"—Rome, that has been supreme, whether as imperial and pagan, or ruling by that system which knows no other name than that of Rome and of which it is written, that it shall not fall by gradual decay, but "suddenly, in one hour shall her judgment come." Does not this fate itself foretell revival that shall eclipse the glory of the past? Do not her own assumption, and the page of inspiration here agree with an instinct or impulsion that is proving irresistible? Who shall say under what form? The heathen world has had its day. Of superstition it is scarcely possible to imagine a more fond culmination than the assumption of infallibility by a man,—a man, who can enfold exclusively, neither the good nor the bad. One form of evil is left,—one that the world has not yet tried, but for which it seems rapidly ripening,—the consummation of iniquity in wilful, daring, open rebellion against a Deity known, recognized, and avowedly hated. The idea of man banding himself for this purpose, is scarcely more ridiculous, by reason of his impotence, than the things that have been done, perhaps not much more impious than things that have been done already.

It seems the apt climax of incurable perverseness and vain boasting. It is the not unnatural result of that great first step he has already taken, in arrogating to himself to determine whether or not, and how far, he

will recognize in his social and corporate relations—the God whose revelation of Himself he has received. Man's modern rule is to poll mankind one by one, and so determine what shall or shall not be true. Who can question what at this moment would be the decision of the universe, if all were called upon to give their verdict? Yet man's rule of freedom and his theory of liberty is license to give his vote on any matter that he will. It needs then only, not a mind more unscrupulous than minds that have been already, not an ambition greater than has been before; not an organization more skilfully devised than has been known, but only a mind and ambition capable of bringing to bear on mankind universally that progressively increasing power resulting from inventions, which shows no present sign of limit, in order, very rapidly, to bring about the inauguration of a new era arriving by a fresh impiety at the old aspiration for one unlimited and universal power,—earth's counterfeit of heaven's unity.

Determined opposition to this dream one day, for a brief moment to be a reality all but consummated upon earth, must inevitably arise from those to whom revelation is reality, and God alone, the King of all the earth. Upon this must follow persecution. The Christian will be forced into direct, ceaseless, and uncompromising passive resistance to impious ordinances, and so will incur the penalty of disobedience to legal authority, though not to lawful. The law of extermination against opponents of man's universal wilfulness and testifiers against his infinite ungodliness

will be imposed, not amidst the abhorrence, but with the approval of mankind. So, by a process which it is even now easy to foresee, a scene of desolation, horror, cruelty and crime, may come upon the world, that explains the foretold convulsion that is to end the present order, or this age of the world. Seeing that there is no other channel of blessing, and therefore no hope for the earth nor for the children of the Father, when the knowledge of the Redeemer shall have been deliberately put away, and refuge to His intercession forbidden under the pain of death: the prayer, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do," will be exchanged for the cry, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost Thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?"

How easily and speedily the first presage of this storm may be raised, the following extract from the new "Manual" of political sagacity sufficiently displays:—

"*In Rome, too, we behold a melancholy proof of the influence of Christianity. Rome, once the mistress of the world, renowned alike for its valour, its learning and its taste; from whose forums emanated that eloquence which still shines forth as the production of a noble and heroic people. Rome, once the depository of poetry and the cultivation of art, whose grandeur and dignity could command the admiration of the world—such *was* Rome in her ancient glory. But, subsequently, how sadly did she fall! She became a miserable, down-trodden, priest-ridden

“country, the victim of a vacillating and despotic
“policy. Her former glory, dignity, and valour dis-
“appeared, and were replaced by a shameless, mean
“and cowardly terrorism. If Christianity were potent
“for good, that good would have been displayed ere
“now. Christianity has had every advantage in its
“favour: the influence of priests; the patronage of
“kings; the alliance of the great and powerful; the
“use of the untold wealth; the command of armies;
“first place among the councillors of nations; the
“willing subjection of the populace; the command of
“their affections and the dominancy of their fears.
“Science, art, education have humbled themselves and
“enlisted in its train. Some of the brightest intellects
“of humanity have laid their treasures at its feet.
“The ties of domestic affection; the bonds of the
“social compact; the political relations of ruler and
“ruled; all have surrendered themselves to its influ-
“ence. Yet with all these advantages it has proved
“unable to keep pace with a progressive civilisation.”

To many minds Rome is still the symbol and synonym of Christianity; the pope—the type, head, and fountain of their creed. It seems, then, not unreasonable to suppose that a palpable revival of prosperity in Rome itself, consequent upon and caused by the downfall of the pope's rule may shake the foundations of his spiritual rule, who has declared his temporal the best of earthly governments and power over the city essential to the performance of infallible functions! Infidelity and atheism may then step into a vacant

seat. It will not be the first time that the servant's unfaithfulness will have brought dishonour on the master.

A long course of historical tradition has most scrupulously maintained the assertion of Roman supremacy, even at times when its practical exercise has been completely in suspense. That characteristic has appertained to her imperial and pagan, as much as to her papal form. The theory of unity and continuity has been alike carefully preserved in each. When the empire was divided between four rulers, it was still, in theory, a single sovereignty jointly administered.

Long after the territorial division, practically into the two empires of the East and the West, of Constantinople and Rome, the same theory was jealously preserved. The very Goths became successors in the line of Roman emperors. Charlemagne handed on the tradition, and the imperial House of Austria was head of the Holy Roman empire, granting in that capacity honours and dignities throughout Europe which continue to this day. It passed in the year of the first Austrian fall to Napoleon I., who proclaimed his son King of Rome; and Napoleon III., who claimed to carry on the Napoleonic era and dynasty, was, to the day of his disaster, virtually master of Rome. In the interval between the two Napoleons, Austria again had practically supreme power over Italy and Rome. The overthrow of both Austria and France has placed the King of Prussia in the position of dictator of the terms of existence to both. Austria, appar-

ently, has finally given up her pretensions to supremacy over Italy and in Germany; but the new-made emperorship has as yet stopped short of intrusion into the vacant seat. The question, Who shall occupy that? seems still undetermined. The King of Prussia is but uncrowned emperor in or of Germany. The value which he sets on coronation ceremonial is notorious. Is he as yet unprepared to seize the headship of the Roman representative imperial power, but content with nothing less, preferring to leave pretensions in abeyance rather than seem to relinquish them by the formal assumption of a merely German style?

France evidently loosens her hold on Rome only with extreme reluctance.

The Pope, a quasi-temporal monarch, within an all but nominal space, is an old man, who, in the course of nature soon must pass away.

Italy, even though in dynastic alliance with Spain, scarcely as yet shews any of the signs that imagination, at least, would be apt to suppose must be identified with such power as holy prophecy and human anticipation seem, the one to unfold and the other to expect, as the accompaniment and cause of the revived splendour, magnificence and wealth of the restored eternal city.

There is one other power. It has, as yet, no form or organization as a polity, but its elements are everywhere and in every country. It has no state, no kingdom, no capital, no central city of its own; no fixed abode, no special home; yet it belongs to every city and has a home in all. It has a name well calculated to spread

its influence; it pretends a brotherhood opposed and superior to the brotherhood of Christianity. Its disciples, confusing Christianity with Christendom, proclaim the failure of the old glad tidings. They behold Christendom debasing the name of God to the uses of ambition, denying God for purposes of policy, standing by in hardened self-complacency, while might stifles the voice of right, oppressing—not helping—those under subjection. They behold rulers, to whom the control of the Deity is an inconvenience, contriving His banishment from the sphere of their occupations and inventing for their discovery the name of the separation of Church and State.

More expert than their teachers, they carry out with more consistency the theory they have adopted. The daily avocations of life, its hourly necessities, its trades, businesses, and social intercourse are their sphere, and, so according to their temperaments, they follow the lead with more or less of singleness of purpose, and separate the influence of religion from the practice and occupations of daily life. Each in his own sphere and relations has his separation of Church and State. If they retain religious rites, they carefully repudiate the power of Christianity to pervade the whole of a new life.

The bolder spirits of the new society, alive to these evils and scorning their transparent folly, unhappily confound apostacy with Christianity and impute the blame of all the misdeeds done in the Name, in which they are committed, not on the betrayers of that name.

Like their rulers they rebel against Divine authority and rule : only they do not do it with a kiss upon their lips.

By a course of strict reasoning deduced from one unreason, they, wiser than their rulers in unwisdom, openly repudiate a God whom His confessed disciples have deposed from national acknowledgement. They openly declare His mission to have failed : they point to the deeds of Europe and call the brotherhood existing in His name a lie.

The new organisation of society ushers in a new brotherhood that is to supersede the old. "The International Alliance of the Socialist Democracy," makes announcement of its theories in these consistent words:—

"The alliance declares itself atheist.

"It seeks the abolition of all creeds ; the substitution of science for faith ; and of human justice for divine.

"It repudiates all idea of patriotism and nationality "in favour of universal democracy."

Socialism, communism, democracy, and rebellion are not new ; atheism, unbelief, and infidelity are old. What is new is this—that these evil forces have the field left open to themselves. Roman superstition does not hold the world in thrall ; a worse thing has happened to the world. Reformation is rejected by the world. The very meaning of the word is lost and man forms nothing anew upon the old foundations. Authority is losing its hold and power, and the nation that stood exceptionally alone, has plunged headlong

into revolution. Once it seemed chosen to receive the kingdom the Jews at their visitation put away; but the time of Gentiles seems drawing to its close. It is surely, and alas! not even slowly rejecting the sway and acknowledgement of truth.

What hope then is there for the world? It must create one for itself. But human authority, how rebellious soever itself against Divine, will not willingly let go its hold on others and the dissolution of society bids fair to follow the conflict between authority and subjection.

Who can venture to surmise the forms this conflict will assume? One thing only may be anticipated with sad certainty, and that is conflict, disturbance, war, on a scale becoming ever worse.

Whether the struggle begins with conflicts of the would be Cæsars of the future, with the subversion of authority, or, whether both shall rage together, who can tell? The Emperor, King of Prussia, the King of Italy, a league of latin races contending for the west, the Czar of all the Russias seizing on the East, or Russia and Prussia, in alliance or in severance, securing the booty, or quarelling over the booty before it is secured. What a prospect for the world! France it may galvanize into returning life, and stimulate to attempt latin headship. England so threatened, that she cannot keep aloof. Who can foreshadow what may overtake a world that has launched out upon the stormy ocean of adventure, having broken the rudder, thrown away the compass, torn the chart, mutinied, and

deposed the captain and the pilot. The answer must be given in a word, and it is—Anarchy.

That seems to be the necessary and reasonable conclusion from the premises that form the present condition of Europe. It has been the foregone conclusion with which the abettors of revolution have been always forced to be content. Their prophecy has always been a new order of society evolved out of the ruins of that which is.

There is something very awful in an instinct that faces all these prospects with the contentment of despair. Despair, that is to say of all that is; despair by revolutionists of their own lot whatever may ensue, and yet contentment that it should be so, because of an ultimate hope in the regeneration of the world. And what if this instinct is true? What if such a resurrection of temporal prosperity is to be evolved out of the ruins of society, and earth's counterfeit of the promise of a new heavens and a new earth is to precede the coming of the true? What if the various forms of rule that have failed to govern the world aright, are to pass suddenly away, overturned by the violence their errors have provoked? A government may rise out of their ruin, received by acclamation, yet ruthlessly imposed, bringing in the promise of unbounded prosperity, yet ending in the concentration of all preceding ills. Untempered failure of man's every boast is to usher in the rule of Him whose reign shall be by righteousness.

What has stayed the triumph of rebellion? What

has stopped the success of anarchy? Not principle, nothing but fear. Let a power appear that can wield anarchy to the subversion of all the thrones and governments of Europe and yet exalt the material prosperity of man, and where would be the shrinking from the crime, the horror of the impiety? Aye! where indeed? the destruction of his property is the fear of man; the exalter of his prosperity he would be ready to worship as his God.

Rome seems reserved to fulfil this instinct. Her boast is that she is empress and mistress of the world, eternal while this age endures. She is the mystery of the world, the power that has been, with an existence that is and that is not; a reign that shall be, emerging from the chaos of the nations.

“I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast “[power] rise up out of the sea, having seven heads “and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and “upon his heads the names of blasphemy.” . . . The “seven heads are seven mountains . the ten horns “are ten kings . the waters . are peoples and “multitudes and nations and tongues.”

A woman—the symbol of a religious system or organisation, (and atheism may be, nay, already is a system and organisation of religious *unbelief*,)—a woman, is described as sitting on the beast, controlling, that is, his power. The woman, it is expressly said, is “that great city which reigneth over the kings of the earth.”

The description of the city seems exhaustive of

every feature that can pourtray wealth, prosperity and power; a queen that shall see no sorrow; with whom the kings of the earth have lived deliciously, with all things dainty and goodly; her merchandize of gold, silver, pearls and precious stones; ivory, incense, luxuries of all kinds and the strength and uses of brass, iron and marble. Strength and abundance of delicacies and provisions; horses, chariots, slaves and souls of men.

It would seem that the wars and conflicts impending over all nations by reason of revolutionary tumult will reduce society to the condition of the sand of the sea (always the emblem of anarchical disturbance), and that a power will arise in Rome that shall shew itself able, out of that confusion, to renovate the outward structure of society, and to build up a supremacy that shall surpass all recent times and probably all past ages in magnificence and splendour. Whether that power arise in the form of the atheistic international alliance as now exhibited or as a refuge from it, the boast of that alliance bids fair to be fulfilled and a condition of material prosperity attained on the overthrow of Christianity, such as neither pagan times nor its own age have known. Is anything more required by the world to reconcile it to forgetfulness of The Most High?

“He gave them their desire;

“They were not estranged from their lust;

“But while their meat was yet in their mouths,

“The wrath of God came upon them, and slew the fattest of them,

“And smote down the chosen of Israel.”

And so it is to be when the consummation of

Rome's glory and impiety is full. Her plagues come in one day: in one hour is she made desolate amidst the lamentation of the world that has a memory only for her delights and riches, and forgets her cruelties her abominations and her shame.

In this sketch two points stand out with marked and prominent certainty, these are the future world-wide greatness of Rome, and consequently, her rise out of her present condition, be it after a state of anarchical confusion, or by means of general war.

The Western question may therefore suddenly, and at any moment, challenge an attention now from time to time only spasmodically awarded to the East, when some fresh unfolding of ambitious design forces upon Europe the consideration of the course it is pursuing. The question of universal empire may revive in its old form of contest between the East and West, between Constantinople and Rome, round which the interests of the world are centred. That empire, when established, may,—nay, indeed, apparently will—combine the characteristics and power of all preceding empires. It would seem that it is to be built up by war and conquest, for its power is to be the wonder and admiration of the world. The hope of peace is to rise out of the convulsions that lead to its aggrandizement and universality; the world at length exclaiming,—Who is able to make war with him,—the ruler of the power?

The prelude, war; the power, universal; its nature blasphemous. England must, therefore, encounter the shock or abrogate her principles. Will she choose the

latter for such purposes so long as a generation trained in the fear of God survives; or will she maintain her liberties, her duties, her honour, and the freedom of the world ?

CHAPTER XI.

ON TURKEY.

THE laws, customs, and religion of the Turk require an act of war to be preceded by a statement of the wrong complained of, and of the reparation demanded under penalty of war. The most solemn religious tribunal of the country is called upon to examine the statement, to pronounce it true and the reparation demanded, right.

Acts of war without declaration of war, and declaration without these preliminaries are alike unlawful and illegal. Accordingly the Moslem plots no schemes for the destruction of society; but observes with scrupulous faithfulness the obligations he contracts.

Treaties are sacred in his eyes and war the last extremity of justice. He has not the inclination and has not organised his power with the view of springing unawares upon marked booty; he is free from the hypocrisy of false pretences. This moderation makes the Turk the hope of Christendom against itself, for within Christendom the league between ambition and revolution threatens the disruption of society.

True it is an outrage on the fitness of things, a shock to the best feelings of mankind, that the city of the Saviour of the world should be in the hands of the followers of a false prophet. It is a shame that such tenets should at all hold sway. Spiritual and moral warfare would be rightly waged against the tenets; but Christendom, torn with discussions, and plotting the robbery and spoliation of the Turk, who offers no offence, brings shame on truth and lends false lustre to a system of untruth.

Nevertheless, the impulse of the Crusades, although it took a questionable shape, was not exclusively aggressive and ambitious. Then, resistance to the Turk was the defence of Europe against the tide of Moslem conquest; but this condition has changed. The Turk has ceased to be aggressive and holds his territories by as good a title as that of most actual possessors.

The recovery of the Holy Sepulchre and the restoration of Palestine are not motives that propel the present era. Moreover, the treatment of the professedly Christian subjects of the Sultan affords no reasonable warrant for foreign intervention.

In the absence of a tribunal empowered to determine international questions of right and justice, interference in the internal administration of Turkey is a monstrous assumption. To affect that special and exceptional abuses justify and necessitate this interference is the most impudent hypocrisy in the face of the conduct, which is beheld with unconcern among nations

of Christendom, as they fall upon each other or are torn asunder by their own corruption. Interference with Turkey is merely the expression of the restless ambition of Russia striving to bring about her constant aspiration for a universal monarchy that shall impose one religion and one rule upon the world.

Wars and civil commotions set in motion for this purpose form the peril of Europe. In other words, its peace and prosperity are disturbed and its danger arises from Russia using revolution as its instrument.

The firmness of the Turk, the strength he may display, the defence he may be able to show that he possesses, by giving proof of the uselessness of the purpose for which revolution is employed, are the only hope of European nations.

France was no sooner broken, and the spirit of England put under paralysis, than Russia gave her treaty of obligations to the winds, and entered again with all the insolent ostentation of confident success on open preparation for the fulfilment of her unchangeable determination.

On the other hand, no sooner did the Turk shew his resolve to hold his own, notwithstanding all the insidious counsels of treacherous advisers than the Candian insurrection suddenly expired. Therefore, all right sympathy must be with the Turk, although it is the shame of Christian nations that it should be so. On the one hand is Christendom, shrinking from no crime, plotting, corrupting, warring, without scruple or measure; instigating rebellions, civil wars and foreign

aggressions, breaking treaties, bringing false charges, scoffing at obligations, full of deceit, false to its allies and its foes, but elevating the standard of the Cross. On the other is the Moslem fulfilling all the obligations of truth in his intercourse with other nations, but living under the symbol of the Crescent, crediting an imposture of falsehood and knowing nothing of the Holy One and the Just, except the wickedness perpetrated in His Name by nations that have made it the war cry of unscrupulous rapacity. The contrast is unspeakably disgraceful.

Whether the Turk has suffered most from his foes or his allies is a question it is discreditable to have to ask, but not difficult to answer. It is the story not of Turkey only and exceptionally, but of all nations in which internal fault has been so great, and the country in consequence so weakened and demoralised as to have looked for foreign aid to remedy internal evil. Not indeed that this has been the case with Turkey. She has invoked no foreign aid, nor needed any against internal dissension ; the help Turkey has required has been rivalry among the Christian vultures, swooping round the prey. Her alliance with foreign aid was pitting the envy of one against the greed of another. Her fault has been, having allowed her defence so far to fail as to give to her body that semblance or reality of weakness which the Czar deemed the symptom of impending dissolution. Nations that once were, but that have ceased to be aggressive, are very apt to become negligent in maintaining their defence.

Nations, however, differ from the individuals that build them up, in that they need not die. Generation after generation carries on the nation, though each such generation passes away.

Nations have, so to speak, their eternity now and their judgment in this world. They perish only when corrupt and by reason only of corruption. They pass away with violence or fall away amidst contempt when they cease to retain any virtue ; but not till then. They fall only by fault. If Turkey were but to rouse herself from weak reliance on the aid or on the animosities of others, she still retains elements of a strength which even the power of Russia would in vain assail.

So far as relates to the Eastern question the prospect of European peace seems to depend on one of three contingencies. Of these the first is that Turkey should shew so firm a front in both policy and arms as to baffle the wiles and force of Russia. She has every inducement to arouse from her dreamy apathy and adopt that truth herself, a perversion of which Russia makes the pretext for seizing her possessions and undermining her rule.

This contingency will probably be at once set aside as too remote even for speculation; nevertheless, it has been the cause of more than one serious alarm to Russia, which it would deprive of the chief lever by which her ambition strives to work.

The next is England, emancipating herself from revolution, resuming her power, the rightful use of her influence and the discharge of her responsibilities

and obligations in the community of nations.

The last is the recognition by Europe of the peril in which the very fabric of society is placed, and the institution of a High Court of Justice that shall universally impose the observance of certain conditions by nations, in their dealings one with another, before they dare appeal to the final arbitrament of war, that shall, in fact, follow and adopt the honest practice of the Turk.

This last is obviously the best and surest guarantee of peace, if only it can be made effectual. This depends on any one nation being clear enough in intelligence to perceive its necessity, honest enough to adopt it, and powerful enough to form and uphold such a court, or on a combination being formed of such nations as may perceive themselves to be marked for the prey and not strong enough to stand against the threatening danger singly, but by uniting, able to set it at defiance.

It would be a fit rebuke to the unprincipled ambition of apostate Christendom to receive from the Mussulman the proposal to extend to the nations of Europe, Christian in profession, those safeguards against wanton and perfidious aggression which characterise the laws of the Turk.

Experience seems to speak trumpet tongued in warning the Sultan and his subjects that the support they nominally receive from Christian powers is only a source of weakness and danger, and that they would gain in strength by standing entirely alone and relying

only on themselves. They are entitled to challenge the institution of some tribunal that shall turn a common sword against the disturber of peace, irrespective of alliances framed for special emergencies or of treaties that fence clear of the real points at issue and more frequently tend, sometimes even by intention, to accomplish that which it is their professed object to avert.

If anything were wanting to open the eyes of the Moslem to the true character of the support he receives, surely the contrast between the way war has been waged when nominally on his behalf and that which European nations have pursued or consented to when really in earnest must have sufficed. Yet the parallel is even more instructive than the contrast.

Prussia, the confederate of Russia, her instrument, victim, rival, or master, as the event may prove, has acted towards France, the part Russia has destined for Turkey. Prussia, we have been told by herself, was not impelled by ambition, but influenced solely by fear. From the beginning, terror has been the cause that expanded the margravate of Brandenburg into the conqueror of Denmark, Austria, Germany and France.

Fear and fear only, weakness and only conscious weakness, occasioned an imperative necessity for making Europe shudder at the merciless terms exacted from a too formidable foe ! The warlike preparations of France and the skill with which they were conducted, (manifest in the strength of an unruly people fettered with Parliamentary institutions, by means of

which the army measures deemed necessary by the imperial government had been refused, and in an undisciplined and unfurnished army), such were the causes that had instigated placing one Hohenzollern on the quasi throne of Rumania some years before and setting up another for the throne of Spain. Influenced by fears precisely similar, Russia shudders at the misdeeds and trembles before the prowess of the listless and apathetic Turk. The expansion of the duchy of Moscow has been the necessary counterpoise devised by well-founded alarm ; the spread of Russia over Asia and in Europe, her naval and military preparation, her efforts and exertions, the wiles of her statesmen and diplomatists have all been and are manifestations of terror. Poland and Circassia have undergone the fate of Alsace and Lorraine. They are all monuments of tyranny and terror ; but though the tyranny may be Russian, the terror is that of the inhabitants. No doubt if Russia were but supreme over the world, she would be free from terrors and alarm.

The nations that have been accomplices or at least have been passive spectators of the humiliation and spoliation of France will no doubt be ready to applaud new expressions of fear as occasion may offer, and to take their parts in helping Turkey with help such as she has tasted in Bulgaria, at Silistria, at Sinope, in the Principalities, at Kars, and wherever else she has in any way suffered the assistance of allies. In victory or defeat they have brought her equally disaster.

France, though convulsed, revolutionized, without

unity of thought or aim, is proclaimed a standing war-like menace to Europe: Russia its pacificator. The consistency of the contradiction is complete. Who looks as he is bid to look, sees as he is bid to see, France, crippled and paying an infinite indemnity. Russia, guaranteed beforehand by her enemies against indemnity, spoliation or loss, inflicting on her nominal conquerors a fine of £200,000,000 (the expense they had incurred) and the loss of 100,000 men (the flower of the armies they sacrificed to her ambition,) then dictating to them in Paris, doomed to destruction, the abdication of their power, the extinction of their alliance the right of search and the inviolability of private property at sea.

In other words, Russia obtained through defeat, the obliteration of the power and influence of England and the abandonment of Turkey with the repudiation of the security of treaty obligations.

CHAPTER XII.

ON AN EUROPEAN HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

UNIVERSAL mutual distrust forms the present condition of Europe. Not a Power trusts another.

Such a state of things is the disgrace and punishment of nations. It is the result of a common experience and common practice of treachery and deceitfulness. It is the inevitable consequence of a system of intercourse that has endeavoured to consecrate double dealing, and to elevate the art and practice of over-reaching into a science, whilst it has sought to invest lying with the attributes of truth as the means of exchanging human thought and of incurring moral obligations. And so Europe is transformed into armed camps and is trembling on the brink of civil and of international wars that are to sweep away that prosperity we call civilization. This is reverting to the practice of Paganism when lust of dominion was considered the spirit of the gods, and men sighed because they knew of no other world to conquer.

It might be well if Europe paused in her career, and seriously put to herself the question—Whither is

she drifting? It is in more than one respect on a course betokening her heathen origin and nature. She may disguise it as she will; she may blink the question if she pleases; she may turn away from its investigation; she may evade it as it meets her if she can; but the secret of her restlessness is no temporary evil, no prelude of a coming peace at hand. She spurns moral obligations; she denies the brotherhood of nations; she arms and arms, and owns no right but fraud, no God but might.

Three impostures meet in her face to face: impostures, but still human, mixtures of good and evil, of truth and falsehood,—the Czar, the Pope, the Sultan. To name them is enough to dispel the idle hallucination that their creeds, however they may imperil them, have to do with the souls of men otherwise than as the instruments of worldly ambition. The Czar and Holy Russia; the Pope and who? To whom is the empire of the West to be allotted? When the Czar has become “the inheritor of the rich and splendid domain of the East,” *who shall reign in Rome, when he does in Constantinople? The Sultan? Is a peaceful revolution of immeasurable blessedness really impending? Is the Turk to learn from the pure fountain of Truth, and a second miracle to be associated with the city over which he rules? Is he to teach the nations Christianity, who has learned nothing of it but the frauds and violence of Christendom?

*The Duke of Argyle.

Here are elements of conflict enough to precipitate a collision that shall bring to pass the olden struggles for the mastery of the world. But there will be this mighty difference. The convulsion will not be the ferment shaking off impurity and error ; it will be heathenism voluntarily returning to its congenial darkness, to its blood and iron. The light has been—and has been put away.

A delusion has been given out that it is right, that it is possible, for England to separate herself from the vicissitudes of Europe, to remain a passive spectator, venting only occasional spasmodic and disregarded utterances as the fray proceeds, making and selling wares to the combatants and finally presenting compliments and congratulations to the conqueror, purchasing the prerogative of meanness by making herself vile.

It has also been stated that her insular formation cuts her off from the ordinary liabilities of the community of nations, and that the surrounding ocean is her sure and sufficient protection ; as though the sea could be crossed only by her ships, even though she surrender her supremacy over its waters !

It is an evil symptom of national disease that such mischievous folly should be thought and written, imagined and inculcated, but it is worse to know that it is earnestly desired and greedily entertained.

God grant that England may take a nobler, happier, safer part ; take it in His strength whose truth she has received and whose favour has been her power and defence, her strength and glory.

That she has all the elements of strength, enough even now in the present condition of affairs, to turn the scale of European determination in favour of the imperative observance of contracted obligation,—it should not, with the resources she possesses, be difficult to shew. At all events to endeavour so to do is her only path of safety, and it is her first of duties. Neglect of duty, on the other hand, because of impending difficulty, doubt, or danger, is nothing else than forsaking faith, or that reliance which is the essence of human connection with the Deity.

Absolute preservation of peace, and compulsory observance of peace, are contradictions in terms. The very necessity for compulsion shews the presence of offenders in overt act or covert intention; but the way to peace and to keep peace as much as the disordered condition of the nations will permit, is to found a tribunal that shall be capable of enforcing the strict observance of contracted obligation.

If Europe would measure the depth of the abyss to the edge of which she has been dragged, let her well consider that the breach of treaties by the right of might is the triumph of violence. If it go unpunished, it is the incentive to constant violence, the sure end of peace. Yet her leading nations have debased themselves to so depraved an act that language itself refuses to put it in words devoid of contradiction and absurdity. Impelled by their fears and entangled by their own contrivances, they have made themselves

formal approving signatories of an act destructive of the *binding* nature of *obligation*.*

They append their acquiescence to what is extorted by force, they express posthumous assent to dictates flaunted before them with the accompaniments of defiance and insult and wrapping themselves in the mantles of their stupendous hypocrisies, blinder than the bird that hides from its pursuers by burying its head in the sand, they scream that they have vindicated the rights of nations and dream that they have skilfully steered clear of destruction and are in no danger of perdition.

The institution of an European High Court of Appeal is a simple, obvious, and probably a necessary remedy for the disastrous evils into which the nations are thus plunging.

Its labours, like those of all human devices must nevertheless be attended with difficulty, and at best the tribunal must needs be fallible and would probably be faulty. How are its components to be preserved from those very vices, which have made diplomacy the by-word and shame of Europe? How in an age repudiating the obligation of treaties is their observance to be secured by another?

Well indeed, may this be asked, for if the corruption of the world has already advanced so far that might will range itself *only* on the side of wrong, the case is hopeless, and England would be guiltless, nay,

*Obligation : bond, engagement. Engage, to bind.—*Vide* Dictionaries.

she would rather be justified and right in withdrawing, if she could, from a community openly avowing only the power of might and violence, and from which she would have stripped the mask of specious hypocrisy. Probably few things are more likely than the institution and eventual debasement of some such court. Corruptly influenced, manipulated to give fraudulent decisions, it is palpably the most potent agent towards effecting universal dominion that could be instituted. In proportion to its power and value rightly used and constituted, must be its liability to debasement and perversion. This is inherent in the nature of things. Whilst it affords therefore no sound argument against the institution of such a court that it may, and probably will be so debased, it is an unanswerable argument why its institution should be the special work of a nation that will not so deprave it, of the only nation that still retains great power, and yet is wholly void of the spirit and desire of aggression : also why it should ally with itself the smaller and emperilled powers of Europe to their preservation, and above all to the preservation of truth, right, honesty and the sense of obligation. Such an alliance would constitute a strong confederation for the peace of the world, and save its individual constituents from being made compulsory approvers of violence.

There is also the strongest encouragement to form such a court and alliance. All unbelief notwithstanding, there is One "by whom kings reign and princes decree justice," who helps them to right that suffer

wrong. The distinguishing characteristic of England's power is that she received it coincidently with her having placed the only legal as well as lawful government of the realm under confessed and entire subjection to the Word of Revelation. In this she stands emphatically in contrast with Mahomedanism, and with impostures that mingle schemes of earthly ambition and vain imaginations with abstract confession of the Deity. Her power is emphatically a trust received in that connection, and the first question for her to determine in relation to her duties to the common family of nations, is the extent of the power and might entrusted to her, what the nature and extent of the trust for which it is committed, what her own responsibility in its discharge.

The power and responsibility of England for preservation of the peace and well-being of mankind, arise from the strength that has been given her directly, and from the mutual antagonisms of the rivals for world wide Empire. It is fortunately the attendant of wrong, perpetrated or attempted, even in the present condition of Europe, that the weaker or the injured have some and sometimes much power of resistance. The voice of England truthfully delivered with serious intention, and evident manifestation of strength and preparedness, to give that voice effect, would then suffice to prevent outrage, or to stay its course.

Much more were she thus earnest and so prepared, could she send forth the invitation for the institution of a High Court of Justice, to enforce the due observ-

ance of international obligations, and influence the nations to its acceptance and the execution of its decrees.

This is nothing else than contending for the peace and preservation of the world. So then, the world's only hope seems to be, England perceiving what her duty is, and arising to the sense of duty, but the only hope of this again is, her also perceiving that her own safety is involved in the performance of her duty.

The matter at issue is in reality the conflict that in this world is to know no end till "time [delay] shall be no longer." To put down all unjust rule, authority and power, is reserved for another dispensation and other circumstances; but it is quite another thing from this, to be actively or passively, partaker in acts of violence and robbery. Appeal has been made to England under every aspect of selfishness. She has been plied in the names of avarice and love of ease with persuasive seductions to isolate herself from her fellow nations, to put off her power and influence, idly dreaming that virtue, the synonym of valour, might consist with unmanliness and impotence.

She cannot fail to know that these are counsels of dishonour. They would never have entered minds not depraved. They could not have been uttered, never have been listened to, except in a condition very far gone from rectitude. She must also become aware that they are the certain road to her destruction, to the loss of all those unprotected hoards of money bags

which she is bid to cherish, in preference to her duty and the protection of her honour. Should she determinately reject them and arise from her lethargy, she will free herself from the shackles of revolution, and emancipate herself from the slavery of revolutionists.

Returning to the dictates of common sense and common honesty in the management of her affairs, she would see through the hypocrisies with which she has been beguiled. She would shake off—might it be for ever—professional politicians, and rid herself of party legislation.

The proper constitution of an European High Court of Justice is utterly at variance with mis-representation. Its composition must evidently be based on the primary principle of influence in proportion to liability in enforcing its decisions.

The first duty of the High Court would be to institute universally the observance of the same formalities before the drawing of the sword, that are already observed by the Turks. These have been already mentioned. Before a declaration of war can be signed the provocation must be shewn, the reparation demanded must be set forth,—the one must be declared to be real and adequate and the other to be just and reasonable.

A transgressor of those laws would be declared to be and be proceeded against as what he is,—the common enemy of man; the offender would have to meet not the intended victim only, but he would have to face

the combined force at the command of the supporters of the court.

This of itself would end the lying accusations and the subtle evasions which have characterized the attacks on Turkey, on Denmark, on Austria and on France alike, and by removing the chances of the success of stealthy preparations, it would put an end to the tiger like springs on paralyzed prey that have met the astounded gaze of stupified Europe.

War would become in truth the last extremity of justice, the stern arbiter between the power of rebellion and the might of right. The nations might disarm, except so far as necessary for the purpose of this high police, and having won general assent to its support, they might give themselves to the labours of peace in assured tranquility, so long as they continued to watch against and to put down transgression.

And what does this amount to? Rising to the level of the Turk! If Europe will not be guided by these principles,—will countenance instead of shrinking with horror from the perpetrators of unjust war, who are nothing else than murderers and robbers,—let her at least blush for very shame in the presence of a Mussulman and abstain from the blasphemy of taking in vain the name of the Saviour and Avenger of mankind, when she is doing the worst deeds of his accuser, enemy and destroyer.

The alternative is that condition on which she has entered. Every nation arming,—arming either for aggression or arming in uncertainty, arming in per-

plexity, arming in fear ; but always arming, arming to meet the ripening plots of utterly unscrupulous ambition—all, except England. Despite the condition of Europe, in the teeth of spoliations and indemnities, she looks for her security to hoarded gold.

Part 3.

CHAPTER I.

ON POINTS OF PERIL.

WE do not watch the operations of any particular set of burglars, nor speculate on the circuit they may select; we do not spend our time in abstract speculation on the more or less of probability of their eventually trying our house, before taking ordinary precautions for its security. We do not wait for the flames to break out on our premises before looking to the safety of the lights and fires. Successful depredations committed with impunity in our immediate neighbourhood; distribution of booty under our eyes; the avowed expression of a determination to sack our house; mockery of our feeble ideas of protection, confident boasting of our anticipated spoliation, would certainly, if it were possible to imagine such things, excite us to be on our guard to the utmost of our power, or at least to the extent the emergency required, unless indeed we had first taken leave of our senses.

Conflagrations close to our premises, whether caused by incendiaries, by the general use of some new, extremely vile and untrustworthy "oil," or both, would certainly arouse us, if capable of exercising our faculties,

to more than common watchfulness. Much more so if we knew incendiaries were reckoning on inflammable material on our premises, to light up a conflagration for our destruction while they seized on our property.

If anything could, under such circumstances, add to our determination to use the utmost vigilance and to be prepared with every possible precaution, it would be, being aware that among the inmates of our house, exposed to such extreme dangers, were some that were helpless, and some that were imbecile: women, children, and men incapacitated; some by obstinacy, some by infirmity, some by feebleness of intellect; but all wrapped in an imperturbable dream of security that would be certain on the awakening of apprehension to a sense of the actual danger, to give way to an intensity of fear that would cause a confusion and create a peril, even exceeding that inherent to the threatening calamity.

It were not more wise on the part of a nation to neglect the proper means of precaution and to postpone the consideration of its defence, until it has exhausted speculation on the likelihood, or otherwise, of the particular expressions and forms a danger may assume, of which the elements palpably exist. The tendency to do so is in itself an expression of the source of greatest danger. The existence of danger is the consequence of the neglect of preparation. There is danger only by failure in watchfulness and duty.

When the consideration of elements of danger

is a pretence under which defence itself is trifled with, such falsity of intention is a crime that cannot be excused, for it involves consequences that may prove fatal. Provided however, no false idea of security is allowed to arise from error in anticipations of particular combinations and of events still contingent,—that the reality of danger is not denied because of uncertainty in the combination of its elements—the study of possible combinations may be of good use, whether or not the hypotheses and assumptions prove correct, or are dissipated by the very precaution that unveils the possibility of their occurrence.

Weighing the relative probabilities of such combinations, serves to indicate the best direction for preparation against them, and may serve to check the contagion of indifference, and of an over-fond assumption of security that despises the safeguards of necessary precaution.

The position of England in the face of existing and future complications in Europe, requires little stress to be laid on the accuracy of any particular speculations as to the form they may assume.

Her dangers spring from two sources which comprehend them all; one is the general overthrow of the sense of obligation, the other the especial repudiation in England, on grounds of avowed selfishness, of moral obligation and of physical strength. Greater dangers to a nation's permanent welfare it is not possible to imagine; they sap the possibility of greatness, for they are destructive of right.

It has been well said,—“If the perils of a country—“defenceless, rich and heartily hated, unarmed in the “midst of armed and greedy foes,—do not alarm her “ruler, the fact of his freedom from alarm constitutes “the gravest of her perils.”

How much more, if some of the country's watchmen are in league with its inflammable material and in accord with the burglars that threaten her; if they who deprecate home strength, English and Imperial unity, who would scatter the Empire, who scoff at effectual home defence as the proposal of alarmists, are at the same time the foremost adulators of foreign armed force and successful violence, and shew themselves even rabidly eager to bow the knee to any conqueror, whoever and whatever he may be, whether in the old world or the new, so long as he is victor. Under such circumstances, all such increase marks a coincident decline in our standing and security.

Rome is reviving, but its future is a sea of uncertainty; the possession of the Empire of the West is undetermined; the latin races are not amalgamated, but are unwilling to pass *en masse*, under the Prussian yoke. Prussia, as yet, lords it only in Germany and over France, but is determined to become as powerful by sea as by land,—to be the successor to the Cæsars. France and Prussia may possibly league, or may be again opposed, but either way, Holland and Belgium are at their mercy. Russia neglects no opportunity of pushing her own designs; the republic in America is liable at any moment to the outbreak of an ambition

that bristles with pretensions and craves for the sole possession of a hemisphere. These, with a domestic condition in which the assembly that imposes the government of the country, subordinates home defence to party ascendancy, dallies with revolution everywhere, and applauds foreign aggressiveness, advocates Russian, Prussian and American ambition, but labours for the complete disintergation of the Imperial possessions, complete a situation in which it behoves England to be in earnest in effectually securing her defence.

CHAPTER II.

THE FUTURE OF THE SEA FROM A PRUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW.

(A TRANSLATION.)

“THE war of liberation of Schleswig-Holstein from
“a hated dominion of strangers that attacked Germany
“in its innermost germ,” are the words of an enthusi-
astic and far-seeing Prussian* even so far back in the
unfolding of Prussian intentions as 1864, “must add to
“all the grounds of the good German Right yet another
“demand, the fulfilment of which not only the political
“new birth of Germany but the highest interests of
“the . . . merchants of the whole civilized world
“requires: the construction of a great ship canal through
“Holstein . . . the best sea-port and at the same
“time the most secure war-port of Germany . . .
“Foreign ships of war must, matter of course, remain
“for ever excluded from the use of the canal; but just
“for that reason must all private property other than
“German, be so much the more not to be touched.
“Foreign goods must be under the guardian ship

*Der Nord und Ost-See Kanal durch Holstein,
Deutschlands Doppelphorte zu seinen Meeren
und zum Weltmeere. Von J. J. Sturz, Berlin, 1864.

“of German Right and German cannon . . and
“only so can very extensive capital which is now locked
“up become extremely moveable [!] . . The state is
“the more bound . . because this great world highway,
“independently of all commercial advantages, has an
“enormous political significance, which in itself renders
“its construction a matter of necessity, because the
“canal by reason of its two exits, forms the most com-
“pletely secured war-port of the world

“The mighty Russian empire that has afresh taken
“a new and powerful impulse in the strength of its un-
“weakened original force has planted its principal ports
“on the coasts of that sea which this canal is to place
“in direct communication with the North Sea and the
“Atlantic Ocean, in order to tread with its 70,000,000
“of people in the ranks of the peoples of progress
“ All this must make the borders
“of the German water-way a mart of the world in the
“most expanded sense of the word and elevate
“Schleswig-Holstein into the richest and most thickly
“peopled strip of the European continent.

“The sea is the great tilt-yard of nations ; on it
“before all, the manhood of a people renders itself hard
“as steel. When Germany has joined in one, by
“means of the North and East Sea Canal, its until
“now, lamed and dissevered maritime powers, it will
“step with redoubled strength into the arena.

“Germany must attain by means of its maritime
“development to that it has sore need of : an active
“part in politics . . that sea, which even the

“ English call—the German ocean, in remembrance of
“ our renowned maritime valour . . . That blessing
“ will bloom again when Germany has recovered the
“ spirit of maritime adventure and enterprise that
“ inspired the Hansa . . . In a word, the German
“ coast which is insufficient for the giant womb of our
“ fatherland will be enlarged . . . this giant womb
“ of the fatherland is in bonds ; to break these fetters
“ is our object. *These fetters* which hinder its extension
“ on the continent *are its frontiers* firmly guarded by
“ powerful nationalities. Russia is ever extending her
“ possessions in Asia both eastward and southward
“ continually ; other nations, such as England and
“ France, win for themselves new spaces in the strange
“ parts of the earth. Germany cannot do this, for it
“ has not the fulcrum on which to rest its leverage for
“ the joint sovereignty—yes, joint sovereignty ! over
“ the world. Therefore, Germany, to whom its German
“ sea, made into a unity, will throw open the ocean,
“ must ever strive with all its might to raise its maritime
“ commerce, its sea power and its relations across the
“ seas, to such a pitch, that by these means, as well as
“ by the overflow of its population, the sea shall become
“ its second home ; so that the German emigrant or
“ sailor shall no longer be exposed to the caprice of
“ foreign nations, but shall everywhere, and wherever
“ he may be, *obtain the value of his strength* and intelli-
“ gence in the consciousness of the might and powerful
“ protection of the fatherland . . . what may
“ the German patriot not promise himself from the
“ political effect of the Holstein canal ?

“In the absence of maritime strength, there can be
“no attitude assumed towards the foreigner that shall
“command regard : this maritime power cannot be
“obtained without a communication between the Baltic
“and North Sea, independent of Denmark and of the
“nations under whose influence that nation will long
“remain. Prussia furnished with the beginning of
“maritime power, which however the united fatherland
“can make but little use of in the Baltic, has proved
“that it has rightly appreciated the ills of this drawback
“by the acquisition of a harbour in the North Sea . . .
“In the event of a maritime war, which from hence-
“forth every war must more or less become, Germany
“ . . . can never fail of allies. The guarantee
“for this assurance is the mutual and inextinguishable
“jealousy of the great maritime powers (with which we
“also count Russia). . . On this Germany may
“reckon so as to build upon it ; the fleet of the United
“States will never oppose it in hostile encounter . .
“In four-and-twenty hours our fleet could pass through
“out of the North Sea into the Baltic, or *vice versa*, to
“to be followed closely either way by the fleets of
“our allies. Our forts would bar the way to the
“enemy and to any of his allies.

“It has been proposed in certain quarters to neutra-
“lize the canal. This would be the greatest political
“fault, and must never be permitted by Germany . .
“The passage could not in that case become the great
“instrument of national might that it must become . .
“*if England's aristocracy disregards the national*

"rights of Germany . . . well, we are a people of
"50,000,000, and if . . . we do not protect our right
"and cannot defend it, we have no right to national
"existence The whole canal must become the
"principal warhaven of the German fleet.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE TRANSPORT OF TROOPS OF INVASION.

“THE object of the enemy would be in the first instance, “to land a sufficient force on some unprotected “part of the coast, to enable him to seize and hold a “position under cover of which the invading army “might be dis-embarked. With the power of concen- “tration, which steam now affords, such a force might “be assembled before daylight, upon any point selected “for the attempt, and thrown on shore in two or three “hours.

Such is the report of the Defence Commission, presented by command of Her Majesty, to Parliament, in 1860. It needs no argument to make it evident that the more appliances and resources are increased, the greater becomes the force with which a landing may be effected under such circumstances as the Defence Commission has set forth.

If the shores be unprotected, the nature of the coast on the parts attempted, imposes in fact, almost the only limitation to the power of descent. Since the date of the Commission which succinctly set forth the danger, the possibility of the attempt has been seriously augmented. The successive abandon-

ments of Denmark and France have placed the whole of the countries abutting on the North Sea at the mercy of Prussia. They have become points of departure she has the power to make use of for such a purpose as this. The over-running of Holland and Belgium by a *coup de main*, is a matter of little more than the time that would be occupied in the railway transit of the troops, intended to be moved over these countries, and concentrated in their ports. A guarantee, (a guarantee of modern Europe) is the only security of Belgian soil. The question, an old and appropriate term for being put to the torture,—the question against Luxembourg, and so against the King of Holland, just as that of Schleswig-Holstein, was turned against the kingdom of Denmark for the acquisition of Jahde and the necessity of restraining in Alsace and Lorraine the resentment evoked by conquest and oppression may readily be made pretexts, under which large masses of organised troops may be assembled within limits of the German frontier and moved with the suddenness and precision of which Prussia has shewn an absolute mastery. Moreover, she has proved herself equal to the successful conduct of far heavier tasks than obtaining the temporary control over a portion of the coasts of France, and commanding the active aid, or effecting the paralysis of a part of her fleets. Besides, France might be incited to pursue a quarrel of her own or be inveigled into an alliance. With exception of the time of the dynasty England has seen precipitated to its fall, her history has no

period to shew in which the policy of her princes or the usurpations of her revolutionists have been in faithful and harmonious accord with the interests and well-being of England.

Whether with or without the active aid or the compulsory service of France, Prussia commanding the resources of Germany and able to make the continental coasts of the North Sea her base of operations, encircles the south and east of England with a belt, which if the maritime ascendancy of England be for a moment broken, becomes the first parallel of approach, and as opposite as it is possible to be to a bulwark of protection. Her enemy, if he chose to declare himself such, is one who has shewn a perfect mastery in the art of combining every instrument that can further his end. His bluster of demeanour; his arrogance of demand; his professions of peace; his fears of being attacked; his imputations on others; his intermeddling in internal affairs of other nations; his interest in the schools of other lands; his sowing of intestine strifes and national divisions; his enrolment of his own people as one gigantic implement of war, are all studied parts of one determined whole, which, on his own shewing, is a passionate desire for maritime ascendancy in order to participate in mastery over the world. Is it necessary to quote his view from his own mouth as to a nation against the aristocracy of which, he hurls his threats, and which, if it will not defend its rights, he deems unworthy of existence? Are there not circumstances enough to prove that one country stands in the way

of such insatiable ambition whom it menaces before all others ; that England must be humbled, effaced, or conquered before the passionate longing of the poetical German can have its high gratification ? He has already mastered the strongest of difficulties, for he has proved that he can wait without wavering in resolution. With him, "Delayed is not discarded" "Aufgehoben ist nicht aufgehoben," "postponed is but put off." Prussia has never yet engaged in conflict without studying every conceivable subtlety of pre-arrangement. When everything that plot and craft can do is ready and the thorough preparation of overwhelming numbers turns probability into all but certainty of result in her favour, her valour has proved as conspicuous as her skill, and the valour begotten of skill has been nourished and strengthened by success. She is avowedly bent on attaining predominant maritime power, and is looking for allies. The treaties which placed South Germany at her disposal were not made known until they were concluded. Her diplomatic, war-like, and naval preparations may be as stealthily concluded at St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Jahde, every nerve be similarly strained, and every endeavour be again pushed on in secret to mature the plot for obtaining maritime ascendancy, effecting the humiliation of Great Britain and gaining the longed-for mastery in the world. If opportunity serve, the blow will fall. A return of the strength of the commercial marine of the German empire, and another of the German sailors employed in English and foreign bottoms would

promptly undeceive those who imagine that Germany, which unfortunately for mankind means Prussia, cannot make a fleet. The threatened demand of half the French fleet would have enabled the seizure of the rest, would have placed the harbours and coast of France at the mercy of Prussia, but it would have instantly unmasked its final object, and in the opinion of the wise heads that manipulate the plot it would have probably unduly precipitated the contest for the coveted maritime ascendancy. Once more they have known how and when to wait. Delayed is not discarded. One country is the concentration of preparation ; what is the other doing ?

The commission to determine the strength of the marine of France laid down the complement at from 55 to 60 screw steamer line-of-battle ships, 80 to 90 first-class frigates, also screw steamers, and 72 steam transports for 1000 men with the due proportion for horses and stores. When these numbers were decided on, she set to work to provide iron-plated vessels in addition.

The expedition of the prince president, Napoleon, for the occupation of Rome, carried 10,000 men in six frigates, three small steamer sloops, and two transports. From careful computation it appears *that a steamer of 1,000 tons can carry 1,500 men and tow horse boats conveying 200 horses with space for limbers, waggons, forage, and attendants, and that the boats required can be constructed in 14 days' time. It would, therefore,

**Vide* Lecture by Captain Tulloch, Journal U. S. Institution.

require 67 such steamers to convey 100,000 men, but only from 16 to 17 for an advance force of 25,000 men landed in order to sieze a position and establish communication with the continent. This mode of transport involves the protection of a fleet or momentary possession of the sea. There is another, which may be called the modern reversion of warfare to olden forms, in which the identity of fighting, whether on sea or land, is fully recognised, and of which Admiral Halsted, C.B., has laid details before the country. He makes a complement of 800 troops, exclusive of marines, and provided with all the necessary equipment for landing in troop boats and steam life boats, a feature of all first rates. This is the instrument required on England's outer circle of protection and to transfer the impulse of collision, if it must occur, to scenes beyond her own shore. Five such ships transport only 4,000 men, but on the other hand transport and protection are one. It is a means of defence required by and perfectly adapted to the whole of the imperial possessions. It would prove as formidable a means of attack on any of these possessions if adopted by an enemy. Unfortunately it does not follow either that England will, or that others will not, adopt this system.

For so short a passage as is required for the invasion of England, from four to six times as many men might be placed on board such war ships as they could carry for their permanent occupation. Taking, therefore, a mixed means as likely to be used for such

an object it would not require more than ten or twenty of the larger steamers and thirty-six of the other kind, to transport 10,000 men, or a contribution of from four to six of the larger and twelve of the smaller, from even a limited coalition against the independence of Great Britain. These very moderate numbers have only to be multiplied by five to transport half a million of men at once to these shores, and to prove that transport in itself does not present the difficulty it is sometimes assumed to do in the way of an invasion. Consequently it does not present that barrier to its success which is too commonly accepted as enough to deter an enterprising enemy. It is a very poor reliance for the honour and safety of a great kingdom. Such difficulties would be little more than child's play to a coalition that might be formed against England, playing for the stakes that it would play for. The German idea is that a nation that cannot protect its interest by force has no right to existence. Prussia has shewn a singular tendency to put her ideas in practice.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE PERIMETER OF POSITIONS.

FORTUNATELY the modern aspect of war facilitates defence, more especially the defence of extended positions. The very fierceness of aggression, the recklessness and hardness with which it is pushed, intended for the very opposite purpose, contribute to this end. Time was when great issues have been determined by single combat. Legends poetical, if not exact, tell of this mode of decision from very early times. Armies have long superseded the expedients of chivalry; but it is only now that war is beginning to mean armed nations in deadly collision. It has been reserved for that strange enigma—modern politeness or civilization—to wage war by the destruction of monuments, the slaughter of the civil population, the proscription of auxiliary forces from quarter, the extirpation of women and children, and the utter despoilment of the conquered. The attack is no longer primarily directed against the soldiery, but their surrender is compassed by the pressure of an agonized population murdered by bombardment. All manner of constraint is deliberately adopted, not in the consciousness of a more utter depravity of brutalism than of

yore, but as the seemingly harsh but really merciful mode of determining the conquest, which means however obtaining more promptly for the invader all that it is possible to take, to carry off or have sent after him. When revenge, cupidity and rage are satiated, and when the prolongation of glut becomes impossible, the swords of the warrior is exchanged for the taunt of the negotiator and the maddening menace of renewed and further hostilities.

It may be well it should be so. Well, if instead of leading the nations to prostrate themselves before the new risen deities of insolence and force, it should make their worship altogether impossible by determination never to yield submission and to render aggression hopeless by returning to the habits of defence. This mode of international warfare unites all the interests of the attacked; it obliterates the distinction between the trained soldier, the citizen, the woman, and the child. It leaves them nothing to live for, unless they succeed in repelling the invasion.

The range too of modern weapons increases defensive strength. It makes the extent of the perimeter of a position a source of strength instead of weakness, and weak only in so far as it is sought unduly to contract the space defended, the extent of which must ever be governed by conditions, and cannot be arbitrarily decreed. Large populous towns, duly aided by defensive works, have the means of furnishing their own garrisons, and even of forming their own armies. The very opposite conclusion has

indeed been addressed to the Lord Mayor and the Sheriffs of London,* urging that large populous cities should not be defended. It would appear, the speaker intended to say—fortified, and that the idea was that a totally unprotected condition would save such towns from the horrors of war. Except for the circumstance that such counsel could be addressed to such an auditory, it would scarcely be necessary to do more than to name it, that it might carry its own refutation to every reflecting mind ; but the orator went on to rejoice that England had no defended towns ! What could he mean ? England is little else than, so to speak, a nest of wealthy populous towns ; to leave them undefended is but to invite aggression, and to follow in the wake of those who give her counsel to go on hoarding unprotected money bags, and to cast her duties to the wind. Paris was not subjected to the treatment it received because it was fortified, but because it was the capital of an invaded country. If wholly unprotected, the conqueror would have marched in many a month sooner and in much more vain-glorious triumph than he ultimately did. It fell only because fortified imperfectly, and treacherously garrisoned : because furnished with inadequate means of resistance, and harassed by the sins of internal disorder. In what she did and what she failed to do, Paris has given an equally instructive lesson and warning to the world. After the catastrophes of Sedan and Metz, after the

* The Dean of Westminster.

surrender of Bazaine, the nation, fondly deemed the most warlike and aggressive in Europe, was denuded of all its armies and had to form new levies with only the walls of the capital around which to rally. Then the inhabitants of that capital, in which all had revelled and over whose fall so many have pointed morals, with little covering of sins in their morals, were awakened from dreams of triumph to the realities of endurance. Paris even after the catastrophe that preceded the siege was in danger only because her works were incomplete. The perimeter of their enclosure was too restricted. They were inadequately armed and ill-supplied. But he who would trace the cause and story of her fall must seek it in the agencies that forced on the declaration of war by a nation unprepared, against one that for a full generation had held that purpose steadfastly in view—in the secret instruments that managed to transfer her defence into new hands in the power of emergency,—hands that proved false to the regency and false to the trust that they usurped and that have not been free of suspicion of tampering with the worst civil dissensions of unhappy France. From the invasion of Denmark to the spoliation of France, falsehood has been the starting point, robbery the goal, and treachery the means in modern wars. These are not things to yield to, to tamper with or to disguise, but to resist to death or life, with honour or with victory.

It is the more necessary to impress the value of an extended perimeter, and the strength that may be derived from the large amount of space that may have

to be enclosed within a defended position, from the contrary antecedent condition of all similar cases. The identity lies in this—that both conditions are absolutely determined by the range of arms ; the contrariety arises from the contrast between the range of existing and of former arms.

When the effective range of musketry was 80 yards and of artillery from 300 to 600 yards, compactness was a most important consideration in all works for strengthening positions and more especially in permanent fortifications. The importance of a limit in scale imposed by the range of weapons, was enhanced by armies then being composed of what would now be deemed very small numbers. Every fortified post required its garrison in proportion to the extent of ground, and the object sought was rather to secure an impregnable foothold on which an extemporised force or a small army might rally, than the protection of any particular area. In England not only had the habits of localised defence fallen into disuse and the principles of feudal customs into neglect, but no others had arisen in their stead. In truth they had been little needed. The limit of range in arms had had the effect of rendering the invasion of the soil of England an operation requiring as many more men and armies in proportion as the arms of those days fell short in range of those now in use. All this is now exactly reversed. An arm is now carried by the same military unit of a man that is capable of the same accuracy as before over a tenfold length ; this is equivalent to an area one hundred-fold greater.

Reliance on protection by a naval supremacy that was a well-established reality may therefore have been no unreasonable trust; but it is a necessary, if an unfortunate, consequence of the changes that have taken place in so many of the principal elements that govern and absolutely determine these results, that a reliance, well founded at one time, may become the cause of ruin at another.

To reason that though she has renounced the right of search and placed her maritime interests in jeopardy, the sea still laves the shores of England and her navy has known no deterioration, and therefore she may continue to neglect her land defence and the duty of individual preparation, is to reason in ignorance or neglect of conditions that have all but become reversed. To act in any measure on a fallacy so great is to place the country in the utmost peril.

Probably from this predominant dependance on naval protection, coupled with the naturally maritime tastes of an insular people, and confused historical notions that armies are the instruments of dangerous and tyrannical sovereigns,—from whatever cause,—it was the fact that a standing army, however small and indispensable, was so much abomination to the minds of many. It was regarded as the tool of kings, the lounge of a luxurious aristocracy—who have always furnished the best officers—and a sink of extravagance, evidently proved by the lavish emoluments it receives. From this political alienation from military duties and military matters generally, arose very naturally an extreme of

illogical ignorance. Expenditure on defensive works or fortifications was held to be synonymous with the extension of a standing army, instead of being appreciated as the means of husbanding forces and military resources of all kinds to the uttermost.

Facts and reasoning were thrown away on such a temper. It was determined not to understand that earth is cheaper and less perishable than wood, a structure of stone more sure to be at hand than a vessel blown by the wind. It was totally incapable of understanding that auxiliary or passive means of protection were invaluable aids in limiting to the smallest number the aggregate necessary to the defence of the kingdom.

To gauge how heavily these prepossessions have weighed upon the country, it is necessary to read the condemnatory recommendations in Parliament of works of defence by those who deemed themselves compelled by official position to make them; but who evidently partook of the ignorance and prejudice of their most vehement opponents. They read so adverse to the cause they plead that if the dumb stone could speak and the beam answer, they might well cry out to be saved from their friends and defended against their advocates, and not to be set up in such stunted impotence as would result in the justification of their condemnation.

There has been besides an influence more evil still at work. Who does not remember floods of philosophical—that appears to be the name with which every species of folly loves to label itself—of philo-

sophical disquisition that have been poured forth from time to time on the vanity of defensive preparation here or there, as in British America, or throughout the empire, because it must needs prove insufficient and end in resistance overcome and punished, not in defence established and successful? Yet the same philosophers desire to draw the scale to the finest hair when the question involves the existence or the destruction of Great Britain! The fact is simply that they are implacable enemies of all defence, of which they do not value the end and for attaining which they cannot in consequence appreciate the means.

Such circumstances could not fail to exert their influence even upon those called upon to give practical effect to whatever the country might be induced to do towards its defence. They had not only to understand at once the full effects of transition from a delivery of fire at the closest contact possible to a conflict of fire beginning beyond the range of vision, to emancipate themselves from all arbitrary rules that were merely mechanical deductions or rules of thumb and to revert solely to first principles on unalterable foundations; but when they had done this, it was only to become aware that they might as well resign their seats, their places and their offices, as endeavour seriously to urge upon the country either premise or conclusion. A sense of the necessity of doing something was awakened; but an attempt to bring about what was required appeared personally hazardous and hopeless to effect. The

result might have been foreseen. It was this—constant meddling with what was already efficient and had been better left alone, and a complete abandonment of all territorial defence either by works or men: an army smothered in administration and a country left without local defence.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE DEFENCE OF LONDON.

THE interest of the defence of England, centres peculiarly on London, the capital. Other capitals severally have their interest; the triumph of an invader is always the more complete for being consummated with an entry into the metropolis of the country he has conquered. The humiliation of the conquered is wanting in one ingredient of anguish if by any means the capital can be kept from the dishonour of being taken; notwithstanding the boast of Paris that it was France, the influence of Paris over France, even when at the pinnacle of her power, fell immeasurably short of that which London exercises over England, and indeed over the whole empire committed to her sway. It is not merely that the palace of the Sovereign comes within the position as a military one, that is commonly enough the case, although no palace can vie with Windsor in historical or actual interest; it is not merely that it is the seat of a legislature and administration that reach to every quarter of the globe; but the main arsenal of the kingdom, the rifle manufactory, the chief powder mill and magazines are all within the limits of what is at once the metropolis,

the focus of communication, the most important, the first commercial city of the realm, and the wealthiest city of the world.

This vital centre, the heart of the nation, may be regarded under either of two aspects very widely asunder in their bearings on defence. It may be looked upon as something that must be protected to the last extremity by all the extraneous resources and power of the kingdom, something for the protection of which to the last gasp of national existence, all exertion must be made and all strength lavished; or it may be treated as the spring and source of defensive strength, flowing out to the farthest extremities, as the citadel and seat of force,—the keep, magazine and arsenal of the entire imperial position.

This latter is the right and proper course and would follow of itself, from the general performance of individual duty by which numerical strength and resources are derived in direct proportion to area, population and wealth. It would attain the end in view with certainty. The other has by comparison nothing to recommend it. It is unnatural, artificial, wasteful, inordinately costly and unjust in operation. Worse than all, it is uncertain of result—and uncertainty is an element inadmissible in true defence. Yet, unfortunately, it is the mode of dealing with the protection of the capital, which though not true in principle, is nevertheless, actual as a fact, and it is less evil and less to be deprecated than entire neglect. The position of London has what protection it can be said to have, and it is very little, by this means

only. London itself is not in any way defended, therefore, unless its capture be a foregone conclusion, it must in theory be defended by some means other than its own valour, watchfulness, preparedness, or skill.

Lord Overstone wrote to the Defence Commission in 1860, (that is, long before the terrible examples and experience of France and Paris,) in forcible, but not exaggerated words:—

“The general confusion and ruin which the presence of a hostile army on British soil must produce, will be such, that it would be absolute madness on the part of the Government and people of this country, were they to omit any possible measure of precaution, or to shrink from any present sacrifice by which the occurrence of such a catastrophe may be rendered impossible.

“ . . . The occupation of London by an invading army. . . . I cannot contemplate or trace to its consequences such a supposition. My only answer is—it must never be.

“ . . . The efforts of a kingdom humiliated, paralyzed, divided in opinion, would not lead to any satisfactory result.

“We have every inducement to make our system of National Defence complete and effectual, the calamities and misery which a successful invasion of England must produce, would be far more serious than any of which the world has yet had experience.

“We have ample means in accumulated wealth, and productive energies sufficient to support all

“necessary expenditure . . . in mechanical skill
“ . . . in a people, proud at heart of their country
“ . . . whose courage and self-devotion have
“never been found to fail in the hour of trial.

“We have a STAKE AT ISSUE, which may well
“call forth all our energies.

“We have *means of defence* of every kind.

“We have *warning* more than enough to awaken
“our vigilance.

“If we prove apathetic . . . or too short-sighted
“and selfish, . . . we must bow to the fate which
“the whole world will declare we have deserved.”

If the metropolis fulfil its proper function, and provide its own defence, the assurance of impregnable strength and peaceful security would be spread throughout the whole empire. It is its heart and centre; if it be whole and beat aright life and health are conveyed to the extremities.

If the metropolis be treated and considered as a point *to be protected*, instead of as the vital centre from which protection emanates, and on which it depends, the metropolitan position must be limited to that which is indispensable to the existence of the metropolis. If it is regarded as the fountain of defence, it must comprise all that is necessary to enable it completely to fulfil its supreme office. A further proof and illustration of this being the right and proper view to take of its functions.

The main line of the position under this aspect must be governed by features of ground, conditions of

population, and the localities of certain posts. It is traced somewhat as follows: beginning with the hill range abutting on the Thames in rear of Canterbury, stretching by Maidstone, Reigate and Guildford, towards Reading, there rising again on the left bank of the Thames, and extending north easterly, passing in rear of Watlington, by Princes Risborough and Ivinghoe, to Dunstable; by Hitchen and Baldock to Royston, and closing by Saffron Waldon, upon Harwich.

Taking as radii certain distances, from a central point, to posts of magnitude and importance already existing, an inner ring on the radius of Woolwich with a breadth extending from Woolwich to Erith includes on the distance of Erith, Rainham in Essex, Romford Highbeach, Enfield, Chipping, Barnett, Elstree, Southal, Hounslow, Twickenham, Kingston, Malden, Carshalton, Croydon, Hayes, Bromley, and closes again on Erith.

On the centre of Woolwich are Barking, Ilford, Wanstead, Walthamstow, Tottenham, Hornsey, Highgate, Willesden, Ealing, Brentford, Richmond, Wimbledon, Norbury, Beckenham, Southend, and Eltham.

This belt encloses for the most part the great mass of metropolitan population and the network of central railway communication.

On the radius of Gravesend and Tilbury there is an outer circle not altogether dissimilar in character,

inasmuch as it also is marked, in several not altogether unimportant places, by the endings of short lines of railroads and by inter-communication between others, as well as in some degree by natural conformation of ground. The general direction of this circle is traced by Gravesend, Tilbury, Brentwood, Chipping Longar, Harlow, Hertford, Hatfield, St. Albans, Kings Langley, Rickmanworth, Uxbridge, Colnebrook, Staines, Chertsey, Weybridge, Effingham, and Reigate, whence it closes, on the line of Erith and Woolwich on the valley of the Dart, resting on the Thames near Purfleet, and on the line of Gravesend and Tilbury, by continuing along the range of hills where it closes on Rochester, in front of Gravesend and rear of Chatham.

A salient in advance of these rings rests on Dorking on the left, and extends by Guildford, Chobham, and Easthampsted, whence it follows the outlying spur in rear of the Loddon River, and closes on the right and north by Reading, Henly-on-Thames, Great Marlow, High Wickham, and Amesham on Kings Langley, covering and enclosing Windsor.

The ring on Woolwich is about 60 to 70 miles in length; that on Erith from 75 to 80 miles; that on Gravesend 130 miles.

The line that has been traced as that of the main line of the metropolitan position is 250 miles long on land with a sea face 50 miles in length. It encloses an area of about 4,925 square miles,

and contains a population of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions (4,501,507).*

This number probably bears the relation to the whole population of the kingdom of $\frac{9}{2}$ to 30. It has been stated on all but official authority† that excluding the numbers of the army, navy, and merchant seamen, 260,000 men eligible for military service arrive annually at a given age. This would yield something over 37,000 men as the proportion on the above area and population. An extreme strain, such as the invasion of the country in force by three confederate first-rate powers, could be met by 742,860 men between the ages of 17 and 37, out of which to organize the force for the metropolitan area, and four times that number in portions of the kingdom beyond that limit, to fall on the enemy in rear of any advance attempted by him on the capital.

It remains to train this population to habits of discipline and to the knowledge and use of arms. Were they changed from raw numbers into the elements of available force, the safety of the country might be held to be secured.

*This number is obtained as follows:—Essex, 423,449; Hertford, 191,532; half of Hants, 232,043; Middlesex, 2,711,849; half of Kent, 372,477; half of Surrey, 478,157; quarter of Buckingham, 45,130; quarter of Berks, 49,870.

† "Military Forces of the Crown," *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1870.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE DEFENCE OF LONDON.—*continued.*

CERTAINTY as to the invader's intention and object, greatly narrows the issue, and lessens the difficulties of defence. This certainty exists. The whole object of the affront of invasion is humiliation to be inflicted, or spoil or conquest to be achieved, and not one of these can be said to be fully attained without the fall of the capital. The very safety of the invader requires it. Without it, the submission of the kingdom to any dictation whatever, can only be assumed by imputation of the meanest pusillanimity. Besides, the chief ports of the kingdom being in a measure fortified, the seizure of an important post by a sudden surprise, has proportionate difficulties interposed. The seizure of a foot-hold in some neglected part, would be undertaken only with a view to further operations, in all which, the ultimate aim would still be the same, namely, the capture of the capital.

Had the Commissioners, to whose report* reference has been made before, acted on the full basis of

* See preceding chapter.

their instructions, which were to deal with "the sufficiency of the fortifications, existing for the Defence of the United Kingdom," the first and most important paragraph of their report would have been, that they could consider and report upon the several details subsequently specified in the instructions framed for their guidance; but that there could be but one reply as the "Defence of the United Kingdom." So long as the capital remained at the mercy of an enemy, this was in no way provided by any measure of protection, furnished to what were merely outposts, however important such outposts might be in themselves, and least of all by outposts not affording each other mutual support. Fortification falling short of the Defence of the Capital, could be looked upon only as a subsidiary means to an end reserved for the future.

That necessity which compels the invader to direct all his measures with a view to an object which is fixed and localized, and the full knowledge of that object and its locality by the defenders, immeasurably facilitate defence. Localization of the duties of defence affords so sure a means of confirming the effect of this advantage that the due observance of these duties is enough to ensure the most effective and complete of victories. It is "the strong man armed, keeping his house, his goods are in peace." The idea even of aggression must be abandoned by the foe unless he is so mad as to rush on his destruction.

Localization of the duties of defence implies, the defence of specified areas or localities, by their pro-

viding for their own defence. It is the clubbing together within certain spaces by the inhabitants of themselves and their resources in order to provide for the performance of a common duty and the attainment of a common end. Carried out over the kingdom, it provides for the defence of the whole kingdom, not alone, by doing in all parts of it what is done in one, but by the mutual support derived from the circumstance that the common duty and aim are fulfilled in neighbouring localities. This is the essence of the advantage of man's life in social and national communities. It is besides, as is the performance of all duty, a lesson in christianity and tends to the benefit of the commonwealth. It is the whole body advantaged by the aggregate of the individual well-doing of each part. It differs fundamentally from provision intended for defence, but blindly abandoned to the care of a precarious and irresponsible central administration, necessarily alike incapable of ensuring success, or of remedying and answering for failure. Happily the delegation of authority and responsibility becomes in the nature of things, impossible, when it is an attempt to depute universally the discharge of individual duty. In direct contrast to such an attempt cohesion is formed and defence is secured, by the common discharge of personal duty. A noble thing and certain of result. It is however, it cannot be denied, reverting to the principles and acts of feudal days; it unites classes and localities in a common aim of supreme importance; but it is also in harmony with the first principles of military strength and with the

first and most important military lesson, namely, the value and duty of mutual support.

Viewed in its relation to the whole kingdom, the metropolitan position is the citadel or keep round which fronts of defence are grouped in contiguous order, abutting on each other and supporting one another, though in their measure severally complete. These fronts fulfil besides the double offices of outworks to the central position and bases for support to defences of the coast.

So, for example, the coast line between the Isle of Sheppey and Rye is faced north of the Foreland by the works on the Thames, and between the Foreland and Rye by that part of the metropolitan position extending from Canterbury by Maidstone to Tonbridge. From Rye to Newhaven, Brighton, and Shoreham the coast is supported by the position from Tonbridge to Guildford with numerous intermediate outposts. Between Shoreham and Southampton, Portsmouth intervenes, and the metropolitan position from Guildford to Reading forms the interior base against an attempt to advance into the country, and so on continuously and in every direction by which the invader might attempt to turn any particular post or position on the coast. It requires, in fact, much more good-will and honesty of purpose than it does skill or training in military art, to perceive that the wealth, population, and means of communication of England are so distributed as to render necessary only that same thoroughness of purpose and heart to render the whole

kingdom one unassailable armed and entrenched camp, disposed in perfect strategical array, without causing any interruption to its civil pursuits.

Within the metropolitan position, as it has been traced, are Sheerness, Gravesend, and Tilbury, all more or less fortified ; Chatham and Woolwich that have been recommended by the Defence Commission to be fortified, but it has not been done. A line of works has also been suggested from Gray Thorrock on the Thames through Ockenham and Warley to Brentwood, and thence to the River Lea. Brentwood would be the principal post of this position, covering the eastern roads, both common and rail, as well as the establishments at Purfleet, Warley, and Waltham Abbey.

From Waltham the line of this position continues by Barnet and Watford and the Colne River to Staines, with Harrow as a central support. Nothing of this, however, has been carried out. Harwich is indeed a military post partially fortified and its works are being improved and enlarged ; but, generally speaking, the east coast has been especially neglected. All projects for any measure of protection that has been carried out in any degree appear to have dealt almost exclusively with the south coast. Yet Cæsar's successful invasion can scarcely be deemed to have been an evil and the Norman William's admits of question ; but all the savage and devastating ravages of the country that have thrown back its civilization for centuries at a time have come, from the North Sea.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE DEFENCE OF LONDON—*continued.*

A CONSIDERATION of much moment in determining the perimeter of an important line of works is the nature of the approaches upon the position to be occupied. Extremes meet. If in a scantily-peopled country the directions of railroads and even those of the common roads may be taken as a guide to its topography, it might seem but a rash venture to attempt to judge the formation of the ground immediately around the metropolis by the railroads leading into the capital. It is, nevertheless the case, that in thickly-populated England the same formations of ground that determine positions for defence, whether by works or forces in the field, have already led to the construction of railroads on the several circumferences around London, and have thereby been the means of providing one of the most essential requisites in defence, which is, quick inter-communication between post and post outwards from the centre, and around the several rings of military position.

But whilst there is scarcely a spot on the inner ring that is not traversed by a railway, and whilst lines from

the most varied directions and distances converge on the circumference and nearly meet in the centre of London, their other extremities are usually found on vulnerable parts of the coast, and the directions they follow in their course towards the capital, mark with accuracy the positions that may be strengthened and occupied to the best advantage for the protection of the metropolis itself.

From this concentration in London of all the rail and other roads from all parts of the coast, it follows that so long as London is held, communication from it towards the coast can be maintained; but communication from the coast to the capital can be cut off. Telegraphic communication from the coast would at once notify any threatening approach or attempted disembarkation; the strength required to meet the enemy, known from the capacity for landing which the assailed locality afforded, could at once be poured from the citadel outwards and onwards in perfect adequacy to the nature of the case. The simple expedient, in the case of any alarm, of retaining all main supplies of locomotives in the capital, sending only those actually in use to the front, and so ever diminishing in number as the coast is approached, and being prepared completely to destroy any locomotive in danger of falling into the enemy's hands, would more seriously impede his movements than even the destruction of parts of the permanent way which would, however, of course, also be resorted to when necessary. So also all depôts of coal should be within fortified positions, beyond risk

of sudden capture and distributed on the same principle of lessening in quantity towards the coast. The transport of an article of so great bulk and weight would seriously impede the enemy and by causing delay might put him in extreme danger. Again, it is evident that, if they be only turned to account, each neighbourhood contains the materials for the force best adapted to the requirements of that locality. The population on the coast is the most suited to give warning of the approach of any foe and to aid in hindering his landing. In the larger towns, corps to destroy and relay permanent way have only to be formed and called out ; the materials of the force, the knowledge and skill are there. The coast is peopled, almost throughout, in proportion to the facilities which it offers to shipping ; wherever a landing is feasible, there generally are the living means ready to hand to encounter the foe in his labour of disembarking. Where lines of communication meet, there, as a rule, is a populous town. In the inner and more open counties where advance in force would be most easy, there national habits supply the elements of a cavalry force that only requires training to be thoroughly serviceable for obtaining and giving notice of the enemy's proximity, for ascertaining his numbers, embarrassing his advance, and destroying him in retreat. Only let London as a position be made the seat of strength as it is already the centre of the kingdom in every other respect, and let the plan for the defence of the kingdom as an integer be based throughout on the study of local resources and local require-

ments, and the advantage must rest with the defenders at every stage.

The very circumstance that the enemy must strike a given point in order to attain his end, that that point is one that contains within itself, not merely theoretically as capital of the kingdom but in hard matter of fact, ample power and all the elements necessary for completely successful resistance, at once enables the defeat and overthrow of the enemy to be accomplished wherever he may begin his attempt. For this, among other reasons, it is a fortunate circumstance that what has been called "a central arsenal" has not been constructed. It would in reality have been an arsenal removed from the real centre; itself either exposed to extreme danger, or obtaining an amount of protection injurious to other interests and demanded by a necessity of entirely artificial creation. It would, moreover, have been fatal to London, the true centre. It was recommended by the Defence Commission simply because they did not dare to hope that they would be listened to if they ventured to speak of the fortification of the capital: which subject was, moreover, excluded by the instructions issued to those who were nevertheless called a Commission to enquire into the "sufficiency existing for the defence of the United Kingdom," and who styled themselves "Commissioners to consider the defences of the United Kingdom." Whatever this may mean, it was palpably, in their estimation, as much as in reality, a very different and a very inferior thing to its defence.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE DEFENCE OF LONDON.—*continued.*

THE Thames offers the easiest and readiest natural means of access to the capital. Water undefended is the aggressor's best friend. Accordingly, the outer extremities of the territorial defence of an island should be outposts of observations on the sea. Vessels of light draft, there should be small in dimension, and of great speed, altogether independent of the fleet, watching the enemy's coasts, and taking notice of his every movement; their duty to hasten with the intelligence of his preparations to their own district, communicating it also to similar vessels acting in concert with them, for other parts of the coast. Water guard is indispensable.

The Medway, the Thames, the Crouch and the Blackwater, form in some degree, one feature. Each presents its measure of natural facility for occupation by an enemy, and requires corresponding protection by works, guns and men.

The space enclosed by the estuaries of the Blackwater and Crouch, between the lines of railway from Southend and Colchester, on the coast of Essex, forms an area of about 50 square miles, which is well adapted

to be made a strong position by an enemy. The anchorage is good. The landings are good.

The channels of approach are not difficult. The distance is only thirty-six miles from London! Monuments and traditions identify it with Roman and Danish times. It is said to have been the contemplated landing place for the hosts of the Spanish Armada, as well as to have been held in view by Napoleon I, in his famous intended expedition.

Preparations for direct resistance against an attack on the Thames, begin in theory at Sheerness, where it has been proposed to keep moveable floating batteries for that purpose. The batteries have yet to be constructed, but before this valuable auxiliary to land coast defence can be relied on, not only must the batteries be built, but when built, they must be under entire and absolute control for local defence. They must not be treated at the same time as fleet and coast defence, and so, by being assigned two duties, prove not available for either of them.

The defence commission proposed the expenditure of £1,000,000 to provide 200 guns, on an average of £5,000 for each gun placed in a moveable floating battery. For the Thames and Medway, 650 guns, at an expenditure of £2,000,000 were proposed, besides £700,000 for Woolwich. Of this amount, about 300 guns have been provided, at an expenditure of £438,000 for the Thames, and £297,427 for Sheerness. The proposition for Chatham, amounting to 335 guns, at a cost of £1,350,000, has not been carried out. The

works at Gravesend and Tilbury, which posts mark the right flank of the defensive position between the Thames and the Stour, have been strengthened to some extent. Southend, Leigh, and Thames Haven, on the shores of the Thames are landing places, which would be threatened by the same part of any general plan of descent upon such portions of the coast as might prove practicable between the Thames and Harwich. Harwich, which forms the left flank of the sea-face of the position has been strengthened. The terminal posts, or flanks of the position must be strong enough to resist an attack in force; otherwise they, or any portion of the intervening ground being taken and a position established in communication with the continental supports of a strong army of invasion, the lost ground would be difficult to regain. The position from the Thames to the Blackwater, though divided by the Crouch is not severed by it; the part north of the Crouch can be held from the sea independently of the other, yet the whole forms an admirable unity. It threatens the capital and the formation of the ground frowns towards London.

Supposing invasion to make a momentary halt with the occupation of this position, strengthened by defensive works on the part of the invader; it might be turned in the direction of London by operations from Colchester and its inland supports, but under much disadvantage of distance, it being much nearer to the capital than is the communication from Colchester. Before the late terrible expansion in aggressive warfare,

it had been *suggested that the position at Tilbury and on the Langdon hills might be strengthened by field-works; but what is obviously necessary is best done thoroughly. The better way of guarding this position, which in the hand of an enemy would prove a strong one, threatening London and taking in flank its communications with Harwich and Colchester, would be to occupy it in such force as would afford protection, instead of leaving room for menace to the shores of the Thames, Crouch and Blackwater, and to the communications between London and the East coast. The strength of occupation would be determined by the features of the ground, the general plan for the defence of the metropolitan area, and the scale of works and forces at several other posts—such as Brentwood, Chelmsford, Maldon, Colchester, and Harwich.

Following the course of communication from the coast to London, the next northwardly is from the Blackwater; from the Naze and Harwich; from Orfordness and Ipswich; from Lowestoff, Yarmouth, Cramer, and Wells; from all of which the railroads unite near London in the line from Colchester. From Wells to Lynn Regis there is a coast line extending to Spalding. From the coasts of the Wash are three nearly parallel lines of railway, the outer two passing, the one through Ely and Cambridge, the other through Peterborough and Huntingdon. They reach London, one as the Eastern Counties line, the other as part of

* Captain Tullock.—see *Russia*.

the Great Northern. This latter line also taps the Humber from Grimsby to Goole, and on to Doncaster. Besides being traversed by these railroads, the country is also intersected by excellent cross-roads. These frequently vary considerably from the directions taken by the railroads; but they connect at the important towns. The towns at these intersections thus contain the means of maintaining the mastery over both the common and the railroads. Maldon, Colchester, Ipswich, Norwich, Ely, and Peterborough are such towns at suitable intervals on an irregular curved line nearest the coast; and Colchester, Ipswich, Bury St. Edmunds, Cambridge, and Bedford on a similar inner line, with Huntingdon centrally between Bedford, Cambridge and Peterborough, whilst Brentwood and Epping mark a position of the inner line of metropolitan defence, with Hertford in advance to the left. This examination of country and communication may be extended northwards by Bridlington, Scarborough and Whitby to Stockton; but as the communication approaches London it unites in the same line of railway. This selection is enough for a full example of the scheme suggested for defence by the systematic use of local resource, and for the elucidation of the principles on which it is based. For its adjustment over the whole kingdom an amount of detail has necessarily to be considered that must be omitted from a sketch.

At Bedford, the lines of railway begin to transfer the scene of the enemy's landing to the western coast. Leicester and Coventry continue the line of posts from

Ely and Peterborough, with Weedon for a centre. Buckingham, Oxford and Reading carry on the inner line from Cambridge and Bedford.

Worcester, Gloucester and Bristol face the Severn, with Swindon and Chipping Norton for supports.

In the north, the Solway Firth, Morecambe Bay, the Mersey and the Dee, all afford favourable landings; but, for the most part, also a dense population and unbounded wealth, with which to prepare to meet the foe. There is a considerable interval between Carlisle and Lancaster; but a landing in the lake scenery is hardly to be apprehended. The enemy will be occupied with other than picturesque objects. Preston, Liverpool and Chester, mark the western boundary of the almost unbroken mass of population between the Mersey and the Humber. Nottingham, Derby, Stafford and Shrewsbury, form an inner line, to which Crewe, Sheffield, Retford, Lincoln and Boston, form advanced posts, stretching to the Wash. Birmingham occupies another centre in rear of Shrewsbury, Stafford and Burton, and in advance of Worcester and Coventry.

Returning to the south-west, Hereford forms an advanced post to Worcester and Gloucester.

Below Bristol, the lines of southern landings begin. The railway communications with the metropolis meet at Reading, Salisbury and Winchester. Farnborough, Guildford, Dorking, Red Hill, Tonbridge and Maidstone, form a continuous natural defensive position, as well as a line of continuous railway, closing on Chatham. Sittingbourne, Canterbury and Ashford are positions

of support for the coast works, as well as points of junction in lines of railway. They command positions towards Sheppey, the Foreland, Dover and Folkestone. Tonbridge Wells, Uckfield, Burgess Hill, Horsham, Haslemere, Midhurst, Petersfield, Alresford, and Basingstoke, are all more or less, examples of the same kind, and good positions for outposts and outworks.

And so throughout the kingdom. The series of bases and outposts, and the interwoven chain of mutual supports, in harmony and close relation with the natural citadel, may everywhere be traced.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE DEFENCE OF LONDON—*continued.*

WHEREVER it is tried, and whatever the test that may be used, the principle of the fitness of local means for purposes of local defence applies,—it becomes everywhere apparent that the distribution both of wealth and population is such as to require only the vindication of the duty of individual obligation in the maintenance of national security, to place the defence of the country beyond doubt, out of reach of the caprices of revolutionary uncertainty and of the dangers attendant on variable and contrary appeals to popular ignorance, indifference, passion or panic.

This may be exemplified by examination of any particular direction of approach upon the capital, which will also serve to shew that whilst the menace of invasion extends to the whole kingdom, still the arenas of descent that hold out prospects of success to an invader, and which if left without adequate protection, may become his stepping-stones, may be very much narrowed; that moreover, even within these limits, some parts afford much greater facilities and consequently are exposed to much greater danger than others, whilst

in all, the nature of the obstacles to the probability of an invader's success vary under definite laws.

Continuing for instance, as an illustration, a cursory review of the coast and country north of Harwich round to the Wash, as the ground from and by which it is sought to threaten the capital, Ipswich, the chief town of the county of Suffolk, is the first important outpost on the north of the metropolitan position. It rests on Harwich the right extreme of the land front and the left of the sea face of that position. It is at the head of the navigation of the Orwell and situated at the foot of a range of hills that slope gradually towards the river. It contains a population of about 43,000; its shipping amounts to 170 vessels and 14,500 tons. It is the head quarters of the county militia artillery, and of a corps of rifle volunteers. Just as it is an out-post to Harwich and the metropolitan position, so Aldborough, Saxmundham, Framlingham, Debenham, and Haughley, all from about five to seven miles distant from one another, are in their turn out-posts to Ipswich, extending in a line towards Bury St. Edmunds, which is about 10 miles from Harwich, 15 miles from Orfordness, and 20 to 25 miles from Aldborough on the coast. More immediately around it are Woodbridge, Otley, Newhaven Market and Hadleigh, all about the same distance from each other, and from Ipswich.

Framlingham, at the head of the Orwell, 14 miles from Ipswich, is known in history as the locality of a castle of Saxon date and of great magnificence, to which

Mary, daughter of Henry VIII., repaired during the few days' reign of the Lady Jane Grey. It is beautifully placed on an eminence. The population of the parish is between 3,000 and 4,000. Stowmarket, near Haughley Junction, is on the Gipping, from which Ipswich, then Gwippenwich, originally took its name, and is by road half way between it and Bury St. Edmunds. Bury St. Edmunds, on the Larke, has a population of 16,000, is the head-quarters of the yeomanry, and the next outpost to the metropolitan position on the line from Ipswich westward. The circle of outposts to Ipswich itself is carried by Hadleigh on a tributary of the Stour, eight miles from Ipswich. It is a market town, with a population of about 5,000.

The communication of Aldborough is with Ipswich by land, with Harwich by sea. The coast between them has historical associations of much interest. Ipswich itself was destroyed by the Danes in the year of our Lord 991; William of Normandy built a castle for its defence; Orford Castle, near Orfordness, is also of Norman origin. It is 90 feet in height and of curious construction. In 1806 a martello tower and a battery for 100 men were built at Aldborough. The coast between Orford, Orford Haven, and Langard Point, opposite Harwich, is studded with martello towers. In off-shore winds there is good riding in from seven to eight fathoms water in Aldborough Bay. Hollesley Bay, an anchorage between Orfordness and Orford Haven, 4 miles long, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, with from 4 to 7 fathoms water, is protected from the wind in

every quarter, except N.E. by E. and E. There are quays for the use of coasters at Orford, Iken, and Snape Bridge. Aldborough owns 60 fishing boats; the arrivals in the year are about 20 vessels of 11,000 to 12,000 tons: the population is 1630. Orford employs 40 vessels and 147 men; the arrivals are about 70 vessels, and the tonnage 2,000 to 3,000: the population is 1,100.

The metropolitan position itself is continued from Harwich by Mannington and the river to Sudbury, a town of about 6000 inhabitants, 18 miles from Ipswich; thence it continues to Saffron Walden in Essex, a town of about the same population, and 20 miles from Sudbury. Royston, in Hertfordshire, where the line traced meets the Icknield way is about 12 miles from Saffron-Walden, and is a salient, where the character of the position changes, and it enters on a hill formation affording natural facilities for positions of strength.

Returning to the coast line towards the Wash is Southwold, locally celebrated as the scene of a naval battle with the Dutch. It is situated on a slight hill and has a population of about 2500; owns 22 vessels, amounting to 1500 tons, and a revenue of £650 yearly, derived from a carrying trade, employing 8000 tons. It has, or had, a battery armed with 8 guns. The coast between it and Aldborough does not call for remark. Lowestoff, off which another engagement with the Dutch took place in the reign of King Charles II., has an artificial harbour that has gone through many vicissitudes. It has an extensive fishery and

carrying trade, and has or had an armed battery of 15 guns. It is the head-quarters of an administrative battalion of volunteers and of corps of artillery and rifle volunteers. The coast from Southwold to Yarmouth is a nearly-continuous line of cliff, but there is a line of projecting beach in front of the cliff line at Lowestoff that forms a promontory, and is the most eastern point of England. The roads afford good anchorage.

Yarmouth has a population of 30,000, has 500 vessels engaged in foreign and coasting trade, owns 480 fishing vessels of from 40 to 50 tons register, which give employment to 4,000 men. The arrivals in a year amount to 2,350 vessels of 193,500 tons. The Bure, Yare, and Waveny are navigable, the Yare as far as Norwich, the Waveny to Bungay, and the Bure to Ayesham.

It is the head-quarters of the county artillery, of an administrative brigade, and of corps of volunteers. Yarmouth Road, six miles long and one wide, is the most important anchorage on the east coast. The coast from Yarmouth on into Lynn Deep or the Wash calls for no detailed examination. The Devil's Throat, as a part of it is called, is exactly the kind of place that defenders might wish their assailants to choose for landing. Moderate precautions are enough everywhere.

Railway communication towards London leads either upon Ipswich or by Haughley Junction towards Bury St. Edmunds, and thence by Ludbury to the junc-

tion below Colchester, or else upon Cambridge. The means available in point of population are sufficient for the purpose of repelling the first efforts of any attempts to land, the characteristics of the locality also being favourable to defence everywhere along the coast.

Norwich is the support to the coast line from Yarmouth to Wells, Peterborough that to the Wash, Ely between the two. Cambridge carries on the line of outposts to the metropolitan position towards Bedford. Huntingdon forms an outpost to it and to Cambridge, and a support to Peterborough.

Norwich, a fortified town in the times of the Danes and Normans, with the ruins of a castle that occupied an area of 23 acres, is well placed on ground gradually rising from the River Wensum, which has been made navigable for a draft of ten feet. It has a population of 80,000. It is the chief town of the county of Norfolk, head-quarters of militia, of an administrative battalion, and strong corps of volunteers.

Peterborough, Ely, and Huntingdon are towns of dimensions and with resources suited to the positions they severally occupy, but not calling for particular notice, except that the last is near Kimbolton, the head-quarters of the Huntingdonshire Light Horse Volunteers, who are favourably known throughout England, and whose colonel, His Grace the Duke of Manchester, is distinguished for the interest he has practically taken in promoting both by example and effort the efficiency not only of this local manifesta-

tion, but the general appreciation of the value and use of local resources for national defence, as well as for advocating the integration of the several parts of the empire with judgment and constancy. Kettering, between Market Harbro and Huntingdon, is the headquarters of the Northamptonshire yeomanry.

Cambridge, once ravaged by the Danes, and with a castle built by William of Normandy, has a population of 26,000, and is situated on an important and extensive level plain immediately in front of the beginning of the hilly portion of the main position, and of that part which would require more of artificial formation to connect it from the river flank from about Leighton, and on to Haverhill in front of Saffron Walden. The former stands at the foot of downs communicating with the Chiltern range, on an old Roman road. Each has a population of from 2,000 to 2,500.

Bedford, on the Ouse, with a comparatively small population for the chief town of a county, is of interest from the converging lines of railway from east, north, and west that pass through it. It is the head-quarters of county militia and has corps of volunteers.

Northampton, which occupies the important position of a salient to the main position on the line of outposts from Ely and Huntingdon and forms the right flank of the face from Oxford westward, is a thriving town of probably about 40,000 inhabitants. It is the head-quarters of the Northampton and Rutland militia, of an administrative battalion, and of corps of volunteers.

Buckingham, with Banbury in advance, carries on the position to Oxford, important from the position it occupies and the junction of converging railroads. The population is probably about 28,000. It has a history besides that of being the chief seat of past and present learning. It has not escaped ravages in the times of the Danes and it has had its share of sufferings in the wars of revolutionary violence. It is the head-quarters of the Oxford Militia, of the University Corps, of an administrative battalion and of corps of volunteers. The yeomanry head-quarters is at Woodstock.

Within the main position, Colchester, a military post of some importance, is the first post on the interior line, and with Chelmsford and Brentwood, forms a continuous line of support facing the North Sea and resting on Harwich on one flank and on Tilbury on the other.

This line is in its turn supported by Romford and Rainham, and is especially important as facing the east and supporting the outer positions, by which it is protected in turn. It is the direction of the chief menace against the metropolis, against the kingdom, and against the empire of the sea; but as in all other cases, the elements of successful resistance are on the spot and only require that attitude of preparedness that is expressed by organization, but that results from will. Let the examination be made where it may, the same abundance and aptitude of local resource are found, the same irregular and half-unconscious endeavour to turn them to account.

The same fitness of parts for grouping together according to relative importance as outposts, supports, centres, or positions, forming a compact body constantly enlarging by aggregation appears throughout. To make use of their condition and to give liberty of action, yet the plan of a unity, to the independent and irregular efforts of particular localities, is to provide for the kingdom cheap and true defence.

The plan by which this unity and control are provided, must itself be identified with the arrangements for furnishing such power for active operations within and beyond her limits, as her condition and circumstances render necessary.

Part 4.

CHAPTER I.

ON LEVYING DEFENSIVE FORCES.

ACCORDING to constitutional maxims, strength for defence is co-extensive with the number and wealth of the population.

The destruction of the property of a country and the extinction of the lives of its inhabitants necessarily terminate its power of resistance ; but liability to service and the duty of defence know of no limit individually, nor, consequently, in that aggregate of individuals which forms the nation.

It is necessary to bear this primary law in mind when dealing with resources, whether of persons or property that are to be set apart for purposes related to the art of war.

For just as no authority in any country can issue a command that can make an unjust war to be lawful, and no subject nor citizen, whether specially trained and set apart for the art of war or not, can yield obedience to a command to wage an unjust war without partaking in the crime of its injustice, which crime in the cases of death that ensue, is murder ; so can none claim exemption whether or not he belong to the profession of arms,

either in person or property, from service of any kind which the defence of the country really requires. His rights are limited to a just distribution of the service to be rendered.

A nation resolved to act up to this law is indestructible, yet it is no more than the performance of individual duty by each man, and only brings us to an old conclusion, namely—that a nation that fulfils its duty is in no danger. Only by its fault can a nation fail in its defence.

The sovereign in council determines the amount in men and money that is necessary at any time and for any given purpose. The localities taxed, or levied upon, furnish the supplies which their nominees present again in assembly and so re-present the grants of the communes or several localities. The postponement of the vote of supplies to other considerations on the part of the representatives of the communes, when it takes place, is therefore the expression of discontent, and amounts to an act of resentment against a condition thereby denounced as one of intolerable grievance. If the demand for supplies is indispensable or just and necessary, and consequently lawful, it is the first step to rebellion : it is resistance to legal authority in a lawful act. If done in the name of the Crown by a nominal minister of the Crown, it presents the aspect of “a kingdom divided against itself.”

The training of the levies is the work of the officers who are properly part of those levies. Their command is the duty of the Sovereign whose functions are exer-

cised by, but not delegated to, a deputy, the commander-in-chief.

The aspect of European affairs and the temper of England are such that the first consideration in framing any plan for providing defence appears to be, the determination of the amount required both in men and money in such a manner as shall establish a permanent proportion between the ever varying dimensions of the menaces against which it is imperative to guard, and the resistance required to be at all times ready to confront them, and to render such menaces of no effect.

The great nations of Europe are arming and are practising war. They can, by reason of their magnitude and habit, do the one without great disturbance to their pursuits in peace ; they wage the other and return laden with spoils : or, they suffer the other and meet with destruction, as may happen. The problem England has to solve is—How shall a little and a commercial nation guard her wealth, preserve her inviolability and maintain her honour without relinquishing the pursuits of commerce and the arts of peace ?

By either of two ways, widely different in character and result, the necessary armed force may be levied and the requisite protection obtained. Both exist ; both are more or less in operation. One is the expansion of a standing army ; the other what may be termed a resident army or the constant discharge on the part of a sufficient number of the military duty of all. For the requirements and habits of England their union in due proportion is unquestionably the best. Reliance on a

standing army is a creed attractive from the admirable and perfect adaptation of the instrument to the purpose immediately in view; but it is seeking to provide defence by a system incompatible with the best interests of all countries, and, perhaps, not possible in England. At best it is reliance on a force to which the profession of arms has become the whole of life, not a means to the discharge of the duties of life. It carries with it a tendency that is inseparable from it: the provision made for defence degenerates into the use for purposes of aggression. The supremacy of arms as the pursuit of a whole nation is fatal to its internal welfare and its external conduct alike, but in no other way could England furnish by means of a standing army the numbers necessary to compete with the hosts of the continental nations that have adopted this plan. Besides which it covers the country with an army even without its invasion: a native army, it is true, and under the restraint of law, but still an army of occupation as much as of defence.

The other method is the security of the kingdom attained and ensured step by step by the adequate discharge of local duties over every part of the kingdom. It is a method free from all incentive and tendency to aggression or to the neglect of civil and social duties. Its fitness for immediate and localized purposes of defence is so great that it springs up, suggests and embodies itself in action from the strength and perfection of the adaptability of local means to meet the peculiarities and exigencies of local require-

ments. It is suit and service rendered to the commonwealth, the real performance of militia or military duty for the common good of all ; but it does not furnish a force for those acts of defence, which assume the form and nature of counter attacks and aggression, and hence the advantage, and indeed the necessity, for the co-operation and combination of these sources of military defensive strength.

CHAPTER II.

ON INDIVIDUAL DUTY IN NATIONAL DEFENCE.

EVERY man withdrawn from the civil avocations of life, in a state otherwise well ordered, is a man in some respects lost to the state; but every man pursuing the civil occupations of life yet rendered capable of performing the duties of a soldier is a man rendered more valuable to the state.

Exoneration from the duty of bearing arms and its consequence, incapacity to bear arms, come in a degenerate condition to be regarded as a privilege; but it is rather an evidence of defective arrangement in the ordering of military service, that an exemption which would once have been properly regarded as a disgrace, should be looked upon as precisely the opposite to a dishonour.

No doubt it may be historically explained to a very great extent by the increase in the magnitude, importance, and generality of commercial and industrial pursuits; but the fact remains altogether untouched by the explanation, and the circumstance that the wealthiest country and the country engaged in the widest and most universal commerce is at the same time the least

provided with organised means of defence,—notwithstanding, that it is probably the best furnished with the elements of defence,—shews that a great fault and error have been committed, not in having trained for and practised war, but in having neglected to remember as a matter of thought and practice that the capacity to bear arms is a necessary part of the duty of man, in that condition of European society which as yet has never altered in character, though in recent years it has terribly intensified in force.

When whole nations are arming as nations and practising the art of war for purposes of aggression, this primary duty of all men to be prepared, becomes more imperative than ever; but in order that they may yield the commonwealth that service it is their bounden duty to give on every occasion that calls for it, they must have fitted themselves so that they shall be able to yield it when it is required.

Accordingly, hypothetical calculations as to the precise number from whom such fitness may be required and from whom it is therefore, to be exacted, are not only vague and for many palpable reasons eminently unsatisfactory, but they lose sight of the cardinal point that determines the assurance of security, and thereby establishes the defence of the nation.

This point rests in the will.* The evidence of will is qualification attained by preparation. If willingness to discharge his share of duty towards the defence of

* "Er muss nur kräftig wollen

"Dann wahrlich kann der Mensch sehr viel."

the country exists in the individual, his first endeavour will be to qualify himself to do so. From this, individual capacity results, and so pervades the mass. Consequently, if willingness be rightly inculcated and received, if the sentiment of the nation be true and right, not a chance, uncertain and arbitrary number of the nation, but the nation as a whole will be in a due state of preparation. On the other hand, where fitness is unthought of and uncared for, there is and can be no defence until there is amendment in the will. Where it is so, love of ease, luxury and self-indulgence, have deadened the sense of duty and extinguished the love of country.

The restoration of a general capacity to bear arms will be the first effort of a country alive to the circumstances which now surround all countries, if it retain the latent vigour of a determination to defend itself. To evoke the desire to be possessed of this quality and to furnish the means of acquiring it, is the first step towards defence, which neither does nor can exist where these are wanting.

This primary obligation and the obvious advantage of its observance at once associate defence with what is called education, but what is more properly, training, or instruction, and also with locality.

Instruction of the young becomes especially valuable when it is sought to recover the sense and performance of a forgotten and neglected obligation; but it also lays the best and most enduring basis for future fitness. Habits of discipline and of acting in consort are most

easily acquired in youth, and best maintained when then acquired. Drill is best taught in schools. This practice has been observed in Switzerland, a country with about $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions of inhabitants that can furnish 200,000 men for home defence at any moment, but if the example is to profit us, we must follow as well as praise it. This is the broadest and first foundation of the sense of personal obligation in the matter of national defence. What has been very aptly called the volunteer movement, (for it was movement in a body otherwise dead,) and the existing volunteer force are a strong, though irregular and unconscious effort to find an outlet and expression for the irrepressible force of the instinctive sense of the same duty. The movement welled forth irresistibly with the occasion that made its expression indispensable. Subject by turns to scowls, criticisms and carpings, it has outlived them all, and the duties undertaken have been so steadfastly discharged that it has won its way into a reality; an unbought expression of patriotism; an unpaid service; an humble, unconscious, unpretending discharge of duty for allegiance and conscience sake. Things—much in vogue to mock at; but they form the one feature in the existing state of affairs on which the country may look with hope and satisfaction; for duty, conscience, and allegiance, although mere sentiments and intangible in themselves, lead to actions of more value than do many words from the followers of talk and money. It is an obvious and necessary policy to give a full expression and a right direction to this broadest, highest, noblest element of strength.

The next forms of personal service in the matter of defence are the militia and yeomanry, linking together and forming the connection between the pursuits of civil life and the use of arms as a profession.

How perfectly these subserve and support the purpose of the regular force, which an extensive empire must maintain, will appear the more clearly, the more minutely the subject is investigated. They dovetail, if the expression may be allowed, into all the features of the standing army, and rightly organised, form one harmonious whole. That standing army, which should be perfectly equipped and constantly prepared for those acts of defensive warfare which take the form of attack, completes the sphere of action for individual duty in the matter of national defence.

CHAPTER III.

ON FITNESS OR IGNORANCE AS QUALIFICATION FOR
DEALING WITH ARMED FORCES.

KINGS are jealous, and have ever been so, for the integrity, honour and independence of the countries over which they rule. The origin of the office vested in their persons, has been fitness to take the lead in placing and keeping these first necessities of nations beyond danger. *They are the symbol and embodiment of the national defence of a free people.* From the earliest period, *armed forces, which are essential instruments to that defence,* have been constituted in as varied a manner as now. The most complex modern force has probably no elements wider asunder in their composition than were the knight and foot soldier of old. The organization or due putting together of the component parts of an army, has therefore always had an intimate part to play in efficiency, and the duties it involves are so far inseparable from those of administration and command that they must be carried out in strict subservience to the purpose the command is to establish. Neither organization nor administration have any other proper function.

That purpose is the defence of the nation in its honour, integrity and independence which are centred in the king. Hence the time-honoured constitutional law and usage which vest the army and all that pertains to it in the person of the Sovereign. The strength necessary, as has been said, is determined by the sovereign in council, and furnished by consent of the communes; but thence legally, lawfully and properly it passes entirely to the jurisdiction of the Sovereign, and out of all further trammel into the sole consideration of efficiency.

The sovereign of olden time called to his council, or selected from it, the officer or officers to whom should be entrusted sundry duties tending to this one end. The present system still retains the names and forms; but it is strange to write,—it seems too absurd to be possible out of Bedlam,—ignorance of everything pertaining to defence, a mind incapable of so much as appreciating its bearing, value, or even perceiving its existence or its want, have been deemed qualifications to be preferred to fitness, capacity and knowledge. Not experienced soldiers, not princes, not nobles, not men otherwise of the highest position and responsibility, are now the king's deputies in this important matter. Revolution has subverted the order of the realm. Its nominees must be successful party politicians, but they need not necessarily be anything besides. Whatever may chance to be their personal merit, they have not necessarily any standing in the country and may possess no qualification for duties to which they have ordinarily

attained rather by noisy declamation and boastful assertion of superiority on the part of the clique with which they are identified over the traditions, habits and principles of the past, than by a modesty that can appreciate their value, or a desire to emulate their greatness.

That such a condition should in the face of the war-like preparations of other nations give rise to serious apprehension is natural, and devoutly to be wished; but it is not re-assuring, though it was to be expected, that confusion, not order, demolition rather than construction, may at any moment prove the result of the action of a revolution that has usurped the power of the lawful and true representation of the kingdom.

"I met an ardent young army reformer,"* are words that, notwithstanding the lapse of a session, must still be ringing in the ears of all to whom the condition of England is a sore anxiety; "I met an ardent young army reformer and expressed to him my surprise that there was such an anxiety to get rid [of the Prince of the blood] of the Duke of Cambridge, who . . . had shewn he knew more of the details connected with the administration of the army than any other man, civil or military, in the country. . . 'That's it', he said, '*That's WHY we must get rid of him*' . . . I turned on my heel and said, 'I am glad to have learned your views . . . because you are able to have an ignorant secretary of state, you must

* Lord Elcho—on the Army Bill, Session 1870.

“saddle the country with an incompetent commander-in-chief.”

In parliament, or talkdom, this man was not bowed out; but passes with a considerable muster for a man to talk to them about a force which has no motive of existence but honour. The honour of the country, what are its prospects in such hands? If the strenuous and persevering endeavour to carry the views thus shamefully acknowledged be not an act of infamy, it would be difficult to find one answering the term. What can be a baser, meaner act of attempted unfaithfulness to the safety of the kingdom and a more unworthy personal action than to set forth competency as the disqualification, and consequently incapacity as the supreme qualification of the custodian of the defence of the realm?

To such depths does political partisanship degrade men that they do not resent being so addressed, nor send the offender to the punishment and contempt which are his due and desert.

Incapacity may betray and ruin armies as much as cause the loss of ships and fleets. It is monstrous to know the country to be endangered by such empirics, and to be sunk so low that they obtain a following when they ought not.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE SECRETARY, TO THE SOVEREIGN IN COUNCIL,
ON MATTERS OF DEFENCE.

To the king's secretary, whose suggestions are submitted in the council, are allotted the duties of considering the numerical strength and composition of the armed forces to be levied. It is true, the nomination of the secretary no longer rests with the sovereign; but inasmuch as in theory he is still the king's officer for an especial duty, he is in so far the rightful officer for that duty. Direct interference with the army, after it has been constituted, has however been superadded to his functions by the commons house of assembly, whose real nominee he also is; but in this interference he is no longer acting within the proper jurisdiction of the secretary in council, but as the official of the house of commons, whose jealousy of the crown in the first instance, and whose encroaching and revolutionary mania since, have left no other duties than their own that they have not sought to take upon themselves.

The assumption of responsibility on behalf of the army, the dependence claimed from the king's real deputy, the commander-in-chief, the issuing of orders to

the army, are all modern usurpations and encroachments unknown to the law and constitution, that have become possible, only through the confusion consequent on the crown having been compelled to surrender the independence of the council, and to accept in its stead the absolute government of the country by the faction momentarily dominant in one of the houses of assembly. The careful retention of old names and forms has served to veil the fact and to render the country blind to its consequences.

This partial unison and partial antagonism of character and office have put their mark upon the army. Exposed to this intrusion, and delivered over to this dictation, it has been deprived of a true head, and left without a real unity. It lives on the guess work of change, and the rules that ought to define its constitution, and the regulations that should mark its duties and privileges, partake of all the uncertainty and vehemence of change that characterize the passion of revolution.

The style of the secretary's office is that of Secretary for War, a style which, though incontrovertibly correct to some extent, is neither so comprehensive nor so expressive of its real purport as would be that of secretary for defence. War is an incident only to defence, a consequence of its breach, and an endeavour to restore it. Preparation for war is not the desire of of the nation in any other sense than that of preparedness to meet it, a means against its outbreak, and for ending it victoriously as speedily as possible if it

occur. An office and appointment to maintain a perpetual state of war is the thing farthest from the thoughts of England.

On the other hand, the style Secretary for Defence would fully place the true aim of the office before even the most ignorant person in the realm, and would tend somewhat to achieve the objects of the office, for it cannot be spoken without truth of purpose; its duties cannot be left undone without betrayal of trust, and it fits the individual nominated to them into his proper relation to others; for the guardianship of that defence in connection with which he hold an office, is vested in the sovereign in council, not in himself, a secretary.

It would also exhibit more plainly than can otherwise be done, the oneness subsisting between land and sea forces formed for one common object. It is said, indeed, that the jurisdiction of the secretary for war extends in actual time of war over the naval branch; but this amounts to little more than as a channel for conveying to a virtually separated portion of a common defence certain high orders of the sovereign on special and particular occasions. A fusion made only on emergency cannot be complete, and a separation which is ended on stress of urgency cannot be necessary in times of tranquility. The defence of a kingdom itself consisting of two islands, one of which partakes of the characteristics of dependency rather than of those of union, but which together hold sway over an empire that is world-wide and that depends on mari-

time ascendancy for its existence, is palpably and necessarily a unity in its entirety, in which forces operating by sea and on land are but interchangeable means in a plan that must be one. Whether or not the gulf that has yawned between these branches of one service be in measure a consequence of the interferences of parliament, it is certain it did not exist in the days in which the foundation was laid of the greatness that until very recently unquestionably pertained to the United Kingdom.

The preparedness England requires is against the attack of the future, such as it will be if it be made at all. The embarking and disembarking, the quick, ready and safe transport of troops hither and thither, are considerations of the gravest importance and thoroughly inseparable from that of the efficiency of its armies.

Time is not allowed in modern warfare for the joint preparation of cumbersome and separated departments. The enemy veils his purpose till he is ready for the spring and trusts to suddenness and unexpectedness for his success. But experience teaches us the danger there is that every alarm will be lulled until too late, when the defence that has been wantonly allowed to be broken has to be restored at infinite cost.

The proper duties of a secretary for defence may then be briefly summed up somewhat as follows. To submit to the sovereign in council his views as to the armed force necessary and on its composition, that is

to say in what proportions it shall consist of regular, militia, and volunteer troops, how it shall be formed and organised, and when and how delivered over to its commander-in-chief.

It would be his province also to provide for the army being furnished with supplies, and for the expansion and contraction of the several levies, and to submit proposals for effecting these. In him would also be vested, under the same authority, the superior control of all matters relating to reserve forces not called out. He would have charge of all supplies not delivered over to the army, and of such as were received back again on its return from active operations from the field or to winter quarters, or if it became from any other cause diminished.

His province in naval matters would be precisely similar. He would submit his views as to the strength and composition of the fleets, and have the superior charge of all construction and equipment for the fleets, and of all stores not delivered to a command, and consequently of all dockyards. The command and entire responsibility for all ships in commission would rest with the naval commander-in-chief in the same way as that of the land forces would with the commander-in-chief of the army.

The treasury would take back its own duties. The department for defence would cease to be a political office, a burrow of clerks and accountants, and a great paper blotting mill. By no colourable sophistry could the charge of the defence of the realm be misrepre-

sented as primarily an administrative question of finance, or in other words, of spending in strict accordance with prescribed forms but without attainment of result. The commander-in-chief would no longer be deprived of the full power, position, and responsibility of the king's deputy as leader of the armies of the realm ; yet the minister of state charged with the office of secretary for defence, confined to his proper duties with their performance strictly enacted, would be invested with an increase of dignity and honour.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

THE object of a commander-in-chief is to confer victory on the troops under his command, whose aim it is to achieve victory under his leadership. His duties embrace every point that transforms the mass of units delivered into his hand into an irresistible and homogeneous whole. Organization, administration and command, all are his work. He receives the component parts of the instrument he is to form; he welds it, and he wields it. Having accomplished with it the work appointed, he delivers up again the trust he had received.

The supreme leader of the forces of the kingdom is the sovereign; but the extremity that calls for the assumption of this office in their own person has become rare with kings. In the case of England especially, there must ever arise frequent occasion for the command of armies viewed in aspects perfectly distinct from such emergency. The portion of her armies maintained in constant readiness for active operations can never be called upon to exercise their art in the real application of actual war upon the soil of

England, until by the *laches* of her rulers her defence has been already broken through. It would be well, moreover, to remember that on all occasions on which the act of invasion has been permitted to be consummated, the invaders have taken possession of the soil. Putting out of sight, for the moment, India and the distant parts of the empire, the battle-fields of the European conflicts, in which England may become involved through acts of foreign aggression, must be sought beyond her own circumference. This is another reason for bringing her land and sea armies into closer relations, but a reason also why the kingly office of leader of the nation through its armies will always be chiefly, if not exclusively, exercised by deputy, which deputy is the sole representative of the sovereign as commander-in-chief, but of the sovereign in that capacity only.

War, or war impending, brings the functions of the council and of the estates of the realm into action. The king in council represents the deliberate power of the executive of the kingdom. The estates are summoned, not for law making or law changing, for which no time could be less opportune, but for the specific purpose of considering the provocation or danger and voting the supplies. In so far then as the king in council may have adopted the suggestions of the secretary, or that the secretary may be entrusted with the instructions of the king in council, he represents the sovereign in an aspect higher, but perfectly distinct from that of the commander-in-chief of the

armed forces of the kingdom, with whose functions he has nothing whatever to do till entrusted with further commands.

These can relate only to political guidance. They cannot touch on the conduct or administration of the army, except by conveying misdemeanour in the opinion of the king on the part of his commander-in-chief.

It is, however, sufficiently obvious that with the decay of the power of the sovereign and the domination of that of the commons, with the dictation to the sovereign of the nominee of that assembly as secretary, with a council,—itself a mockery except as the creation of that assembly,—the position of the secretary must become more and more powerful and that of the direct personal deputy and representative of a sovereign power that has been deprived of an independent council and is never exercised in the leadership of forces, must diminish more and more until a higher remedy is applied than mere changes in parts of army organization. Army reform means forming the army again in its olden model. Army revolution means transferring the control of all the armed forces of the kingdom into the hands of political partisans. A “professional” army means an army recognising no calling but the art of violence, having no respect for the proper relations of civil position and the discharge of civil duties. It means armed forces with their preferments and rewards at the disposal of “professional” politicians.

It means the power of violence put into the hands of partisans and political adventurers. They may be excellent partisans and scrupulous adventurers; they may be not necessarily either the one or the other, and they may obtain control over the power of violence not for their excellence but by their partisanship. The liability to abuse which such a system presents and the extreme dangers which it may at any moment bring about are obvious without description. It is the appropriate engine of revolution; but it is not a force for defence. It is inconsistent with the liberties of a free people, and nothing that so is can be conducive to that indispensable unity in sentiment and bond of feeling which is the true secret of the inviolability of any people. It is on the contrary, as it has been proved in every country and in every age, the sword of anarchy, however long it may seem to slumber in the sheath, and however much it may be enwrapped with unconscious delusions or with false pretences. Anarchy is the climax of internal dissension, the adversary's strongest ally.

The only proper ruler of armies is the sovereign, and the right representative of the sovereign as commander-in-chief is plainly the person nearest to the sovereign in dignity in whom the requisite qualifications and fitness are to be found. His functions as commander-in-chief are to form the efficiency of the army and to be responsible for its deeds. The army is entrusted to his care, moulded and wielded by his skill. When this is not the case revolution has touched the organization of the army.

CHAPTER VI.

ON ADMINISTRATION.

UNDER the pressure of interference by the House of Commons, it has been elicited, that no officer at present exists who is styled Commander-in-Chief.

It appears the office itself is re-organized, in the abstract, as held by an "officer commanding-in-chief."

The distinction is more than merely technical. There is indeed a very considerable difference between the emoluments of the two styles; but there is much more. The alteration sounds, even in its pecuniary relation, as wanting in consideration, for it is quite possible to conceive the offer of the position itself to have been originally represented as that of the substance, influence and power of the highest army command, deprived only of the emolument of the higher style. Acceptance under these conditions may even have been pressed under circumstances difficult to meet, without presenting an opportunity for the imputation of pecuniary greed and self-seeking, which there is a certain class of persons

not averse to attributing to Princes of the blood. It may have been acceded to under the influence of a high sensibility of honour, an earnest attachment to the service, regard for the welfare of the nation, and devotion to the true interests of the Crown. However this may have been, the existence of the lower style has been sought to be turned to the occasion—under circumstances reflecting little credit on even the present House of Commons—of attempts at variance with and subversive of the power and prerogative of the sovereign. An alleged dualism has been made use of, not in order to recover the clear definition of two offices perfectly distinct, but to diminish the only constitutional standing ground of the army, as emphatically the army of the sovereign, and to lessen—even to placing in jeopardy—the direct relations between the deputy commander-in-chief and the king, whilst the army itself has been exposed to a series of tentative, undefined and uncertain experiments, under the expressed hope that finally the dissolved elements will again resolve into some new body not much worse than the old.

The hero of England, the soldier of the Peninsula, the conqueror of Waterloo, fought the yet harder battle of organizing his army in the teeth of political obstructions. The result was the perfect fulfilment of the duty of a commander-in-chief and the attainment of the object of all armies, an unbroken chain of victories, his own lasting fame and honour, and the peace of Europe secured for many years. He framed a code of regulations on the ill-important

subjects of organization, administration, and the furnishing of supplies. This has been swept away. The void thus made was to be better filled by the labours of civil politicians and men selected to meet and carry out their views by deputy, men who gave evidence of fitness for such a task by a modesty that made them conscious of their own immeasurable superiority to Wellington! The confusion and disasters of the opening of the expedition in the Crimea was made the occasion for this unparalleled act of obliteration under the pretext that the mismanagement alleged to have taken place could not by reason of those very regulations have been brought home to the mis-doers! It seems beyond hope, to bring reason, argument or evidence to bear on minds that could accept such a statement of a system established by the Duke and stamped with the seal of his achievements; but another statement may be ventured without fear of refutation: it is this. Not only can that not possibly have been the case, but those regulations and that system cannot have been complied with without leaving the mark throughout at each step of the persons responsible at every stage. The evidence existing must have been suppressed before it could possibly have been otherwise; or, the regulations must have been not complied with, a breach and neglect equally indicative of the fault, and where it lay.

There may have been grave reasons of state for covering the real offences and the real offenders; but it was not a noble act to throw this slur on the work

of the great departed warrior who always led England's troops to victory and placed her in deserved honour and esteem at the summit of the nations. Not one of his instruments in the subversion of his work and the protrusion of their own, can dare to boast that their work has laid down a clear simple channel of duties or established an unbroken, real and tangible chain of responsibility, though under any system it may always be possible to find or make a scapegoat, and, as has been well said, a bad system vigorously carried out is better than a good one neglected.

The only object for which an army exists is fighting power. Its watch-word is patriotism, and its duty is to guard and fight against every enemy of its country. It is not a carcase for experiment. It knows nothing of party.

Its allegiance is to the Sovereign and it requires the Queen's Regulations. It does not need,—it cannot exist in a state of efficiency with,—ceaseless administrative changes. Its commander-in-chief is the officer from whom the result determined upon is required. He is answerable for it; the whole responsibility is his, and he must be furnished with the authority and power to exact it.

Neither expenditure nor administration alone can command efficiency. It cannot be obtained without expenditure, and may be obtained in due and exact proportion to the expenditure incurred; but it is nevertheless true that an expenditure may be incurred on administration that will defeat the attainment of

efficiency in precisely the same ratio as it is incurred.

Administration that brings out fighting power to the best advantage is the best administration possible. That which evolves it least and places it to the worst advantage, is the worst possible administration. Others range between these extremes: that which is cumbersome is mischevious. The French defeats in their recent war are said to be sufficiently accounted for by their system of supply alone, independently of all other causes. The Prussian victories are stated to be almost the mechanical result of their contrary system. The remains of the olden English military organization, exemplified in what was called the regimental system, with its strong bonds of personal and social union, was one never known to fail. The *personnel* of the olden English army has been ever conspicuous for excellence; but administration may sweep that away and may substitute a French for a Prussian or a Duke of Wellington's system of supply.

Administration may besides be lavishly extravagant in instrumentalities for effecting petty economies costing ten-fold what they save; these instrumentalities may involve delay. Delay in military matters may mean death and defeat. *Administration, therefore, admits of being so contrived as to bring about, if not as its object, yet as its certain result, the total destruction of that for the preservation and healthy action of which it alone ostensibly exists.* The evil genius of English administration appears to be the love of meddling and a mania for checks. The very service of supplies,

emphatically the servant of servants, if it is to be of use at all, is grandiloquently and perniciously transformed into a control or a compteroles. If the latter be meant and the form of writing the word has been merely that "Phonetic Nuz" system, which, by corrupting their derivation, obliterates the true meaning of words, it is a proper style enough for a service of checktaking; but if the former, it is a check on the whole army; a check that can only fulfil its functions by the destruction of the army with which it is associated. By no possibility can the service of supplies control an army except by the failure of supplies, which means the destruction of the armies in which it is suffered or made to take place. Either way, the name is a misnomer, and an unhappy one, full of bad omen, made the more conspicuous by the story of its origin and its supercession of the rules of the great duke.

Checks, in their place and within bounds, are useful and necessary; but they cannot alter their nature and being. They remain drags, hindrances, checks. An army checked by political dictation means nothing else than an army paralyzed. Such an army had better not exist at all. The parliamentary official may once have been useful as a check on the power of the crown, by reason of its absolute control over a standing army; but it has become painfully apparent that the preservation of the remnant of that power is the first military as well as civil necessity of the day.

The administration of the commander-in-chief involved an expenditure of £48,000, that of the secre-

tary, £169,000; but a drag of $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the motive power, let the figures in the estimates be ever so much shifted, writes its own condemnation in numbers of arithmetic.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE STAFF AND SUPPLIES.

THE *personnel* of all armies consists of cavalry, artillery, engineers and infantry. The commanders of these branches are dependent on the commander-in-chief or general officer commanding, from whom they receive their orders and instructions, and whom they furnish with such information and opinion as he may call for; but communications from, or to him, are made through an intermediate channel,—the staff.

These various branches of an army are all required in its operations, and subject to a common law and a common imperative necessity. Man and horse must, at the time appointed, be on the spot required, which, in a military sense, they cannot be said to be so, unless they are there furnished with all that they require for the service they are called upon to yield on the spot and at the time they are to yield it. From this indispensable condition, arose the practice of the soldier carrying not only his arms and ammunition, but his rations in some measure, his kit, and pack, and cloak, an endeavour which resulted in loading man and horse, (from whom racer's duty was required), like baggage

animals. From this evil, again came the distinctions into light and heavy cavalry, besides many other differences arising from varieties of arms and equipment furnished for special requirements. In all, there remains the same necessity. Man and horse must be furnished with a portion at least of the necessary supplies in such a manner that they form as near as possible, part of the very man and horse requiring them. Improvement in arms, with some consequent change in tactics, have nearly done away with infantry distinctions; but all remain clogged by this necessity of being furnished with supplies, of carrying them with them as far as possible, yet of carrying as little as may be, for what they carry is necessarily encumbrance, and what they lack, is necessarily hindrance. *Impedimenta* remains from Roman to present days, a very principal of military difficulties.

The most prominent feature in the problem to be solved appears to be lost sight of in attempts rather to ignore than to meet the peculiarities of the dilemma. The soldier moves in specified masses, formed of given limits; thus, a certain number of men make up a company,—of companies, a battalion,—of battalions, a brigade,—of brigades, a division, and so on. Again, a certain proportion of all the several arms constitutes an army, a force, consisting of parts, each having some special peculiarity. Inasmuch, then, as what the soldier can carry is exactly in the place where it is wanted, the solution of the problem nearest to its conditions is to identify with the unit to be moved, the supply

necessary to that unit,—that is to say, to harmonize and dovetail the system of supply with each unit, in contradistinction to treating it as a separate, or much worse, a superior and independent branch of military administration, an error of arrangement, to be explained only by omission to distinguish between the duties of providing the means for procuring the supplies of an army, and those of organizing and administering the distribution, delivery and forthcoming of those supplies in the time and at the place appointed; between the duties, that is, of the government and those of the Commander-in-chief.

From the necessity for the commander of any force of mixed arms, that is to say of any army, to be able to handle all arms, and the ordinary training of soldiers only in one, has arisen an artificial attempt to indoctrinate certain men with an exceptional fitness by a special arrangement. They are put through a course of additional theoretical teaching, and are for a short time attached to the several arms and then are eligible to be put on the staff of a general officer, in which position they are placed as favourably as circumstances admit, for acquiring a further insight into the duties of command. Against this system may be urged that the circumstances under which the selection for this training necessarily takes place, inevitably excludes from it, and the after career it opens, the overwhelming majority of officers and must therefore tend to exclude from the command of armies, numbers who may be much more fit than any among the small number

to which the selection becomes limited. Moreover, it has a tendency to introduce something of the nature of caste, and unquestionably it shuts the officers of the staff, who are to be the future commanders, from that special intimate acquaintance with the details and practice of any one arm and of regimental life and experience, which may after all be the more valuable training. But the great evidence of its imperfection, if not the proof of its fault, lies in the fact that it is an artificial and arbitrary incident in military service, extraneous to its natural requirements, and contrary to that simplicity of military administration, which is one key, if not the principal key to success.

The simplest and most efficient staff would seem to be that dictated by the circumstances of service, the assembly round the general in the capacity of his staff of the superior commander of each of the arms. It would complete the chain of responsibility, and it would bring every officer in some relation for gradually acquiring fitness for mixed command during the ordinary career of his individual service. It would test the capacity for command not only of a far greater number than can be the case at present, but it would test it under the eye of experience and in the matter of practice. It would, besides, furnish a consistent unit for the staff throughout all armies and their positions. It would assemble immediately around the commander-in-chief, as well as around all generals in command, the representatives of all portions of the

army that have to act together ; from whatever arm the general might be taken, he would be placed in close and immediate contact with them all.

It would, in addition, afford the *simplest* and *consequently the best* solution of the difficulty of furnishing supplies at the time and place required. By this arrangement, orders for the several branches would be communicated by the officer of each branch and such as were common, by the senior or chief of the staff. The seconds in command also, would, by this method, be trained to command as they can by no other, for they would exercise command, but under supervision, since the command itself would of necessity rest with the senior officer ; but the second in command, responsible to him, would have to exercise its active duties when the officer both in command and upon the staff, was engaged in duties with the general officer commanding.

The movement and distribution of supplies falls by this arrangement into its natural groove. The staff and commanding officer of cavalry would be responsible for his own arm and all transport involving horses when not in service with another branch. The officer of artillery for his arm and all stores relating to artillery when once delivered to the command. The officer of engineers for his and all preliminary arrangements for the movement and accommodation of troops. The officer of infantry for his arm, its ammunition, clothing, accoutrements and actual movement.

The principle is applicable alike to the army of

operation and its sub-commands, to military districts, towns, garrisons and counties. In fixed posts, food and forage would be under contract; ammunition and stores in magazines. They would be furnished to forces in the field by a commissariat—an integral part of the forces. The vouchers and documents would require the approval of the commanding-officer of engineers, whose approval sanctioned by the general officer commanding would be final on each transaction, but with a responsibility, subject to examination by the treasury. Payment, in fixed quarters would be conducted by paymasters and agents giving security; on service, by the commissariat. When moving, the proportion of transport would be attached to the unit for which it was required, and the commanding-officer of each fraction of the army would be responsible for the movement of that fraction, as well as in all other respects. He would be furnished with the means of attaining completeness, and he would be answerable that he did acquire completeness.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE RANK AND FILE.

THE military duties that require to be permanently yielded may be classed something as follows:—

I.—An army for active operations, the standing army proper.

II.—An army of occupation in Ireland, a branch of the above.

III.—A force for reliefs, and for garrisons and reliefs in possessions out of the United Kingdom, the same.

IV.—A force for garrisons at home.

V.—A reserve, and

VI.—An army for India, which being dealt with separately, may be dismissed from present considerations.

The components of these, besides the regular army, are the militia, the yeomanry, the pensioners, the volunteers, and the nominal reserve.

The numbers, including all ranks are according to the estimates for the years 1870-71, 1871-72, and 1872-73 ; respectively, 459,270, 494,528, and 465,710,

at a cost of £11,762,000,* £14,697,700,* and £13,582,000.* They consisted in 1870-71, of 115,037† regulars, 134,037 militia, 17,102 yeomanry, 23,000 pensioners and reserve, 170,094 volunteers.

In 1871-72, the numbers were, 135,047 †regulars, 134,037 militia, 15,773 yeomanry, 39,000 pensioners and reserves, and 170,671 volunteers. In 1872-73, the numbers are 133,649† regulars, 139,018 militia, 15,455 yeomanry, 35,000 pensioners and reserve, and 142,600 volunteers.

The arms in these several numbers divide as follows—

In 1870-71, cavalry 11,077; yeomanry 17,108 and 10 bodies of volunteer light horse, aggregate not given. Horse artillery 2,275, field brigades 3,510, garrison brigades, including coast and depôt brigades 11,567. These numbers were modified by the reduction of one battery in each garrison brigade, by the addition of 6 batteries of horse artillery and 20 field batteries, and the withdrawal of 5 batteries from India. Militia artillery 15,259, volunteer artillery 33,813. Guards 5,940, infantry of the line 61,392, engineers 4,836, colonial corps 3,573, transport 3,055, militia 115,046, volunteers 136,281.

The numbers of militia are irrespective of officers; those of the volunteer infantry include the bodies of light horse. Officers of militia draw the same rates of pay, whether artillery or infantry. Volunteers receive the same capitation grant, whether engineers, rifles, or

* Pages 3 of the several Estimates.

† Pages 6.

light horse. These are accordingly lumped together, whilst the pay of other grades being different, they are carefully tabulated separately.

This is very right and proper if the house of commons kept to its monetary functions ; but inasmuch as it takes on itself to control the efficiency, to interfere with the detail and discipline of the army, to determine as well as to scrutinize the mode of attaining the result, it affords a striking comment on its mode of doing so and of its competency, to find a difference of half-pence accurately recognized, and a difference of arm utterly ignored. The estimates themselves are framed by accountants and tabulated by clerks. Incontrovertibly, the proper way if they are looked upon simply as monetary statements ; but wholly at variance with their use for determining the relative value and cost of the matter with which they deal, whether that of a post, possession, or an ingredient of the *personnel*.

In 1871-72 the comparison and detail of numbers given, page 16 of the estimate 1870-71, is done away. Two-and-twenty pages of appendix give information in detail. If the parliamentary rule of all military detail is desirable, or inevitable, it might be facilitated and made more efficient by tabulation dealing with result rather than exclusively with cost. For instance, if the votes constituting the *personnel* were by units of definite and stated composition and so many of them.

The number in 1871-72 were 12,952 cavalry ; 15,773 yeomanry ; light horse volunteers not given ;

2837 horse artillery; 6057 field-brigades; 13,487 garrison-brigades; 15,259 militia artillery; 34,005 artillery volunteers; 6640 guards; 78,719 infantry of the line; 5169 engineers; 3282 transport; 114,920 militia; 136,666 volunteers; 39,000 pensioners and reserves.

In 1872-73 the numbers are 12,367 cavalry; 15,455 yeomanry; light horse volunteers, numbers not given. Horse artillery, 3,062; artillery, including field, garrison, coast and depôt brigades, 17,177; militia artillery, 16,108; volunteer artillery, 33,600; engineers, 5,169; guards, 6,640; infantry of the line. 78,749; colonial corps, 3,571; transport, 3,514; militia, 119,234; volunteers, 139,000; reserves, 35,000.

The several numbers of these successive years:—459,270, 494,528, and 465,710, are not formidable even on paper compared with the numerical strength of continental armed nations; but they are quite sufficient to warrant a very deep practical interest in the reality and efficiency of that which they represent.

The varying quality, character and cost of the several ingredients of which these defensive resources, (already made more or less available and therefore in their respective degrees affording a safe basis of calculation), seem to point out the means not only of improving the state of preparation in which to maintain the attitude of defence, but also how to accomplish this with least disturbance to the habits, feelings and pursuits of the country, and at the least expenditure. The problem requiring to be solved is how to obtain a force,

sufficient in number, adequately trained, properly distributed and thoroughly supplied. At one extremity of the scale are the volunteers,—the force involving the least expense, but also the least available; at the other is the standing army, that should be so equipped as to be in every sense of the word, available for active operations at a minutes notice; but in every respect the most costly. Between are the militia; behind are the pensioners and reserve. It must not be understood that the militia are less expensive because they are only called out for a short time; or the volunteers, because they receive only a capitation grant; but militia permanently called out are relatively less costly than the troops of the regular service, and the same would hold good with the services of the volunteers. In the proportion therefore, that any duties now discharged by the standing army, and that interfere with its perfect freedom and thorough adaptation for active operations, can be performed by volunteers or by militia; in so far would the standing army be benefitted and virtually expanded, the actual state of preparation, if the country be improved, and the expenditure be lessened by the transfer of such duties to them.

Next, in some respects, the very different qualifications that are severally necessary in an active army, for garrison service and in the reserve, correspond in a great measure with the qualities of man at different ages but in the same occupation, and would seem to solve the difficulty of meeting seeming contradictions of requirement.

One of the most striking of these, for instance, arises at the very threshold of military life, in the question as to the most desirable length of time for the period of enlistment. Whilst it would appear that the shorter the period of enlistment is, the greater will be the numbers passing through the training consequent upon it; so, on the other hand, the longer it is, the more veteran and valuable will be the quality of the troops. The shorter it is, the wider it might be presumed, will be the diffusion throughout the mass of the population of military knowledge and tastes, through the constant return of drilled men to that mass, and the greater the consequent general capacity of the nation to rise as a nation in arms, if it have to do so; but the longer it is, the more limited is the interruption to the tastes, habits, feelings and industry of the nation, whose military aptitude may be brought out by means less disturbing than so general an enlistment as must attend a short duration of service. The shorter that period is, the younger, more energetic and moveable the force; but the longer it is, the greater the amount of service obtained from men once thoroughly trained; but on the other hand, the greater also become the incidental expenses of a riper age, such as those entailed by marriage and for pensions; with this important qualification however, that these very conditions render it a calling for life, and enable the enlisted soldier to look forward to his career up to its close, with a confidence equal to that of his compeer in civil life. Whereas, the interruption to civil avocations and the disturbing

tendency that any period of enlistment, however short, certainly carries with it, involves the probability of a result that can hardly be too strongly deprecated, in unfitting a man for, and depriving him of the opportunities of following, a civil calling without furnishing him with another. These contrarieties disappear, or rather they are resolved into accord, by allotting each proper condition to the corresponding variety in the nature of the service required.

According to this view, the recruit would begin with the army for garrisons, pass to that for operations and reliefs, revert to that for garrisons, and end in the reserves. This system applied throughout the regular army, would give a nucleus of veterans in all branches, and would unite the regular and auxiliary forces in service and association throughout the career of each.

The allotment of the specific number of years service under each phase, is a matter of comparative indifference, when the object is merely to exemplify the principle proposed; but taking as an example, say, enlistment at between the ages of 17 to 25 years, (recruits being enlisted according to evident physical qualification rather than nominal age,) one year as a recruit in the garrison's army, six years in the army of operations and reliefs, ten in the garrison's army, ten more in the *reserve, and then a pension for life, with liability to service in the second reserve. This would make the ages from 24 to 32 years old for passing into

* I contemplate the first reserve performing modified but real duty, enough to maintain efficiency and to be a tangible, not a ubiquitous force.

the garrison's army, from 34 to 42 for passing into the reserve, and from 44 to 52 for a life pension, with pensioner's duty after seven-and-twenty year's service. A recruit, enlisting in any county would serve one year in garrison in that county, would pass to the county regiment, revert to the county garrisons, pass to the reserve of the county, and in it receive his pension. Men forming the army of operations would be unmarried, yet the soldier might look forward to marriage with the same right of expectation as any of his class in civil life. The strongest inducements to enlistment that can be offered, and that ensure both number and quality, are the maintenance of local connection, the knowledge of future prospects, and the certainty of pension; so also tradition and historical local association have proved the strongest incentives to distinguished conduct on the part of regiments.

This system would furnish 5,000 men annually for reserves on every 30,000 of the army of occupation, and 50,000 in ten years, with 50,000 more in the reserves after twenty years, on the assumption that the recruiting was regular and the periods of service as suggested. The strength of garrison army required in addition to this out-come from the regular army would be met by local militia. The way to render militia effective is to call and keep them out.

The way to render volunteers efficient would seem to be by extending the system already adopted as to rifle and artillery practice, and to lay down a full standard of requirements in all respects, including the

brigading together of the same and different arms, and to afford a corresponding capitation grant on its attainment, carrying the principle as far as the proficiency desired.

CHAPTER IX.

ON COST AND NUMBERS.

CHECKS that are excessive defeat the object for which they exist. The innumerable tabulations, the waggon loads of returns, the tons weight of correspondence that encumber the military offices of England, are in their excess, injurious extravagance. They paralyze the efficiency they are intended to further. They take the soldier from his proper work and duty; they involve an expenditure in great part unnecessary. Finally, they overlay information so that, often, that which is valuable is lost sight of and disregarded. Moreover, the rampant dominancy of a clerical system has subordinated every matter to an assumed convenience in account keeping. Returns are based not on the requirements of efficiency but on details of expenditure; so that after all the information that is really essential is extremely difficult to extract supposing that it is at all conveyed. It has in all probability to be compiled from an almost interminable mass of documents.

Some such unwelcome suspicion can scarcely fail to have crossed the mind of many a member of parliament, who may have wished to ascertain, say the cost

of any particular station at home or abroad, and what constituted the provision for its occupation and defence. If he consulted the estimates for the purpose of trying to satisfy his enquiry, he must have laid them down as wise as he took them up. If he reflected that the elaborate machinery be voted for from year to year under the heads of administration and offices went to working out on paper,—not to be computed,—and through channels, not to be counted, the most trivial item of all that information, he must have been tempted to make a general application from the example before him. The result of all these documents, compiled with an ultimate view to parliamentary submission, and framed with an exclusive regard to what can only be called a pedantry of account keeping:—this £169,000 worth of checkdom, and a classification full of intricacy and form, leaves him uninformed on every point of relative cost and value. He can quickly find the aggregate cost of emptying all the military cesspools and sweeping all the military chimneys in the empire, and he will find it carefully summed; but he will not be able to compile the aggregate cost of any one station, how that is arrived at, what is yielded for it, of what its garrison is composed, and why? If he is interested in home and local defence and wishes to trace the nature, strength and character of spontaneous efforts made in particular localities and refers to the returns of volunteers, he will find them lumped according to the capitation grant they receive; but, instead of the details of such matters, he is told the cost of tuning the organ

in the college at Sandhurst, and the aggregate army expenditure of soap, soda and lime. He is armed with authority and supplied with information with which he can safely challenge votes on these weighty matters.

If, for the purpose of computing the unit for army operations in the field, a brigade of infantry be taken, at three battalions of 1,000 men each, a division at four brigades, and the army unit for infantry at two divisions, it makes of infantry 24,000. If 3,000 cavalry and 96 guns be added to this unit, it may be a high, but probably is a desirable proportion, not only on account of the essential value of these arms, but also of the longer previous training which they require. They would be formed of two brigades of cavalry, each of three regiments of 500 men and of two brigades of artillery, each of 48 guns, forming eight batteries. One thousand engineers added to these makes a total of 30,000, to which, for purposes of transport in medical, commissariat, and store branches may be added 5,000 men and a like number of horses or their equivalent, at an expenditure, including rations and forage, of *£728,700, or averaging something under £50 a man. To this amount* must be added that for barracks, arms, clothing, and accoutrement, and

*For convenience of investigation the bases are given from which the above figures are deduced. They are in no way original, they could be of no value if they were. They are taken from the estimates as far as stated. Lump sums have been placed for simplicity's sake opposite the chief officers in lieu of infinite petty allowances and counter stoppages. The remainder, except where specially stated, has been principally taken or deduced from the Columns of Estimate, page 16, 1870-71, p. 16, and Appendix, 1871-72.

ammunition expended. These may fairly be approximated at £2 2s. for barracks, £5 for arms, accoutrements and ammunition, and £4 for clothing, making £60 per man in all.

The unit can be doubled out of existing numbers without trenching on garrison artillery, on the guards either cavalry or foot, and leaving still some margin of infantry. To these numbers may be added, available for any purpose at home or abroad, the marine artillery—2,877; and the marine light infantry—11,123.

We have, therefore, a force of about 80,000 men who can be raised to the highest pitch of efficiency at an expense of £5,000,000 out of an expenditure regularly incurred.

We have besides an approximate numerical strength at existing numbers, of 15,259 artillery and 114,920 infantry, who would be available for garrison duty throughout the year, at an additional cost of £5,076,981, or about £39 a head, that is an additional strength in artillery, about equal to the garrison and field brigades together, and in infantry of more than twice the strength of the line.

There remain the yeomanry, the pensioners, and reserve, which all admit of being made available, with very little shock to the civil habits of the country. The standard of efficiency once obtained, the yeomanry would only be required to be permanently embodied in the event of impending invasion.

But to meet any terrible emergency, we have besides 1,000,000 of young men between the ages of 18 and

22, whom an expenditure of from £40,000,000 to £60,000,000 would place in a state of preparedness, to confront any confederacy threatening the wealth or integrity of the empire. It were a most foolish encroachment on the life and wealth of the kingdom to resort to any measure of the kind without occasion; but the sum is less than one-half the estimated amount of the annually accruing wealth of the nation, and ridiculously small compared with the exactions imposed by triumphant might on far less wealthy France, or the claim presented in the name of the *Alabama*, a claim that would never have been advanced against a country with defence. A country that had not in some measure neglected its defence would have entered on no negotiation on such a matter, whether or not it waived its own rights of remonstrance against the countenance of "Fenian" and "sympathizers" attacks.

The comparative ease with which we could, if needs be, furnish both the money and men determines not only our real sources of security, but it also points out our responsibility and duty. We shall be the least blameless of all nations if we acquiesce in the extinction of right by might. We shall be the most guilty of all if we suffer truth and obligation to be blotted out of the creed and practice of Europe. We shall be the most despoiled and the heaviest losers, if under the name of indemnity we allow license of extortion to become the practice of war. Our seeming convenience would be a real breach of trust; we should fall, and we should fall dishonoured and unregretted. The road to ruin is parsimony out of place.

Taking the numbers of the year 1871-72 for a basis, there are 133,201 men at a cost of £14,697,000.

Retaining the army unit of 30,000, there may therefore be forthcoming, of men ready for service in every respect, and attended by other 5000 men and horses or their equivalents.

2 × 30,000 men	£3,600,000
Balance of numerical strength to bring up the numbers to those furnished in the estimates:—			
73,201 men, garrison forces			3,660,050
Funds voted			
For militia	...	£957,300	
For yeomanry		81,700	
For volunteers		485,700	
For army reserve		129,200	
			<hr/>
All available as at present			£1,653,900
Being 60,000 men, army for operations,			
73,201 men for garrisons,			
320,461 men for reserves and auxiliaries			<hr/>
Total			£8,913,950
Non-effective votes	2,297,500
War-like stores	1,815,800
Works other than barracks, which are included in the cost per man	...		253,070
			<hr/>
			13,280,320

1871-72 net charge for army	
in estimates 	14,697,700
	<hr/>
Saving	£1,417,420
	<hr/>

or taking into account how the votes for irregular forces, and the non-efficient votes may be applied, fully 10 per cent. on the whole, with largely increased efficiency.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.

STATEMENT OF THE COMPLETE COST OF AN ARMY UNIT
OF 30,000 MEN.

Lieutenant-general commanding ...	£3,500			
3 general officers commanding divs.				
1 general officer commanding R.A.				
1 general officer commanding R.E.				
5 at £2000				
	10,000			
6 major-generals commanding brigades				
6 at £1200	7200			
6 brigades at £1000	6000			
Cavalry 3000 men complete	144,000			
*Artillery 2000 men	80,000			
*Engineers 1000 men	34,000			

Bases on which medical commissariat, ammunition and store transport have been numerically completed.

Medical.

Regimental— horses men

1 light carriage,
4 horses, 6 men

2 ambulances,
12 horses, 12 men.

The brigade 48 54

Brigade Reserve—

2 wagons, 12 horses,
24 men.

1 light carriage,
8 horses, 12 men.

			<i>Division Reserve—</i>		
*Infantry 24,000	980,000		10 wagons, 60 horses,		
			120 men	66	120
<hr/>					
	£1,264,700		<i>Commissariat—</i>		
†Transport ...	£173,000		1¼lbs.meat, 1lb. bread,		
‡Rations ...	161,000		and groceries for		
§Forage ...	130,000		distribution.		
<hr/>			50 wagons at 4 horses,		
	£1,728,700		250 carts at 2 horses	700	700
			<i>Cavalry—</i>		
			Carriage of forage and		
			<i>Ammunition—</i>		
			100 rounds per man in		
			6 wagons of 6 horses.		
			4 light carriages of 1 horse.		
			<i>Balance—</i>		
			Reserve ammunition		
			and margin.		

N.B.—Brigade-Majors and Aides-de-camp included in the totals.

* Taken from the estimates in the proportion of numbers.

† Taken from the estimates by adding what are called Army! Service! Corps! and Army! Hospital! Corps! and applying the proportion of numbers.

‡ Calculated according to the proportion of numbers.

§ One-third the total amount in estimates.

CHAPTER X.

ON COST AND ADMINISTRATION.

ON comparing the estimates for the years 1870-71 and 1871-72, under vote 16, p. 85, a very remarkable evidence of the tenor of the revolution, under the guise of army change, will be found. These pages in the respective estimates are severally headed with the numbers, in words, £222,300 and £194,000, and in the column for that purpose a net decrease of £23,324 is declared to be made. A note reduces this amount by about £10,000, which is merely transferred to other votes, and here the resemblance ends.

The bold type and clear headings—"Department of the Secretary of State for War" and "Department of the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief" that are conspicuous in 1870-71, have disappeared in 1871-72, and in their stead have crept up terms altogether new. There appears a "Central Department," and an "Officer Commanding-in-Chief," who is but B to a "Surveyor-General" at C, and a D of a "Financial Secretary." "The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief" has disappeared from the pages of the estimates.

On looking a little further, the alleged diminution in

expenditure seems to share the same vanishing fate, or rather it re-appears, but under the very ugly aspect of an entirely opposite character. Under each letter of this new alphabet appears a steady increase, very conspicuous in the "Central Department," in the "Surveyor-General's," and in that of the "Financial Secretary."

It is not until the humble grade of "office keepers and messengers" is reached that any diminution is found. These do not seem to have fared as luxuriously; they have lost £204; A, C and D, have gained £20,718, and B £1,912, a net increase of £22,426, which is converted into the saving mentioned by a note appending £36,063 to the year 1870-71, as a "sum required to meet excess of charge during the year 1871-72 (*sic*) beyond the amounts taken above for the several departments," which, instead of a saving of £23,000, reads uncommonly like an increase of £58,489, of which £36,063 were procured from the year 1870-71.

The estimate for the year 1872-73 shews a further increase of £689 in the office of the surveyor-general, and of £1,800 in that of the financial secretary. If the array of officers and pen-men that have to furnish material to the men of talk be taken into account, the luxury of having the army managed by a parliamentary regime proves somewhat costly. The heads alone, whose only qualification is their parliamentary existence, absorb £8,500, but they seem to be ever requiring more and more addition to the aid with which they are furnished, of which only a very small part

indeed would bear the test of the one question that ought to determine every military matter, namely—will it increase fighting power, and will it do so to the best advantage and in the best manner?

Immediately under the parliamentary chiefs comes a permanent under secretary, with a chief clerk and registrar, whose never-ending tasks, with ever-new regulations, must make their berths anything but sinecures. Under the head of the control branch, now called surveyor-general of the ordnance, are a director of transports, another of contracts, with principals and a string of clerks—senior, junior, supplementary, and military.

The financial full “secretary” has an accountant-general, with a deputy and another assistant under him and the same interminable list of principals, clerks—senior and junior and military. It is more remarkable than satisfactory in an economic point of view to observe how indispensable appear to have been new and costly appointments at the top, in offices already overloaded, in order to accomplish those reductions—that have pressed so very hardly on the subordinate and poorer classes,—that reduced the army to an ebb that had to be immediately redressed as best it might,—that diminished the dockyard stores and sent adrift workmen, both of which also had to be replaced.

There appears to be but one exception. Opposite to the new and modest style allotted to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who might scarcely be recognized without surprise as “officer command-

ing-in-chief," is the sum of £4000 as attached to the highest military representative of the Sovereign, which sum is apparently exceeded by a little more than £1 a day; but a foot-note explains that the votes for "B" include "allowances hitherto granted for servants, forage and lodgings." The topographical sub-division, and pay for the economy of "supernumerary members of the late establishment," complete the small apparent increase of the office stamped B. These comparisons do not serve to place in a very favourable light the invidious comments that have been as freely as untruly ventured, on the alleged emoluments drawn by the first military officer of the Crown.

If the navy estimates be examined, the same contrasts obtrude themselves. The equivalent office to that properly pertaining to His Royal Highness is the Lord High Admiral's, which is executed by Lords Commissioners, and is in theory subordinate to the Secretary for War—at least, in time of war; but the emoluments for the commission, with the indispensable addition of the financial secretary's business, amount to very close on the salary of three secretaries of state, and not far from four times that of the commander-in-chief.

Adverting now not to administration as it exists, but to such as seems appropriate and necessary, bearing in mind that the sole right object of administration is the efficiency of the army and navy as the defensive power of England, the first obvious point is, that parliamentary officials, as such, have no standing in the matter at all.

The crown demands the supplies deemed necessary by the sovereign in council. The grants for these purposes is made to the crown. It rests, therefore, with the crown to summon to its councils whom it pleases, and to appoint to these matters whom it sees fit. The lawful rights of the house of commons are strictly limited to satisfaction that the supplies have been applied to the purpose for which they were voted. The perpetual intrusion of parliamentary officialism into the detail of army administration, is in point of fact, one continued act of accusation and condemnation of the crown and of its officers. If not this, it is the transfer of the command of armed forces from the crown to the house of commons: either way, it is not less injurious, as even so summary a sketch as this must show, to imperial interests than it is to the true dignity of the commons themselves. They cannot by any possibility attend to the petty details which they now either call for, or have thrust before them, and to the large, broad and important matters with which they ought to deal. The consequence is patent in both cases. An attempt, necessarily abortive, is constantly made on to centre even the most trivial transactions, not alone in a central office, but actually in a central official: but the broad questions, the extended interests, the practical result, are thoroughly obscured. Personal jealousies and private advantage take the place of public interests.

While pedantry and meddlesomeness are having high day, the interests of the country are sacrificed to

the experiments of theorists and the tabulations of accountants. There was sound sense and an important moral contained in the simple question of a labourer who asked, "Don't you think, Sir, if the First Lord had been minding his own business, instead of coming down to the Hospital to discharge an under gardener, may be the *Captain* would never have gone to the bottom with all those men?" The First Lord, probably, scarcely carried his personal investigations nor his economies to the extent the man supposed; but the sentence is fit for the motto of warning against a system to which army and navy are alike subjected by endless interference and undue centralization. It would be a happy day for England when constitutional rights were again recognized and adopted; for these very numerous, very honourable and very costly parliamentary appointments, with the consequence they bestow and the emoluments they carry with them, are but exaggerations of legs of mutton up poles for which clowns climb. Unfortunately, when political partisanship scrambles for power and the spoils of office, the penalty the country may have to pay for these pranks, is not only the needless creation of high offices, but may in the end, prove to be the loss of honour and independence.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X.

TABLE OF COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIVE COST.

The Secretary for Defence (to the Sovereign in Council)	£5,000
Two assistants—one for the army, one for the navy, each	£3,500 7,000
Six deputy assistants, viz:—	
Three for the army :	
For forces levying	2,000
For manufactures	2,000
For stores and contracts	2,000
Three for the navy :	
For construction	2,500
For stores, victualling, purchase, and con- tracts	2,000
For dockyard works and buildings	1,500
	<hr/>
	£12,000 12,000
	<hr/>
	£24,000

EXISTING (PARLIAMENTARY) EQUIVALENTS.

Secretary of State	£5,000	
Under ditto ...	2,000	
Permanent under do.	1,500	
Surveyor-General	1,500	
Director of Trans- ports ...	1,500	
Director of Con- tracts ...	1,500	
Director of Ar- tillery ...	1,500	
Financial Secretary	1,500	
Accountant-General	1,500	
	<hr/>	
	17,500	
	<hr/>	£17,500
Lords of the Ad- miralty ...	13,900	
Director of Naval Ordnance ...	1,000	
Director of Naval Works ...	1,300	
Victualling stores and contracts	2,650	
	<hr/>	
	18,850	
	<hr/>	18,850
		<hr/>
		36,350
		<hr/>
Nett saving ...	£12,350	
or upwards of 36 per cent.		

This reduction it should be observed is not the result of a suggestion or desire for economy, but for efficiency. It is made without trenching on any working office-bearer for whom a substitute is not suggested, and it deals only with the heads in the existing branches of administration. Neither have the salaries of necessary appointments been reduced, but rather augmented.

It is probably not at all too much to say that, making ample provision for the office establishment of a secretary for defence, and for the administration of the army and navy under their respective commanders-in-chief, but doing away with useless, and therefore, in matter of defence, hurtful paper work, (and doing away only with what is useless and hurtful,) the same reduction in expenditure would hold good throughout. But on £370,567 which existing administration costs, that reduction would be no less than £123,522. If so, this amount would be available for evolving direct fighting without any addition to existing estimates. It is within a £1,000 of the entire charge for the army reserve force. The tendency of administrative cost is, however, to perpetual increase. Without any addition to the armed forces, and notwithstanding the pinching economy preached and practiced in other directions, the cost of administration shows an increase of £13,068 on last year. £85,494 in clerks,—in this amount the commander-in-chief's office, which is indispensable, is not included, and £122,545 in examining accounts in the head quarter offices alone, exclusive of all the local

offices, paymaster's and accountant's branches of the control department, may give some idea of how necessary in an economic point of view is a complete revision of administration, and how beneficial to the service would prove its reduction to its proper functions and limits.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE REPORT OF A ROYAL COMMISSION.

ON the 20th day of August, in the 23rd year of Her Majesty's reign, a royal commission, to which reference has already been made, was issued in the customary form, to treat on the most important subject that can engage a nation and its ruler. The commissioners were instructed to make such suggestions as would put "the United Kingdom in a complete state of defence."

The terms of the commission demand attention. They direct enquiry to be made into the "state, condition and sufficiency of the fortifications existing for the defence of the United Kingdom," and then proceed to call for suggestions for the comprehensive object of its complete defence.

The report made by the commissioners, recapitulates these important instructions, and places the apprehension of their purport by the commissioners beyond doubt, in these words:—

"The undersigned commissioners appointed by
"your Majesty for enquiring into the present state,
"condition and sufficiency of the fortifications existing
"and projected for the defence of the United Kingdom,

“and for considering the most effectual means of placing the kingdom in a complete state of defence . . . having taken the steps necessary to the accomplishment of the duties with which we have been entrusted, beg leave, &c., &c.”

It is startling to find so satisfactory a statement, both in the instructions and expression of their apprehension, lead to a result which, if not exactly at point blank variance with the promise, falls, and was intended to fall, altogether short of the expectation so perfect a recital could not fail to awaken.

The royal commission is accompanied by a memorandum of instructions by the secretary of state, from the war office, that so modifies as entirely to alter the scope of the duty assigned to the commission. It is no longer left to the commissioners to point out the steps necessary to be taken; these are laid down to them in the secretary's memorandum, and they exclude both the metropolis and the kingdom of Ireland from the sphere of the commission.

A communication, dated three months subsequently, may be held to be at variance with the latter part of this assertion, inasmuch as it refers to at least one port in Ireland. That communication states, that “Her Majesty's Government, (not Her Majesty in council,) *had decided* that it was desirable that the store of guns and warlike material should no longer be concentrated in one place, and that Weedon, where it was proposed to deposit valuable public property, was accordingly to be visited by the commission.”

To this is tacked on the following rider to which it is not easy to attach a meaning:—

“I may take this opportunity of adding that I understand that all the dockyards have now been visited, with the exception of Haulbowline at Queens-town, and I should be glad if the commission would visit that establishment and report on the means necessary to protect it from attack.”—S. HERBERT.

The commission ultimately propose £120,000 for Cork, which scarcely brings preparation for the defence of Ireland within serious contemplation.

The memorandum of instructions desires the commission to examine plans of works in progress and to inspect the ground at specified places, viz.: at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Pembroke, Dover, Chatham, and the Medway.

They are desired to take into consideration the small amount of force generally maintained by the country, and especially the limited number of the Royal Artillery.

Evidently impelled by an imperative sense of the duty that had ostensibly and morally devolved upon them, the commissioners break through the letter of their restrictions, and say with reference to the metropolis:—

“Whilst . . . considering the protection of the vital points against which an enemy, intent upon inflicting a heavy blow upon the country, would direct his efforts, the question of the defence of London presents itself.

“There can be no doubt that the main object of an

“enemy invading the country, would be to push for the capital, in the hope that if he succeeded in obtaining command of it, such a disaster would result in our buying him off upon any terms he might think it expedient to extract.

“In connection with this subject, we beg to call attention to an opinion of Lord Overstone.”

To Lord Overstone's remarks, reference has already been made in these notes. The commissioners continue, “the defence of London has not been brought under our consideration.”

Notwithstanding, however, that it was thus limited by its instructions, the commission, as was to be expected, entered fully into the importance of the matter that was entrusted to them. The report opens with three well-worded and important paragraphs that merit being constantly borne in remembrance. The first two point out the insufficiency of exclusively naval preparation in terms which imply neither doubt nor hesitation, though they inevitably fall short of the actual peril such reliance would involve, because the commission could not refer either one way or the other to the right of search, a political question that had been gravely compromised, nor to the loss of the influence of England in the councils of the nations of Europe. Yet with all these limitations to the reasons they were at liberty to adduce the commissioners report that the fleet alone, besides being insufficient to the defence of the kingdom would involve, in the attempt to rely upon it, “the necessity of retaining in the channel, for purely

“defensive purposes, a fleet equal to any that could be
“brought against it . . . by any probable com-
“bination of maritime powers ; and this in addition to
“the other fleets and cruisers, which are required for
“the protection of the vast colonial empire . . .
“and of our commerce and interests in every quarter of
“the globe. An undue proportion of the fleet [of Eng-
“land] tied in the channel, would set proportionally
“free [those of other European states] . . .

“Even if it were possible that a fleet sufficient to
“meet the enemy of a sudden naval combination
“against this country, could be kept available and fully
“manned in time of peace . . . it would lead to
“an outlay far exceeding the expenditure which would
“suffice under other circumstances. The first cost
“would be very great . . . the expense for mainte-
“nance continual . . . involving a large additional
“number of trained seamen, a class of men who can
“with difficulty be obtained, and . . . the most costly
“of any . . . A periodical renewal of the fleet
“every . . . thirty years . . . would be requisite,
“without regard to the transitional state of naval
“architecture, and the rapid progress of mechanical
“science . . .

“Independently of these considerations . . .
“the state of naval warfare has been revolutionized . . .
“the efficient blockade of an enemy’s ports has become
“well-nigh impossible ; the practice of firing shells
“horizontally . . . the enormous . . . power
“and accuracy of artillery . . . lead to the con-

“clusion that after an action even a victorious fleet
“would be crippled and . . . unfit for service
“. . . Should the fleet, from whatever cause, be
“unable to keep the command of the Channel . . .
“the insular position of the kingdom . . . would
“enable any . . . power or powers to concentrate
“a larger body of troops on any point of our coasts
“more rapidly and secretly than could be done against
“any country, having only a land frontier ; and an
“army so placed could maintain its base and be rein-
“forced, and supplied with more facility than if depen-
“dent on land communications.”

“Strongly impressed as your commissioners are with
“the absolute necessity of maintaining our naval superi-
“ority for the defence of our own shores, the protection
“of our colonies and commerce, and of our interests both
“at home and abroad, we have addressed ourselves to
“the consideration of the defence of our naval arsenals
“and dockyards, with a full conviction of the primary
“importance of that measure. Without secure ports
“in which a fleet can find refuge in case of disaster or
“temporary inferiority, and without dockyards and
“workshops where damages can be repaired, or new
“ships fitted out, a fleet must be like an army without
“a base of operations; and our naval power, in the
“event of a single reverse, be exposed to annihilation.”

* * * * *

“Since the application of steam to the propulsion
“of vessels,” the commissioners continue, “we can no
“longer rely upon being able to prevent the landing of

“a hostile force in the country . . . a force might
“be assembled before daylight upon any point selected
“for the attempt, and thrown on shore in two or three
“hours.”

With this apprehension of the duty, they were directed partially to advise upon, the commissioners next consider an increase of the standing army, and point out that every man thereof costs from £60 to £70; but that every man of its augmentation beyond the number for which provision is usually made, would involve besides, about £11 to obtain him, and £100 for his barrack accommodation, on the costly scale laid down in consequence of sanitary considerations. To obtain by this means even the pitiful addition of 66,000 men is reckoned to involve an expenditure of £8,000,000 at the outset, and £4,000,000 annually.

In a paragraph which follows, there is expressed an appreciation of the case, which, modified by the mere abbreviation of leaving out of words dealing with details, sets forth the scheme advocated in these pages. So altered, the paragraph would read as follows:—

“The same millions expended in fortifications
“would be more effectual for the defence [of defined
“positions] than an increase of the regular army. . .
“ . . and would entail no future annual charge beyond
“a small sum for maintenance. The expense of
“embodying substitutes for regular troops . . .
“would not exceed [a fraction] of the cost of an equal
“regular force. . . . [The army] would by [this]
“agency be set free to act in the field.”

These conclusions, if put in practice throughout the kingdom, resolve themselves into the deductions that flow from the principle of the localization of defence; that is to say, defence attained by local forces acting in positions strengthened by works, leaving the standing army free for active operations in any field that may prove necessary to dispel all danger of the invasion of these shores.

After the reference to London, that has been already quoted, the commission proceed to point out that its defence would not supersede that of the arsenals and dockyards, and *vice versa*, shewing that unless these were also fortified or protected, the enemy, debarred from London, might yet seize them to the fearful peril of the navy and the country, and that, on the contrary, their security is an important step towards attaining that of the metropolis.

Referring to the terms which called the attention of the commission to the small general force, and more especially of artillery, the report states that they "have not limited the number and extent of works, in "any proportion to either the actual or probable "strength of that body," and pointing out that "untrained men of average capacity can be taught the "ordinary duties . . . of garrison artillery . . . " . in about three months . . . where supported by a due admixture of fully-trained men and "commanded by properly-trained officers."

This admixture, it will be observed, is precisely the consequence that would ensue from the adoption of the

system of levying armed forces that has been submitted in these suggestions.

With regard to the armament, the commission lay some stress on the proposal to partially arm the principal salients and flanks of the several works at all times ; to have in reserve in the works themselves as many more guns and carriages as will extend the protection of the flanks and face to a war armament ; and in a central dépôt in each position, a further number to complete the maximum, with a proper proportion to replace casualties and to provide for repairs.

From all these considerations it plainly appears—first, that the recommendations of the commissioners will have embraced all that they deemed indispensable to the attainment of the objects to which they were restricted by the memorandum of institutions ; but, secondly, that these recommendations will have been confined to within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the attainment of those objects.

These recommendations required an expenditure of £10,350,000 for works, £1,000,000 for floating works (the term used is “defences”), and £500,000 for armament of works, or £11,850,000 in all.

The following interesting and instructive conversation on the subject of the armaments took place in the Session of 1870* in the House of Commons :—

“Captain Beaumont* said, he would beg to ask the “Secretary of State for War whether he still adheres “to the belief that the producing power of our “arsenals is sufficient to enable us in three weeks to

“replace such an amount of ammunition as was expended during the Crimean war; and whether it is correct that there are not rifled guns sufficient to meet one-tenth of the requirements of the new fortifications.”*

“Mr. Cardwell: ‘Sir, my honourable and gallant friend has not quite correctly quoted what I said.’

“I laid it down as a principle that it is not expedient to keep excessive stores of articles which are liable to deterioration by keeping, are subject to change of pattern, and of which our powers of production are great. . . . As regards projectiles for ordnance, there have been great changes since the Crimean war. The guns are heavier and less numerous, and consequently the projectiles are so too. I am assured by the director of artillery that projectiles for every gun will be ready as soon as the guns can be mounted. “As regards guns for armaments at home and abroad, of muzzle loading rifle guns, there are now in position just one-tenth of the number which will be required when the works are complete. There are ready and making in the course of the year all that were contained in the demand of the engineers for the year, with a considerable surplus. In all, except the heavy loading rifled guns, the supply is ample. The remaining muzzle loading rifled guns are to be completed, so as to be ready as the works are completed.”

The eventual simultaneous completion of works,

* Hansard, 5th August, 1870.

guns and projectiles, is a satisfactory adjustment of detail; but as the secretary of state himself determines what is to be brought forward, the reply would be misunderstood if it were held to imply that the rate of completion is determined by professional military opinion.

If the recommendations of the defence commission are essential to the security of the United Kingdom, one-tenth part of the proportion of those recommendations that were adopted cannot have met the possible requirements of the case. The safety of England in the meanwhile has therefore resulted from good fortune rather than a state of preparation. Consciousness of a necessity to preserve its security from being challenged can hardly fail to influence, if it does not shape the policy a country must adopt.

CHAPTER XII.

ON THE REPORT OF A ROYAL COMMISSION—(*continued.*)

To assume the recommendations of the royal commissioners carried out would be to suppose a good deal that has not taken place. Still, it cannot reasonably be questioned that these recommendations were confined within the narrowest limits that the commissioners deemed possibly consistent with the duty assigned them. If they had advised an improper outlay and a wasteful expenditure of national property, they would have been open to serious censure. There is, however, no evidence whatever to be found of anything that would give reason to conclude that the commissioners have been censured, or their report deemed unreasonable, extravagant, impracticable, injudicious, beyond just proportion or the requirements of the case.

Proceeding then to trace the cause of the discrepancy between the comprehensive introduction to both of the commission and report, and the sequel and acts that have followed, the first circumstance that arrests attention is the striking contrast between the terms of the

commission and those of the memorandum of instructions that accompanies it. Intimation of an intention of limitation may indeed be traced in the words of the commission itself if it be interpreted by the light of subsequent events, inasmuch as in the commission itself attention is particularly directed to the dockyards and arsenals, in words which follow those relating to the sufficiency required for the defence of the United Kingdom, which are again followed in their turn by a second reference, calling for suggestions to place the United Kingdom in a complete state of defence.

The reference to particular posts is in these words:—
“especially all such works of defence as are intended
“for the protection of our royal arsenals and dockyards,
“in case of any hostile attack being made by foreign
“enemies both by sea and land.”

Special is not exclusive reference. “The complete defence of the United Kingdom” is even more pointedly and prominently named, being twice repeated. The injunction to have regard to the ordinary numbers of the royal artillery is contained in the commission, but the reason for disregarding it is assigned. If the limitation and restriction were purposed from the first, it makes it more difficult to perceive the motive for inserting at all in the commission the broad, ruling and imperative direction to provide for the complete defence of the United Kingdom.

The next incident partakes of the same mystery. Commissioners enjoined to report on the complete defence of a kingdom against any hostile attack by

foreign enemies, both by sea and land, deem them precluded by the terms of their instructions from dealing at all with the means of resisting what they yet specify as the undoubted main object of an enemy attacking that kingdom. This object they pronounce to be the capture of the capital. They then go on to state that it does not fall within their province to deal with the defence of the main object of attack!

Then, when the commission have reported on such subjects as they considered within the bounds of their instruction, even the limited suggestions they felt at liberty to submit, were summarily reduced by one-third of the whole amount. A "committee" subsequently appointed to "enquire into the construction, condition and cost of the fortifications erected under [certain] statutes," states that the "government" "made important reductions by omitting works that had formed part of the plan of the royal commissioners." They did this to the extent of £3,930,000. They struck out the whole of the proposed works for Chatham and Woolwich, part of those of the Medway; about half of those for the positions at Portsmouth, known as the advanced works of Portsdown and Gosport, part of the sea forts; and they made reductions at Plymouth, Pembroke and Portland.

If these reductions can be justified, the commissioners must have reported very largely in excess of real requirements, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary. If they did not do so, then these reductions must have seriously compromised the efficiency

of the preparations for defence at all the posts affected. Either way, the result must have been a scheme falling short even of the limited authority vested in the commission.

Finally, in the face of the convulsed condition of Europe, the execution of the fragment that remained has been spread over an indefinite series of years, and is still incomplete.

Most probably economy will be taken for granted as explaining the motive of these successive reductions. *Economy is the due disposition of things, the arrangement of proper objects in right proportion.* If therefore there is one thing more than another that economy would have dictated, it would have been those terms of the commission which enjoin the furnishing of data for a complete state of defence for the whole United Kingdom and the scrupulous fulfilment of the requirements consequent on its recommendations, provided these recommendations were found to merit approval.

Even economy in the perverted acceptation of the word,—reduction of amount in expenditure attained by sacrificing the due disposition of things, and by the disturbance of proper object and right proportion,—does not solve the difficulty. It fails altogether to explain why the recital of the commission should have set forth the true and full nature of the case and display so just an appreciation of the requirements of the United Kingdom, without intention of fulfilment, that intention being effectually barred from the very beginning by the terms of instructions that altogether fettered the commissioners.

Moreover, reduction in amount cannot have been the primary motive that led to that reduction itself. If any doubt might have remained upon this point, it has been dispelled by light thrown upon it by more recent acts. It has recently been stated by the highest parliamentary and finance* authority of the day, that an amount more than double that cut off from these works of defence, has been demanded, *and that the demand has been readily met*, on the mere presumption, (for it has not been put to the test), that officers who paid the state for the privilege of serving it, would not undergo the training requisite "for one of the most highly developed of all the arts practised by mankind;" that it had consequently become indispensable to procure men that would do this. So much, according to the statement of the first lord of the treasury, than whom no one can be more qualified to speak, is the country ready to pay cheerfully, for a single ingredient in the priceless matter of defence.

It is impossible for one moment seriously to institute a comparison between the relative importance of effective provision for the fortification of the United Kingdom, and the substitution of one particular mode of conferring commissions over another, except by a more grave imputation on the state of the army that has been made. Yet in practice this has been done, to the infinite disparagement of the more important consideration.

*The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., at Blackheath.

Moreover, opponents of the change have asserted, that, be the demerits of the recently existing system what they may, neither the financial nor the military consequences of the alteration can be safely predicted. They add that the expenditure was unnecessary, the object political, the system substituted more evil than that superseded,

A measure, which, admits of such serious misgivings, even if only on the part of its adversaries, cannot reasonably be put in comparison with one submitting definite works of construction demanded by a royal commission. Such works may be superfluous. They cannot be injurious. Their plan of construction is evident. Their cost is definite. Saving of money, cannot then, have been the primary motive that defeated the recommendations, and stunted the instructions of the royal commission.

The conclusion is irresistible. One proposal appealed directly and solely to imperial interests and requirements; the other made its appeal through party passions. The decision rested with political partizans.

One tended to secure the empire, but the other humiliated political opponents. One strengthened the unity, the other the class antagonisms and party divisions of the kingdom. Political leaders necessarily appreciate party objects and are forced to be in earnest for their attainment. If they care at all for imperial defence and can master its bearings, still it can be of little immediate value* in their eyes. Instead of

possessing political importance, it can only be attained by a partial sacrifice of personal popularity. So the the commission was made to run in terms that would silence, if they did not satisfy, those who grieved to believe the kingdom void of defence, and who pressed their grief and grievance, whilst at the same time the terms of the commission were made void, to conciliate those who rendered political support to the government, but who had stepped into parliament with cries of retrenchment and army reduction on their lips. "The complete defence of the United Kingdom" was sacrificed. It was not even allowed to be dealt with by a royal commission, ostensibly appointed to furnish suggestions for its establishment, and was not so much as proposed to the house of commons. But whilst the reality was made impossible, the name was steadily preserved. The semblance was maintained. Though the protection of the vital point and main object of attack was peremptorily excluded from consideration, the impression that the complete defence of the United Kingdom was being dealt with and provided for was carefully maintained.

The style, or title of the blue book containing the commissioners' report, exemplifies the manner in which this impression would be conveyed. It is as follows:—"Report of the commissioners, appointed to consider the defences of the United Kingdom." The change to the plural, from *defence* to *defences*, saves it from untruth. If unmeaning in expression, at all it saves it from purporting to be a report providing

for the defence of the United Kingdom. Yet without stating anything of the kind, how probable that it would give the same impression. A title such as "*Report of commissioners appointed to consider the defence of certain posts in the United Kingdom*," would have been exact. That "*to consider certain defences*," would have made it evident that the term defences had been used in a secondary sense, with a meaning synonymous with that of fortifications, but embracing protection by naval as well as by land service means.

It was framed possibly, merely as a docket, certainly not with the careful accuracy that characterizes the report itself; but the evil of the title is, that except to careful readers, it suggests what is not the case, namely, that the ostensible purport of the royal commission, has been fulfilled. It entirely fails to convey the contrary and real fact, which is, that a certain amount of protection for certain posts in the United Kingdom is provided, but that its complete defence is not dealt with in any way. It is pointedly excluded. A report on defending certain posts in the United Kingdom is a thing materially different from one making provision for its complete defence.

Although commissions are still royal in name, their appointment, direction and management, the receipt of the reports they frame, no longer rest with the sovereign in council. The council has been displaced by a cabinet consisting exclusively of representatives of the party momentarily supreme. The inevitable consequence is the subordination of all other con-

siderations to the exigencies of partizanship. Such a condition leaves no room for single-minded administration; no scope for patriotism except as incidental to party objects; none, that is to say, for true and real patriotism. The administration of national affairs has fallen into the hands of the body, framed to make, not to administer, the law. Power is gained by passionate appeals to a mass of population from which degrees of privilege according to duty discharged and responsibility for the exercise of privilege, have been wildly obliterated. When the influences that should carry weight have been swamped, if not eluminated, and ignorance, passion and prejudice are consulted in their stead, it is difficult to see how the independence of the kingdom is to be cared for, or its defence secured. It is all but impossible for a body to practice economy that is itself constituted in complete disregard of the due disposition of proper objects by proportionate means. It is itself the creature of instability, and can scarcely be expected to provide the calmness of security, in other words, *stability*.

A nation without assured security is but the plaything of chance. Its hopes rest on the uncertainty of being attacked and the possibility of escaping defeat, not on the consciousness of power that bids defiance to invasion. The policy that hopes to lull, not to arouse the nation, is not the policy of Pitt or Wellington.

CHAPTER XIII.

ON THE COST OF WORKS FOR THE METROPOLITAN POSITION.

THE average of £1,000,000 for each post may be taken as a fair approximation, derived from actual experience of the cost of a position. Positions that afford complete mutual support, such as have been contemplated throughout in the suggestions herein made, would necessarily be stronger by means of the same instrumentality than could be single and detached positions deprived of such support.

If, notwithstanding the alterations to which they have been subjected in execution, the conclusions of the commission on defence be accepted, the expenditure averages £1,000,000 on each post. The works as carried out, also amount to very nearly £8,000,000 expenditure on eight posts. The committee, to which reference has been already made, state that this amount has been reached, notwithstanding the reductions that had been made, from circumstances they specify as follows:—because the works designed and constructed differ widely from those originally contemplated; the positions selected have not been adopted; several of the works are for more guns, and on a larger

scale ; iron structures of a most costly nature have proved necessary for sea defences : the thickness and strength of masonry had everywhere to be largely added to, to resist the projectiles from rifled guns, introduced since the date of the commissioners report.

If corroboration has been needed, here is proof positive that the recommendations of the commission had been kept to the lowest limit possible at the time, and had not even made provision for the contingency then already imminent of a mighty change in the range and power of weapons of offence.

Weighing these conditions one against another, the tangible result from actual construction, the suggestions of the commission, but the incomplete execution of those suggestions, against the additional strength derived from an unbroken chain of supports, the average of £1,000,000 per post, becomes a measure of cost that may be assumed with some confidence.

Taking then on a rough calculation, Harwich, Cambridge, Dunstable, Oxford, Reading, Dorking and Chatham as posts, or positions in the neighbourhood of posts, that may be treated as equivalents to those dealt with by the commissioners, this would make 7 of such posts. To these, 3 more require to be added, 1 for the position of the Blackwater, 1 for the distance between Harwich and Cambridge, and 1 for Tonbridge, Maidstone and Canterbury—making 10 such posts.

Taking again on an inner ring, Gravesend, Chipping Longar, Hertford, Watford, Staines, Guildford and Woolwich (to Purfleet) as other posts, and classing

Woolwich and Gravesend with the former posts in point of importance, and the others at one-third of the same importance, it gives a total equivalent to 15 of such posts as have been treated by the commission, or an amount in money of £15,000,000.

This amount freely, and it may be even over estimated, would appear to be enough for the protection of the capital, and to form the citadel of a defence for the country that would effectually secure it from the danger of such destruction as has overtaken France, and from the paralyzing sense of insecurity attendant on a condition without the assurance of safety. It is, it may be noted, a little over three-fifths of one year's estimates for the army and navy. With the cost of the abolition of the purchase of commissions which has been stated at sums varying from £8,000,000 to £40,000,000 it is difficult to compare it. It is about one-third more than the cost of the Abyssinian campaign. In short the cost of effectually securing the defence of the kingdom, sinks into positive insignificance when compared with the constant drain involved in disasters attending the intrusion of partizanship into the permanent administration of the affairs of the realm. Whether its costliness be measured by the penalty that had to be paid for management that brought about the war with Russia, and ended it by diplomacy giving a complete triumph to Russia—by that incurred for discourtesy to an African potentate—by the countless millions to be spent in merely altering the mode of officering armed forces, or by the impending claims

advanced under pretext of the *Alabama*, the same result is everywhere apparent.

If the example of the administration of the army and navy be adopted as a criterion, and it may be more difficult than may be supposed to shew why it should not be 33 per cent. on £73,000,000 of revenue annually raised, amounts to upwards of £24,000,000, which would pay for the protection of London and leave a surplus equal to the whole cost of the Abyssinian campaign from the revenues of a single year. Such a conclusion, allowing for the widest margin of error, has manifestly much foundation. In much more probability than will be conceded without reluctance, it may rest altogether on the solid foundation of facts. In every country that has tried the same system of administration, increased taxation and diminished results have gone on hand-in-hand in almost exact proportion as it has been followed. Wherever it has been adopted, there is the same cry of reduction; the same addition of high and new officials; the same increase of taxation; the same cutting off at the skirts. The tremendous indebtedness of modern nations is of modern incidence cotemporaneous with their adoption of government by talk and number. Of this attendant evil of modern democracy, Italy affords the latest and a striking example. She has won the object of her ambition, and has also attained a taxation that has reached, if it has not passed, the limits of endurance. A country struggling for new existence is rightly in a position with a collective representation and the

supreme power over law in active exercise. It is in the presence of revolution. A country professing to have known laws and a sovereignty it regards with reverence, has need of the tranquil assurance of domestic security. England needs more the protection of her capital than the agitations of expensive politicians.

CHAPTER XIV.

ON LOCAL PROVISIONS OF MEANS FOR DEFENCE.

THE plan for the local defence of the country that is suggested in these pages, does not contemplate the raising a gigantic standing army, nor the forsaking by the nation, of its civil duties for the pursuit of arms. It looks to every man, not incapacitated by sufficient cause, to become versed in the use of arms, and to every neighbourhood to have its inhabitants duly organized in association adequate to its own defence. It requires every locality to discharge its duties as a component part of a larger integer. It must therefore be based on a unity of design ; but it combines with it local liberty of action. The control of central authority would be confined to determining the nature and extent of provision required to be made in each locality, seeing that this was furnished and remedying remissness or neglect, should they occur.

The inhabitants within a certain area would be called upon to furnish the standard of military fitness in number and quality as determined upon for that area. The standard would vary with the nature of the locality, but would everywhere comprise a capacity to

bear arms and a knowledge of their use. It would include, in varying degrees, ability to move in mass with order and discipline. In short, that which is now voluntary and partial, and has no standard except in the primary essential of the use of the arms would be made not only morally obligatory, which it must always be, but legally compulsory. The authority by which it would be exacted, would be that of the locality; but the standards required within the several areas would be fixed by a central authority. In this manner the various gradations in individual aptitude would be attained without hardship to the individual, the advantages of unity of plan would be secured, and the control of authority would be provided without the intrusion of centralization on local liberty. From every man not disqualified by special infirmity, or in holy orders, would be exacted once in his life evidence of attainment to a specified standard of fitness. This would in no wise involve any interruption whatever of civil pursuits; it would become, in fact, as it is in obligation, a part of civil duties. The next consideration would be the determination and maintenance of standards of what may be called corporate military qualification for specified areas. These too would be governed by the nature and requirements of the several localities. They would comprise fixed standards of qualification for specified numbers, in the corporate use of arms, under certain conditions such as are involved in company, battalion, troop or battery, brigade, divisional and field drills,—in encampments, marches,

duties of garrison and in the field, with stated periods for exercise and for proof of attainment to the standards of qualification. The boundaries of areas, or limits of localities would be governed by military considerations, each area being so defined as to constitute a complete unit, but a unit itself a component part of a perfect integer.

By this arrangement each locality would be given the option of providing and maintaining its own forces. These would aggregate round the numbers formed by the outcome from the army maintained for active operations. Localities complying with the standards of qualification laid down for the sedentary army, (both as to numbers and attainment) and furnishing a fixed proportion in men and money to the army for the field, reliefs abroad and special posts, such as the Royal dockyards and arsenals, would be free from further taxation, and from external control beyond that necessary for the regular maintenance of the standards as determined.

Nomination to commands, in all the grades of command, would revert, as in what may be called in primitive times, to those who furnished, equipped, drilled and maintained proportionate numbers.

Forces called out would be under the general officers commanding districts and under the commander-in-chief the same as any now existing.

In many localities the strengthening of positions by works and the maintenance of such works might be provided by the same method. It might even be

applied to many parts of the metropolitan position, and in fact, if desired, to the whole, by the general government becoming a contributor for its particular interests within the position.

By proper arrangement of localities round what may be called local citadels or centres of support, the expenditure may be adjusted with equity and success. Under judicious arrangement the largest result would probably be obtained in this manner at the least expenditure, as it would enlist, more than any other, the special interest of each locality in its own works and forces.

The metropolis would be the centre of the area that has been more particularly dealt with in this sketch ; the great towns of the north, the midland districts, and the west would be the centres of others. The applicability and merits of the plan arise out of the co-relative distribution of the elements of defensive strength, namely—wealth and population, with the extent of defence required. An advantage of this method of providing for defence is that several independent excellent results are attained by the same provision.

Thus the line of works of a position should be about five miles in advance of the zone of close habitation and should have a clear space in front of it again of not much less extent. Not rigidly clear bare spaces, but space free from anything like an approach to dense habitation. These reserves of ground would be a considerable expense to acquire, and would be a heavy

charge, and probably but ill managed in the hands of a central parliamentary government, and they would be a loss and deprivation to the immediate neighbourhood. Vested, on the contrary, under specified restrictions, in the local authorities of towns and counties, they would be sources of revenue rather than of cost. They would be valuable as the nearest means for furnishing certain kinds of supplies; and they would provide for the health and recreation of the inhabitants, and in any case would cause a free circulation of air round the scenes of closest human habitation. There would be no reason for interfering in ordinary times with a comparatively small population, such as that of country seats, and of a limited number of buildings, provided they are brought under control and ownership. So vested, they might be let on lease under stipulations meeting the necessities of the case of actual warfare on its occurrence, and many of them might prove directly useful to the object chiefly in view.

CHAPTER XV.

ON THE KING'S MOTTO.

THE characteristic and distinctive mark of principle is that it is always true and always applicable.

It stands in striking contrast to theory, which may be true or it may not, and which, if true, may, or may not apply.

Reversing this ground it may safely be asserted of a proposition, that if it is found to be applicable everywhere and under all circumstances, and attended by like results wherever it is applied, that proposition is built upon a true foundation, and is in fact a principle.

And so the scheme of defence by organization of local means and local resources, now brought,—so far as concerns this sketch—to a conclusion, may fairly challenge the possession of this characteristic.

It is built up from the beginning on the fundamental basis of all social life, namely, obligation co-equal with privilege, and privilege co-equal with obligation fulfilled.

This principle applied to the internal life of a nation puts harmony in the place of discord. It replaces the rivalries and antagonisms of mutually opposed classes

of society by common wealth and similar interests. Instead of division it produces concord; for partizanship and strife it substitutes unity of object and identity of means. It supersedes revolution by stability; uncertainty by permanency; the dissolution of society by its establishment and safety. It delivers a country from being a prey to paroxysms of well-grounded but terrible apprehensions, and gives in their stead the tranquil repose of certain security and domestic peace.

Applied to defence it equalizes the burden and distributes the weight. In fact, it so completely changes the aspect of that dreadful problem, that such terms are felt to be no longer applicable. That which it perplexes statesmen and legislatures to provide by complex and artificial ingenuity, becomes the ordinary incident of manhood; the natural consequence of the well-being of the state. Instead of defence being extraneously provided and ingeniously applied to the community from without, as if it were a foreign and independent thing and a separate element to its ordinary existence, it literally grows with the nation's growth; spreads with its increase; expands with its prosperity; and is an inseparable and indissoluble portion of its being.

Applied to an empire, it unites its parts in a firm, secure, and perfect bond. A bond, reasonable and intelligible, and which leaves room for every right sentiment, for every motive of feeling and affection, but which shuts out all others absolutely. Before the more than magical influence of its power, questions of

strife, jealousies, divisions, and the arts of agitation must needs be hushed and die away. Justice is the measure meted to all. Each man, and each section in the community becomes possessed exactly of the influence which is his or its due, that which attaches to the share they severally bear in discharging obligations and fulfilling duties in the state. It provides home rule and central authority at the same time. The presenters of contributions from provinces of the empire become the council of the imperial state.

It solves the seeming difficulties of what is called colonial defence. Where there is no population and consequently no tillage and no means of procuring transport and supplies, an enemy cannot long remain, and has but little inducement to come. Where there is population it can defend—and can defend effectively—the territory necessary to its occupation in time of war. The mutual bond between portions of the same empire, established by the practice of this principle, would render them parts of one people. It would effectually extend protection to the farthest limits of an assailed position.

Wherever, and however, the enemy might be drawn on to establish himself in scantily peopled, and all but empty regions; if he sought to overwhelm a peopled and protected district by a constant and overpowering flow of numbers, he would be liable to utter extermination by extraneous descents upon his bases of operation and his lines of communication.

By providing effective land and coast defence, and

by forming this effective nucleus of protecting force in all possessions of the United Kingdom abroad, it serves to shew the value and the necessity of the freedom of the fleets of England. These are needed to be the instrument of communication to her most distant possessions, and to maintain inviolable her highways on the ocean.

Above and before all, perhaps, it strips the pretences of selfishness bare. It tears off the masks under which the arrogance, vanity and ambition of partizans, politicians, place hunters, and adventurers are now hidden. The state would be ruled by those who bear its burdens, not by the empirics who make those burdens. A man possessed of the lofty ambition of benefitting the state and of prominently sharing in its rule, would have to give evidence of his fitness by qualifying himself to discharge the larger share in its obligations. A standard of obligation attached to every description of privilege, and an increase in privilege attainable by an increase in obligation discharged, would open the pathway of honorable ambition to all; but it would very speedily bring to light hollow and impudent pretensions.

The restoration of the independence of the Sovereign in Council, but the limitation of the privy council to executive functions;—the formation of a tribunal imperial in fact rather than in name only, and its limitation to functions of legislation;—the limitation of the times and purposes of assembly of the highest tribunal that can be convoked to occasions of special emergency and matters of extraordinary import;—the conduct

of every matter dependent on elections on the principle of influence in proportion to duty discharged ;—real responsibility of life and property attached to the discharge of national trusts, seem indispensable, if England is to be arrested in a downward course and to be saved from the perils of revolution, the throes of disorder and perhaps the jaws of death.

If it seem much to hope that these restorations may be effected. If there is much to discourage hope, so there has been in every age and all times much to discourage, and little reason for anticipating the triumph on earth of any right cause ; yet the victories of truth have been gloriously fought for and won in England, and been maintained through many a generation. To him who believes the cause of right to be the cause of One who rules over all from the beginning, there is one token of very great encouragement and full of hope. When the alliance of every shade of infidelity and unbelief was proclaiming the avowed intention of still farther shaking those national ties between religion and rule, which cause the recognition of the Godhead, the nation has been startled into an act of faith, and has evinced that recognition in its highest purport : in earnest, sincere, humble and loving supplication, in access to the Godhead, and in human fellowship and sympathy with sorrow and trial. It did not stop to remember its divisions, nor delay to split hairs with cold-bloodedness. The heart of the nation was bowed almost as the heart of one man with personal sorrow and individual

humiliation. The danger threatening the beloved prince, son of a sovereign beloved, revealed the real temper of the nation, and re-awakened the exercise of faith.

Treason and impiety have been uttering their villanious threats: "No God, no king,"—had become the watchword of a set more evil and more reckless than even party spirit ordinarily presents; but where He, to whom belong the issues of life and death, made it evident by whose mercy alone our blessings are enjoyed, and how easily that which men threatened to overturn and to treat as of no value, might be taken from them by a Higher hand; they recoiled with loathing and disgust from every fellow-worker in the purposed crime, with an earnestness that leaves room to hope it may be followed up by entrance on a new career that may yet frustrate the designs of the revolution, and restore order and stability to the institutions of the realm. How long it is since an act of national humiliation had taken place. Had one been enjoined by authority no doubt it would have been cavilled at, and perhaps made an occasion of offence rather than amendment. Political agitators would quickly have traded on class prejudices. Many recent events in European nations have called loudly enough for such humiliations; but Denmark, Austria and France, seem to have turned their thoughts to human prowess only, as the means of averting the disasters that befell them. Even the churches in England and Ireland looked on in blank dismay, when the

dishonouring and spoiling of the church in Ireland, and the extinction of the national union of those churches was in contemplation and in action. They looked for human aid, They made remonstrance; but no corporate supplication rose before the throne of grace that the nation might be saved from disavowing God as Ruler over all lands. In all these cases the catastrophe took place. Prussia was conspicuous as an exception. Fear of France, whom she was about to destroy, was indeed the profession of her rulers, and the administrative act may not have been above suspicion; but the personal piety of many of her subjects is placed beyond question by the inspiration of their songs. However, this may have been, the humiliation and the acknowledgement of dependence were hers and hers exceptionally: the triumph and the victory are hers alone.

The threatening peril to the monarchy in the person of her future king roused England from her long dull apathy. When human power could be of no avail, *she* KNEW *where to fly for succour*. Neither will nor knowledge were wanting. Her humiliation did not stay for formal word or regular injunction. Gaiety and amusement dropped out of hearts that had no room except for sympathy and sorrow.

Her prayer was wonderfully heard.

How completely other hope had failed is evidenced by words speaking of the impending blow as having, it might be, already fallen when judges on their circuits

spoke of the prince's state. It is seen in the letter accompanying the set form of prayer.

The prayer that makes its special petition the occasion for beseeching a continuance to the nation of the Light by which alone it knows "the Father of mercies and the God of all comfort, the only help in time of need," asks for much more than even the life most precious to the nation.

Without the knowledge of Eternal Truth whither would the nation have looked for help ?

The conflict of the future is for the preservation of Light and Truth. If a generation trained in that knowledge takes it away, what will the children do ?

"It is impossible to imagine,"* were words spoken in Westminster Abbey, "a more striking tribute to the "sometimes forgotten and disparaged truth of the "supremacy of the English Crown. . . . Amidst "all their dissensions and party strifes, they were "Englishmen first and foremost."

When this creates astonishment, will it continue ?

And in another place :†—

"Beyond the horizon of medical science lies a "reserve of Divine possibilities, which, while making "use of science and acting in harmony with known "material laws, may, in answer to the united supplica- "tions of a people, evoke into existence new forms of

*The Dean.

†The Rev. D. Moore, Holy Trinity, Paddington.

“remedial agency, and vindicate the title of Him that
“sitteth in the heavens as ‘the God that heareth
“prayer.’ . . . We call ourselves a loyal people,
“and never has there been a more outspoken and well-
“timed demonstration of our loyalty. It seemed as if
“by one fervent and simultaneous outburst of sympathy
“with the Throne and its sorrows, we had determined
“to reduce to the level of their own insignificance
“those small persons who would fain try their
“’prentice hands at mending upon monarchy. Then
“let our loyalty be religious; let our patriotism be
“Christian.”

If in the warning He has sent and in the mercy He has vouchsafed, it has been the purpose of Him, who is more ready to hear than we to ask, and is wont to bestow more than we entreat, to fulfil all our petition and to prolong to the nation the knowledge of His Name, the sanctuary of His refuge and the prolonging of days of tranquility, then may England indeed return with thankful rejoicings to the song of her national anthem and forget the unhappy and momentary substitution in its stead of ribald revolutionary rubbish.

In the old language of the kingdom was a word that in a single sound signified right, straight, law, justice, privilege, duty and obligation. One could not be named without the other. The utterance was inseparable, as the things in their nature are and as they ought to be in practice. They are God's ordinance.

The Giver and the gift appear in the motto of our princes. The word is DROIT, the giver—God, the motto “Dieu et mon droit.” Long may they continue to be revered in England and the country, happy in free service to both God and the king, rejoice in the full possession and tranquil assurance of true DEFENCE.

THE END.

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